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Introduction
In Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County,' Lycoming County ("Lycoming") prevailed on review of the District
Court's2 order of dismissal. The facts essentially were uncontroverted
and established discriminatory3 pricing adopted to ease the flow of
exogenous solid waste4 into Lycoming's publicly-owned landfill. In a
decision of first impression, the Third Circuit followed a recent
trend' in landfill jurisprudence and found Lycoming's landfill operations "market participant" in character. As such, Lycoming's pricing
scheme escaped traditional dormant Commerce Clause review despite conduct discriminating against foreign commerce.'
The market participant doctrine is at once both an abandonment of traditional dormant Commerce Clause balancing and an
adoption of a narrow exception for a particularized form of stateimposed interstate commercial "burden" warranting reduced judicial
apprehension. Central to the doctrine is: (1) a heightened concern
for state sovereignty when a state distributes to its residents resources they have combined to produce; and (2) a lesser potential to
encroach upon dormant Commerce Clause values of national unification and free trade when a distribution takes this form. What is crucial is that these reasons coalesce in defense of the doctrine's applicability in a concrete factual setting. This Article will consider
whether the market participant doctrine adequately safeguards established constitutional values and, more particularly, whether the
I. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
2. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa.
1988).
3. Discrimination in waste disposal inheres when a pricing scheme affords differential
treatment based not on physical content, but on the geographical origin of waste. See City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (statutory ban on the importation of
almost all exogenously-derived waste).
4. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") offers a suitable definition
for solid waste: "any garbage, refuse, sludge, . : and other discarded material." 42 U.S.C. §
6903(27) (1982).
5. See infra note 298.
6. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 248-49 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
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Swin court faithfully applied the doctrine.
After the factual dispute and the District Court and Circuit
Court holdings are recounted in Part I, Part II traces the emergence
of the market participant doctrine through an analysis of Supreme
Court precedent. Part III distills the core constitutional values implicated by the dormant Commerce Clause. The conclusions serve as
benchmarks against which the propriety of the market participant
exception will be gauged. Part IV harmonizes the constitutional values distilled in Part III with market participant precedent set forth
in Part II. Part IV then concludes the constitutional analysis by setting forth the contours of the market participant/regulator test in a
manner depicting: (1) that heightened concerns for state sovereignty
do exist when a state distributes to its residents resources they have
combined to produce; and (2) that when a distribution takes the
form of market participation, values of national unification and free
trade are encroached to a lesser degree. What will emerge is a test of
market participation which is true to the constitutional values protected by the dormant Commerce Clause and the values of federalism contained within the Constitution. Part V applies these principles to the Swin decision. Finally, Part VI concludes the Article with
a review of recent decisions and recent congressional activity.
I.

The Swin Decision

A.

Factual and ProceduralHistory

Appeal was taken by Swin Resource Systems, Inc. ("Swin") to
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit assigning error in the
District Court's order of dismissal. On review, the court accepted as
true all well-pleaded allegations advanced in Swin's complaint and
7
all reasonable inferences therefrom.
Swin is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of
business in Columbia County, Pennsylvania. At the time of trial,
Swin owned and operated a solid Waste processing facility. Operations included the acceptance of solid waste primarily from eastern
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, subsequent processing and sale of recyclables, and final transportation to landfills of 'waste that could not
be salvaged. 8 Swin began operations on the premise that all unsalvageable waste would continue to be accepted at the Lycoming
7. Id. at 247 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
8. Complaint at 5, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (No. 87-1565).
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landfill' - a business decision influenced by factors such as proximity, cost, and the national scarcity of landfill disposal capacity. 10
Lycoming County is a political subdivision of Pennsylvania. Initially, and prior to the construction of its landfill, Lycoming secured
from the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, a
30-year permit to occupy a 130-acre parcel of land for use as a pub-

lic landfill." The parcel is situated on the Federal Prison Camp Reservation, Allenwood, Pennsylvania." Lycoming also applied for and

received a grant from the Appalachian Regional Commission to aid
in the construction and operation of the proposed landfill facility.13

Landfill operations formally began in 1978."
B.

The Dispute

On March 6, 1986, a date prior to Swin's operations, the
Lycoming County Solid Waste Department (the managing body of

the Lycoming landfill) verified by letter that it would accept solid
waste from the Swin facility "at a price range of $10.00 per ton...
[or] somewhere in [that] range, but [the price] may require readjustment . . . because we are presently working on a rate study
which is not completed . . . . This price range is for the 52 County
service area only . ... ,, Lycoming's rate structure assigned different disposal costs ("tipping fees") depending upon the waste genera-

tion/collection area. The cost per ton for disposal was either $10.00,
$13.25, or $17.20 depending on whether the solid waste was generated within Lycoming County, within a specified 5/2 county area, or
from outside the specified 5V2 county area, respectively. 6 For reasons
not stated in the record, from November 1986 to September 14,
1987, Lycoming charged Swin the rate for waste collected within the
9. Swin's solid waste processing permit was issued upon representation that all processed
solid waste would be deposited at the Lycoming landfill consistent with Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") regulations. Id.
10. Id. at 6, 9.
11. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
. 12. Statutory authority for the issuance of permits to occupy federal lands is provided at
43 U.S.C. § 931(c) (1982) and 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(I) (1990). In full consideration for the use of
such lands, Lycoming agreed to accept, at no charge, all wastes from both the U.S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, PA, and the Federal Prison Camp, Allenwood, PA. Complaint, exhibit C, 1
15, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(No. 87-1565).
13. The Appalachian Regional Commission grant totalled $1,300,000. Compliant at 9,
Swin (No. 87-1565).
14. Swin, 883 F.2d at 247.
15. Complaint, exhibit E, Swin (No. 87-1565) (letter from Wayne Alexander, General
Manager, Lycoming landfill).
16. Id. at 7-10.
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In March 1987, however, Lycoming instructed

Swin that, until a new field became operational, Swin would have to
limit disposal to 100 tons per day - one-third of Swin's production. 8 In September 1987, Lycoming simultaneously increased the
rate for waste collected outside the 51/2 county area. to $30.00 per ton

(leaving the other rates intact), changed Swin's status to a "non-51/2
county area disposer," and limited Swin's disposal to 100 tons per
day indefinitely.

9

Consequently, Swin could no longer economically

utilize the Lycoming landfill and discontinued all shipments made to
the site."0
C.

Swin's Allegations and Disposition

The District Court dismissed Swin's Commerce Clause arguments on evidence that Lycoming was a market participant.2 1 In reviewing the lower court's finding of market participant status 22 as a

matter of law, the Third Circuit began its inquiry by addressing an
issue expressly reserved by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.23 The issue was whether a state (or a political
subdivision) may restrict to state residents access to state-owned or
state-produced resources.24 Distinguishing Philadelphia, the Court
of Appeals considered Lycoming's landfill operations more akin to
"market participation" in the market for disposal services than to
"market regulation" of the private landfill or waste disposal market. 25 The court found Lycoming's conduct narrowly circumscribed
17. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). At such time, Swin was receiving waste from New
Jersey.
18. Id. at 248.
19. Id. at 247-48.
20. Research by the author disclosed the fact that Swin later arranged to ship its solid
waste to other Pennsylvania landfills and landfills located in Indiana, Ohio, and West Virginia,
at an overall transportation cost increase of approximately 250%.
21. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (M.D.
Pa. 1988).
22. Precedent articulating the market participant doctrine is set forth infra Part II. It is
not necessary at this juncture to understand the intricacies of the market participant doctrine;
this Part seeks only to set forth the District Court and Circuit Court holdings in a general
sense.

23. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Philadelphia was a case where New Jersey, in an effort to
conserve its already short supply of landfill space, legislated to prohibit the import of nearly all
exogenous solid waste. The statute was protectionist on its face and in effect, for it "imposed
on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving thc State's remaining landfill
space." Id. at 627.
24. The PhiladelphiaCourt was careful to qualify its holding and expressed no opinion
as to the constitutionality of New Jersey entering the "landfill market" through the expenditure of state funds. Id. at 627 n.6.
25. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 88:1 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir.
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in both scope and effect and, therefore, well within the realm of permissible "proprietary" activity sanctioned by the market participant

doctrine. 2' The pricing scheme applied only to those using the
Lycoming facility.2 7 The operations of other public and private landfills within the State were unaffected.
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether "there [was]
some special rule to be applied to a state's effort to harbor a scarce
natural resource" 2 8 otherwise cautioning application of the market
participant exception. The court underscored the unfairness of allowing a state preferential access to its natural resources. 2 9 At the
same time, by defining "natural resource" narrowly, the court found
it unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine should extend to par-

ticipation in the market for natural resources."0 In sum, the court
felt convinced that Lycoming had not "hoarded" natural resources
like natural gas, coal, crude oil, etc., which by their very nature are
available purely as a matter of happenstance and, thus, peculiar to

each state."'
1. The Dissent.-Chief Judge Gibbons found little desirable in
the market participant doctrine and quite vividly referred to the doctrine's announcement as "a peculiar eruption of Dixieism . . . a pe-

culiar manifestation of the 'new federalism' run amok; states rights
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
26. In October 1986, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources revised
the Lycoming County Solid Waste Management plan, noting: "The Lycoming County Landfill
does have the disposal capacity for an expanded municipal and industrial waste service area
well in excess of the required ten year planning period established by the Pennsylvania Solid
Waste Management Act." Complaint at 7, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County,
678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (No. 87-1565). Moreover, the Third Circuit Court assumed that the landfill had sufficient capacity to serve the needs of both the 5 county area
and Swin for the duration of the 30-year permit. Swin, 883 F.2d at 257.
In such a situation, one might expect a competitive business to charge a price maximizing
current returns rather than pricing established purchasers out of the market. Business motives,
however, have an individualistic dimension and a pricing decision that fails to maximize shortterm gains may allow a business to remain competitive in the long term. Forecasted capacity is
simply one variable that may enter into a pricing scheme; future scarcity and local goodwill
each may counsel for prudence in the short term. As a result, to say that Lycoming was acting
less like a private market participant (like a private landfill operator) is to disregard the fine
balance of competing business motivations held by both public and private concerns.
27. Research by the author uncovered a DER survey indicating that as of December 15,
1989, there were 71 municipal waste landfills operating in Pennsylvania. The extent to which
their rates were competitive with Lycoming's, or whether they would have accepted Swin's
waste, in whole or in part, is unknown.
28. Swin, 883 F.2d at 251.
29. Id. at 251-52.
30. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251-54 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
31. Id. at 254.
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in drag." 32 Name-calling notwithstanding, the Chief Judge illustrated, perhaps incorrectly, some of the more salient features of the
doctrine and, at the same time, distinguished the case on the merits
from market participant precedent.
Chief Judge Gibbons' dissent began by drawing a doctrinal parallel between the overruled case of National League of Cities v.
Usery3" and Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,3" the latter being
the seminal case of market participation. Owing to the fact that both
cases were decided by the Supreme Court on the same day and by
the same majority,3 5 and that each involved a Commerce Clause attack, the domino effect appeared to be compelling the Chief Judge.
Moreover, the notoriously unworkable traditional/nontraditional distinction espoused in National League of Cities and rejected by the
Court in Garcia was found by Chief Judge Gibbons to share some
common characteristics with the market participant/regulator distinction proposed by the market participant exception.3 6
On the merits, the dissenting judge perceived Lycoming's preferential rate schedule as an attempt at "regulating downstream"
outside the narrowly-defined market in which Lycoming had a proprietary interest.3 7 Specifically, the rate structure was seen as enabling Lycoming to reach - in a manner akin to regulation - into
the private economic relationships of its trading partners, i.e., Swin's
transactions with its New Jersey waste suppliers.38
And so the story goes for Swin. Not only did the Third Circuit
find the activity of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania more analogous to that of a market participant than a
market regulator, the court also conferred market participant status
in a case where a significant component of the participant's market
operations involved land, the quintessence of a natural resource. The
propriety of these conclusions forms the central theme of this
Article.
32. Id. at 257, 262 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
33. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
34. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
35. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart comprised the
plurality in National League of Cities with Justice Blackmun concurring. These five Justices
formed a majority in Alexandria Scrap.
36. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 257-58, 260-62
(3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
37. Id. at 259-60.
38. Id. at 259.
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II.

The Market Participant Doctrine: A Case Approach

The market participant doctrine was formally announced by the
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 9 The doctrine
creates an exception whereby state "market participant" activity is
not subject to the federal constitutional limitations placed on state
"regulation" affecting interstate commerce. In the wake of Alexandria Scrap, the infant market participant doctrine has received further refinement by the Supreme Court in three cases. Part II examines each of these market participant cases in order to lay an
analytical framework for the remainder of the Article. For those
more familiar with market participant precedent, Part II ends with a
review of the lessons taught by these cases.
A.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.4

At issue in Alexandria Scrap was a Maryland statute aimed at
eliminating the growing aesthetic problem of abandoned automobiles
("hulks") within the State."1 The statute was designed to create an
incentive for hulk removal by providing a bounty to be paid to local
and out-of-state scrap processors for each Maryland-titled automobile scrapped., 2 The statute was later amended to include a relaxed
documentation requirement for local processors."3 This amendment
served as an incentive for haulers to deliver hulks to Maryland
processors."
Finding a "precipitate decline" in the number of eligible hulks
moving in interstate commerce,' both the District Court and the
Supreme Court conceded that the practical effect of the amendment
was substantially similar to the effect that would have been produced
if Maryland had completely withdrawn participation by out-of-state
processors in the bounty program."' The District Court invalidated
the statute under the Pike test of dormant Commerce Clause review.' 7 The Supreme Court reversed and stated in unequivocal terms
that this simply is "not

. .

merce Clause is concerned."
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

. the kind of action with which the Com8 Thus

setting forth what later would be

426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796-800.
Id. at 800-01.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 800 (1976).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 801-02, 803 n.13.
Id. at 804. See infra text accompanying note 141 for the Pike test formulation.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 805.
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referred to as the "market participant exception," Justice Powell
first distinguished a line of cases decided under dormant Commerce
Clause review:"9
The common thread of [cited dormant Commerce Clause cases]
is that the State interfered with the natural functioning of the
interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which
it may occur. Instead, it has entered the market itself to bid up
their price. There has been an impact on the interstate flow of
hulks only because . . . Maryland effectively has made it more

lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose of their hulks in
Maryland.5
The Court appreciated the burden on interstate commerce, but
continued:
We believe, however, that the novelty of this case: is not its presentation of a new form of "burden" upon commerce, but that
appellee should characterize Maryland's action as a burden
which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect. The
Clause was designed in part to prevent trade barriersthat had
undermined efforts of the fledgling States to form a cohesive
whole . . . [b]ut until today the Court has not been asked to

hold that the entry by the State itself into the market as purchaser .

. .

creates a burden upon that commerce if the State

restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the
State. 1
What is apparent from the Court's reasoning is that the distribution of state largesse in a manner analogous to the private
purchase of an article of interstate commerce cannot be equated
with "trade barriers" of the type forbidden by the Commerce
Clause-despite a pronounced effect on the flow of interstate commerce. Significantly, there was nothing apart from the free market
49. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona requirement
that locally-grown fresh fruit be packed in-state before interstate shipment); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (denial of a state milk license on grounds that
interstate shipment would adversely affect local competition and supply); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South Carolina requirement that shrimp boats fishing off-coast must
dock, pay local taxes, and package locally-seined shrimp prior to interstate transport); FosterFountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (statutory requirement that locally-seined
shrimp be shelled and beheaded within state prior to interstate transport); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (West Virginia statute demanding satisfaction of local
natural gas orders before service to outside markets).
50. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 807-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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response to Maryland's incentive that impeded the natural flow of
interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court permitted Maryland to
prefer local processors as recipients of a subsidy funded through the
State's treasury. 2
B. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake"
Reeves presented the Court with the issue of whether a state,
acting as a discriminatory seller of goods in interstate commerce,
might find refuge in the newly-articulated market participant rule.
As a product of South Dakota's then-prevailing Progressive political
movement, in 1919 the State adopted plans for the construction and
operation of a cement production facility.5 4 The facility was successful and regularly supplied both local and out-of-state cement demand.55 Unfortunately, 1978 was a- bad year for plant production.
Unable to meet current demand, the South Dakota Cement Commission, as governing body of the state-owned facility, felt constrained to "reaffirm[] its policy of supplying all South Dakota customers first." 56 As a result, Reeves, Inc. had its trucks turned away
and, unable to find a substitute supplier, was forced at one point to
cut production by 76%."
Noting that the Commerce Clause "responds principally to state
taxes and regulatory measures impeding private free trade in the national marketplace," the Court began by stating that the basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between states as market participants and states as market regulators "makes good sense and
sound law." 58 Thereafter, the Court resumed where Alexandria
Scrap left off, yet continued on a much broader course bottomed on
notions of state sovereignty and the proprietary nature of the state's
market activity, not on rigid notions of "free trade" and "the natural
functioning of the interstate market" as seen in Alexandria Scrap.
Thus, the Court resisted the dissent's plea to cabin the exception to
those instances where the state participated in the market without
directly impeding the flow of interstate commerce.50
52. Id. at 810.
53. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
54. Id. at 430-32, 446 & nn. I, 19.
55. Id. at 432. Between 1970 and 1977, approximately 40% of the plant's output was
sold to out-of-state concerns. Reeves, Inc., a Wyoming based corporation, purchased about
95% of its cement from the South Dakota facility. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 433.
58. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980).
59. Justice Powell argued in his dissent for the Court to remain true to the Commerce
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The majority embraced a more deferential view toward state

market participation partly in recognition of a state's sovereign role
"as guardian and trustee for its people.""0 Notions of state sovereignty counseled in favor of restraint not only in the belief that the
states retained some degree of sovereign discretion to decide with
whom to deal when distributing their largesse, but also with respect
to the federalist notion that to discourage similar state initiatives
would jeopardize the creativity necessary to serve local needs "by
rob[bing] [the State] of the intended benefit of its foresight, risk,
and industry."'" In response to a claim of protectionism, the Court
found the South Dakota preference protectionist "only in the sense
that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who
fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve
... . [W]hile perhaps 'protectionist' in a loose sense, [the prefer-

ence] reflect[s] the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of
state government - to serve the citizens of the State. 62
Clause and the value it places on the natural functioning of the interstate market safeguarded
by the "second step" in Alexandria Scrap, i.e., whether the program "constitutes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 450-51 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976)). The majority found no benefit to be gained in
distinguishing between types of burdens and resolved that the "two step" analysis "collapse[s]
into a single inquiry: whether the challenged 'program constitute[s] direct state participation
in the market.'" Id. at 435 n.7 (citation omitted).
The dissent found South Dakota's program representative of a type of "burden" hostile to
established Commerce Clause values because it acted directly as a barrier to the flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 452-53. See also Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 803 n.13 (noting that
the Maryland amendment does not accomplish its burdensome effect directly). According to
Justice Powell, apparently it was the "ancillary" or "indirect" burden suffered by the Maryland subsidy that made it a "burden" not intended to be made suspect by the Commerce
Clause. Id.
As a practical matter, one might perceive this argument as curious since the impact on
the flow of interstate commerce in Reeves is indistinguishable from that in Alexandria Scrap.
See supra text accompanying note 46; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-4, 6-5, at 408 (1988) (pre-1938 Commerce Clause jurisprudence tolerating
state regulations burdening commerce "indirectly," as opposed to "dircctly," rejected as overly
conclusory and misleadingly imprecise). Added to this might be the comment that both programs discriminated facially against interstate commerce. The Maryland program discriminated by offering differential documentation requirements depending upon the processor's residence; the South Dakota program discriminated by selling exclusively to local concerns.
However, to give Justice Powell his due, perhaps he was making the point that there are degrees of facial discrimination and South Dakota's discrimination acted more overtly as a "barrier" to trade, whereas Maryland's discrimination was more subtle, allowing market forces to
adjust the flow of commerce to the benefit of local processors. Justice Powell cannot be criticized for merely appreciating that refusals to deal may endanger, to a greater extent, national
unification goals. See generally infra Part Ill. Owing to their more direct or ostensible nature,
one can reasonably argue that trade refusals are more prone to be seen as purposeful discrimination and, thus, are more likely to incite interstate resentment and retaliation.
60. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (citing Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (quoting
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903))).
61. Id. at 441, 446.
62. Id. at 442.
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The most roundly criticized justification offered in defense of
the market participant doctrine is illustrated by the Court's countenance of the similarities shared between public and private market
participants.6" Finding that state proprietary activities often may be
"burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants," and owing to the "long recognized right of the trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom he
will deal . . . [and the] similarities [between] private businesses and

public entities functioning in the marketplace[,]" the Court felt
"[elvenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States
should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints
"64

What is perhaps most intriguing about the Reeves decision is
the Court's response to the claim that South Dakota was "hoarding"
a natural resource, viz., cement. The Court reviewed precedent supporting petitioner's claim, yet found the cement in Reeves sufficiently
dissimilar from natural resources such as coal, timber, wild game, or
minerals the hoarding of which had been assailed previously under
the Commerce Clause.65 As a result, by defining cement as lying
63. See. e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(denouncing the analogy as a pretense because states cannot be presumed to behave like private enterprises); William Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participantsin
Solid Waste Disposal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?,
18 ENVTL. L.J. 779, 809 (1988) (admonishing the Court for embracing the analogy without
first considering the extreme inequality derived from the state participant's inherent competitive advantage); Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine,
22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 559, 607-08 (1990) ("Even the basic concept - government as non-government - is oxymoronic fiction."); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate
Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 487, 506 (1981) (suggesting that the sovereign trader/private
trader analogy disregards that states often are motivated by "noneconomic political influences"
and that the evenhandedness rationale begs the question of why a state should have the same
freedoms as private businesses); Jonathan Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79
GEO. L.J. 567, 575-76 (1991) [hereinafter Geo. Note] ("The rationale behind the exception is
that when a state is participating in the market, its role is analogous to that of a private firm,
and therefore the state should be allowed to choose with whom it wants to do business.")
(footnote omitted); Arlene Warden, Comment, The Disposition of State-Owned Resources
Under the Commerce Clause, 212 Hous. L. REV. 533, 551 (1984) (finding the market participant doctrine "predicated on a theory that the state, when acting in a proprietary capacity,
can be analogized to a private business and hence should be accorded the same freedom from
constitutional restraints that businesses enjoy") (emphasis added). But see Stephanie Landry,
Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of the MarketParticipant Doctrine from State Purchases and Sale of Goods and Services to Natural Resources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 515, 537 (1985) (observing that while the Court has analogized the state to a private actor, the Court has not "equated" the state with a private actor).
64. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39, 439 n.12 (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
65. Id. at 443-44. See infra sources cited at note 73 denouncing state "hoarding." Un-
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outside traditional natural resources doctrine, the Court was able to
skirt the issue of whether a state may preferentially distribute stateowned natural resources under the rubric of market participation.
The Court did, nonetheless, bolster its reasoning in support of the
South Dakota program in a manner suggesting doctrinal limitations
of general applicability which should enlighten the analysis in a nat66
ural resources context.
C.

White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,

Inc.67
In White, the Supreme Court was faced with an executive order
issued by the Mayor of Boston requiring, inter alia, that each con-

struction project funded in whole or in part with city funds include a
workforce comprised of at least 50% bona fide Boston residents. 68 In
practice, the order required private construction fir'ms seeking a public contract to hire, preferentially, Boston residents to fill 50% of the
positions on a project. 69 The distribution of approximately $54 million was affected, $34 million of which was federally funded through
the Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) program (the ballike natural resources fortuitously located in a particular state, the Court found market participant status proper by characterizing cement as the "end product of a complex process whereby
a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials" not unique to South Dakota. Id.
at 444.
It is important to recognize that in each of the natural resources cases cited, the Court
was presented factually with state regulatory conduct either eliminating or otherwise burdening interstate commerce in the state's natural resources. Id. at 443. The foundation, however,
upon which the market participant exception rests denies market participant status where state
regulatory conduct is found. Perhaps this explains the Court's reluctance to announce a blanket exception for natural resources, for it would be misplaced to rely wholly on a doctrine
borne of regulatory overreaching as authority for carving out an exception for those situations
involving what necessarily must be non-regulatory state activity.
66. Id. at 444. In support of its holding, the Reeves Court commented on what South
Dakota had not done, suggesting, in a general sense, concerns that may be implicated if and
when a natural resource is at issue:
South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other
materials used to make cement. Nor has it restricted the ability of private firms
or sister States to set up plants within its borders. Moreover, petitioner has not
suggested that South Dakota possesses unique access to the materials needed to
produce cement . . . [n]or has South Dakota cut off access to its cement altogether, for the policy does not bar resale of the South Dakota cement to out-ofstate purchasers.
Id. at 444 & n.17 (emphasis added).
In sum, the Court appeared preoccupied with: (I) resource scarcity; (2) barriers to private
market entry, i.e., private accessibility to the "factors of production" needed to enter the market; and (3) the availability of indirect resource procurement through the secondary market.
Satisfaction of each of these removed the specter of an impenetrable trade barrier eliminating
private competition.
67. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
68. Id. at 205 & n.I.
69. Id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissening in part).
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ance representing city funds). 70
The Court, per Rehnquist, J., began by expelling any doubt left
in Reeves that impact on commerce might be relevant to a finding of
market participant status. In particular, there was no occasion to assess the burdens on interstate commerce since the Court felt that
this inquiry would be appropriate only if the state was a market regulator falling outside the exception. 7' While conceding that there
"are some limits on state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the
government transacts business[,] . . . [the majority held that]
[e]veryone affected by the order [was], in a substantial if informal
sense, 'working for the city.' ",72 The dissent, drawing upon well-settled constitutional doctrine that a state is without authority to compel private economic actors to deal preferentially or exclusively with
local residents, 7 3 found the principle equally applicable to prefer70. Id. at 212 & n.5.
71. Id. at 209-10.
72. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983).
73. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 339 (1979) (statute preventing interstate transport after a resource becomes an article of interstate commerce); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1928) (statute permitting local shrimp to be reduced to private possession at which point the state "releases its hold" and those taking shrimp
"become entitled to the rights of private ownership and the protection of the Commerce
Clause against burdensome state regulation"); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,
595-98 (1923) (West Virginia statute affording local concerns preferential purchasing rights to
state-owned natural gas supplies, to the exclusion of established out-of-state market, held to
work a serious burden on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause);
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1911) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting
the private export of natural gas held invalid since "[glas, when reduced to possession, . . . is
[a landowner's] individual property, subject to sale by him, and may be the subject of intrastate and interstate commerce"); ef City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (statute banning the importation of solid waste and having the effect of requiring local
private landfill owners to prefer - indeed, exclusively deal with - locally-derived wastes).
A passage from West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. uniquely describes the national interest
in the unfettered distribution of natural resources:
Gas, when reduced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the
land, and, when redticed to possession, is his individual property subject to sale
by him, and may be a subject of intrastate commerce and interstate commerce
....
If the States have such power [to remove from the private sector the right
to dispose of property] a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might
keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals ....
Embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state
lines . . . . [E]ach State is made greater by a division of its resources, natural
and created, with every other State, and those of every other States with it. This
was the purpose . . . of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of
the United States.
West, 221 U.S. at 255. One commentator has suggested that Pennsylvania and West are "no
longer valid because many changes have occurred in the seventy-five years since they were
decided." See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L.
REV. 131, 143-44 (1990). Mr. Johnson's view appears to be an isolated one.
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ences mandated through conditional contracting with private concerns."' Thus, the dissent considered the executive order to be a "di-

rect attempt to govern private economic relationships" by regulating
the private relationship existing between the public contractor and

his employees."'
The crux of the White decision, however, rests with the Court's

preoccupation with the source of the money used to fund affected
construction projects. Where the City expended its own funds, market participant status naturally followed. 6 By contrast, where the
order reached projects funded in part with federal funds, the Court
paused to consider the propriety of extending market participant status." Unfortunately, once again the Court was presented with facts
enabling the Justices to skirt a difficult issue. Upon close examination of the specific statutory authorization and implementing regulations, the Court was convinced that Congress had "affirmatively permit[ted] the type of parochial favoritism expressed in the order. '7 8
The issue was recast in an affirmative spending power context. Since
the distribution was directed by Congress, the negative implications
of the Commerce Clause and the market participant doctrine were
no longer relevant 7 9 Thus, the propriety of extending market participant status in those instances where funding derives either: (1) exter-

nally, without explicit direction by Congress; or (2) from private
sources, escaped judicial review.
D.

South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke8 °

Wunnicke marks not only the Court's latest examination of the
market participant doctrine, 81 it also represents the first case to deny
74. White, 460 U.S. at 217 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 218-19.
76. Id. at 214-15.
77. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 212-15
(1983). Application of the executive order to nonlocal funds derived from the UDAG program
was one factor considered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in support of its
decision against a finding of market participation status. See White: v. Massachusetts Council"
of Constr. Employers, Inc., 425 N.E.2d 346, 354-55 (Mass. 1981).
78. White, 460 U.S. at 213 n.l I (congressional purpose of program was to provide, inter
alia, opportunities for training and employment to lower-income residents in project area).
79. Id. at 213.
80. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
81. Three cases of more recent vinthge refer to the doctrine and deserve abbreviated
mention. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802-03 (1992) (noting that the State of
Oklahoma acts as a market participant when directing the purchasing decisions of a stateowned public utility); New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988)
(holding that the market participant doctrine has no application to state assessment and computation of taxes - "a primeval governmental activity"); Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould,
Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289-90 (1986) (holding that market participant doctrine has no application
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the doctrine's extension on the merits. In Wunnicke, petitioner, an
Alaskan timber producer/shipper, challenged Alaska's "primary
manufacture" requirement and its mandate that all purchasers of
state-owned timber process the timber locally prior to interstate
transport.82 Justice White, writing for a plurality of the Court, 83 rejected Alaska's contentions that: (1) the "primary manufacture" requirement was analogous, in effect, to the subsidy in Alexandria
Scrap;84 (2) Alaska simply was choosing its trading partners reminiscent of the discretion afforded South Dakota in Reeves;85 or (3)
through sanctioning a parallel "primary manufacturing" requirement with respect to federally-owned Alaskan timber, Congress implicitly, but clearly, expressed its approval of the Alaskan
preference.86
Defining the market narrowly, the plurality noted that Maryland's participation in Alexandria Scrap was limited to the scrap
market, whereas Alaska's participation in the timber sales market
"impose[d] conditions downstream in the timber-processing marin those instances where Congress has acted).
82. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 84 & nn.I, 2.
83. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined with Justice White. Justice Powell
and the Chief Justice concurred in the judgment, but would remand on the issue of market
participation. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented. Justice Marshall took no part in the
decision.
84. Alaska claimed that because it initially sold the timber at a discounted price, the
processing requirement merely effected an indirect subsidy to the local processing industry
equivalent "to the difference between the price the timber would fetch in the absence of such a
requirement and the amount the state actually receives." Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 95. Likewise,
the dissent felt that Alaska might have subsidized directly the local timber processing industry
under the rationale of Alexandria Scrap. Id. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (accepting
Alaska's argument that a downstream restriction coupled with a discounted price is but another means of providing local processors with the same benefit as a direct subsidy). The plurality, however, avoided the economic question of whether the discount on the sale of timber
demanded by the free market to process locally would produce a similar preference, i.e., a
similar "effect" comparable to a direct subsidy to the local processing industry. Instead, the
plurality focused on the extent each method influenced the private, separate economic relationships of the purchaser. Finding that South Central Timber Development, Inc. had no discretion to process elsewhere, the plurality suggested that "pure" or "unconditional" subsidies generally are less intrusive, leaving the choice to process locally with the private purchaser, not the
state. Id. at 95.
85. The dissent suggested that Alaska might have chosen to sell its timber exclusively to
those companies maintaining active primary processing plants in Alaska. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 103 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)). The plurality was quick to note that even the
freedoms of private traders are circumscribed by the antitrust laws. Id. at 98 (vertical restraints are per se illegal) (citing Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911)).
86. The plurality understood the parallel federal policy as not amounting to "a clear
expression of approval by Congress." Id. at 92. "[Flor a state regulation to be removed from
the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear."
Id. at 91.
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ket."' 87 Furthermore, the Court reiterated that Reeves "did not . . .
sanction the imposition of any terms that the State might desire,"'88
and that the terms imposed by Alaska contained three elements not
present in Reeves: foreign commerce, a natural resource,89 and restrictions on resale. 0
Synthesizing these distinctions and recognizing the limitation
suggested in White, 9 the plurality resolved that '[t]he limit of the

market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a state to impose
burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant,
but allows it to go no further." 92 In defense of its finding of market
regulation, the plurality noted that: (1) a state market participant
should have business motivations similar to those of the private
trader - motivations that seldom include concern over disposition
subsequent to sale; and (2) downstream regulations have a greater
regulatory effect than do bona fide limitations on the initial sale because, in the latter situation, the seller maintains a continuing pro-

prietary interest.9 3 Without a continuing proprietary interest, Alaska

was seen as "attempting to govern the private, :separate economic

relationships of its trading partners."94 As noted in the White dissent, 95 similar regulations of private trade have a long history of violating the dormant Commerce Clause.
E. Lessons Taught
The mere fact that the market participant doctrine was an-

nounced contemporaneously with the National League of Cities v.
Usery" decision is significant, despite the distinct constitutional ba-

ses. What is perhaps most conspicuous in each case upholding market participant activity is the judicial sanction of state-sponsored dis87. Id. at 95.
88. Id. at 96.
89. The timber in Wunnicke was certainly a natural resource, yet the plurality appeared
reluctant to rest the decision exclusively on this fact. Consequently, it remains unclear whether
the Court will support a general exception to the doctrine simply where natural resources are
implicated. Whether the Court might view differently the preferential distribution of stateowned nonreplenishing resources such as oil, natural gas, mineral3, or other geographically
scarce natural resources is not apparent from the decision.
90. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984).
91. See supra text accompanying note 72 where the mayoral order was seen as affecting
a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the City was a major participant.
92. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97.
93. Id. at 99.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 73 and text accompanying note 64 where these concerns are discussed in the White dissent and in Reeves.
96. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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crimination burdening the flow of interstate commerce. And yet, the

Court offers reassurance that there is less cause for alarm, constitutionally, when a state acts as a "market participant" rather than as a
"market regulator." Although a precise definition of the characteristics of a market participant is never provided, a few abstractions can
be offered.

Central is the Court's preoccupation with the form or means by
which a state prefers its citizens and, thereby, burdens the interstate

market. In each of the programs dubbed "market participant," the
Court highlighted the fact of state spending. 97 Whether by subsidizing local industry," purchasing a product or service in the market, 99 or selling or otherwise offering to the public a product or service,100 in each instance a local preference was made available

through the infusion of state funds. In particular, and illustrative of
the significance of state spending, the White Court went so far as to
bifurcate the judicial inquiry with respect to the source of funding.101
Wunnicke clarified that congressional approval of a preference must
be "clearly expressed" to remove a state program from the strictures
of dormant Commerce Clause review. When, however, a state is selling natural resources that it "owns,"102 the Court has hinted that it
97. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 21415 (1983) (appreciating that Boston expended its own funds when entering into construction
projects); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) (unobjectionable for a state to limit
benefits generated by state program to those who fund the state treasury); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976) (noting that Maryland's participation took the
form of a distribution of governmental largesse, the effects of which exerted an influence in the
market).
98. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (statutory "bounty" scheme making it more
profitable to process scrap automobiles locally).
99. See White, 460 U.S. 204 (executive order directing the purchase of construction
services for local project); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.
1972) (Florida statute mandating the local purchase of printing services by state agencies),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
100. See Reeves, 447 U.S. 429 (state ownership and operation of a cement producing
facility).
101. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
102. The Court has been known to distinguish between "fictional" and "nonfictional"
ownership, the former being merely "expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have the power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of natural resources." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)). In Hughes,
Oklahoma claimed an ownership interest in the minnows seined from waters held in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of Oklahoma residents. This type of "fictional" ownership should be distinguished from sovereign "nonfictional" ownership evidenced, for example,
by Alaska's ownership of oil and gas lands or the timber grown on state-owned lands. See
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 85 (1984) (timber);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 & n.l 1 (1978) (oil and gas); cf. Western Oil and Gas
Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984) (ownership of tidal and submerged lands pursuant to federal statute), affid per curiam by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985).
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might be more reluctant to extend the doctrine."' 3
The Supreme Court also has shown an indifference to the type
of state activity undertaken (traditional or nontraditional) 0 4 and the
type of burden effected (direct or indirect).10 5 Significant is the
Court's shift from the free trade/natural functioning of the interstate market theory of Alexandria Scrap to a theory more forthright
in its recognition that commerce is burdened in an analogous manner
irrespective of the type of burden. The Reeves Court relied heavily
on considerations of state sovereignty and a state's sovereign role as
guardian and trustee for its residents. It found these values wellserved by allowing states the freedom to create programs and distribute largesse as best to serve their constituencies. Denial might
discourage the risk, foresight, and industry necessary to increase the
material well-being of those the state was designed to serve. But,
perhaps most importantly, the Court found the label "protectionism"
of little help. Thus, in one sentence the greater part of all dormant
Commerce Clause cases was distinguished. Central was a belief that
the states have a heightened sovereign claim when redistributing to
their residents benefits made available through the local fisk. Indeed,
it was this characteristic seized upon in the Alexandria Scrap,
Reeves, and White cases that enabled the Justices to distinguish
market participation from that to which the "Commerce Clause
[principally] responds [-] . . .regulatory measures impeding free
private trade in the national marketplace."'' 0 6
Free trade and the national marketplace have not been ignored.
The Supreme Court has hinted that it might not be as receptive
when the form or means through which a state prefers its citizens
approaches market "regulation" either indirectly, where the extent
of the interstate burden tends toward "trade barriers '"107 or other103. See South-Central Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (existence
of a natural resource used as one factor counselling against extension of the doctrine); cf.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1980) (care taken in defining cement as lying
outside natural resources doctrine). But cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 L.S. 518, 529 (1978) (state
ownership often serves as the crucial factor in determining availability of a preference). Hicklinwas decided on privileges and immunities and not on market participant grounds.
Hesitation in extending the market participant exception to stale-owned natural resources
comes as no surprise. After all, the primary value of a state's natural resources is a product of
geological fortuity and, apart from extraction/refining costs, is conceived without the infusion
of state revenues. See generally infra Part V.B.3. for an expansion on this idea.
104. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.10 (Even apart from the traditional, states retain
,some measure of sovereign interest . . . to decide how, and with whom, and for whose benefit
to deal.").
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442.
107. Suggesting that the extent of interstate commercial burden may be relevant and

MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE

wise implicates concerns traditionally associated with state "hoarding" of natural resources, or directly, by "downstream" regulation.
With regard to state market participation approaching indirect
regulation, the Supreme Court has intimated a concern with disabling the states from doing indirectly by market participation that
which they cannot do directly by regulation. Under the Reeves rationale, there would be greater cause for alarm where: (1) there exists a strong national interest in unfettered access to a state's natural
resources due to unique state endowment; (2) a substantial share of
a state's natural resource reserves are owned by the state, limiting
the possibility of private market entry/competition; or (3) state regulation inhibits private market entry.1" 8 State market participation
accompanied by one or more of these three factors might be seen as
tantamount to state "hoarding" implicating the core values protected
by the dormant Commerce Clause.' 0 9
With regard to state market participation approaching direct
regulation, Wunnicke illustrates a judicial concern for the degree of
"downstream" burden engendered by state-imposed conditions affecting the separate, private economic relationships of a state's trading partners. In Wunnicke, the Court found "sound reasons for distinguishing between a state's preferring its own residents in the
initial disposition of goods when it is a market participant and a
state's attachment of restrictions on dispositions subsequent to the
goods coming to rest in private hands."" 0 In the latter situation, the
Court observed that the inquiry becomes aligned with firm constitucontrary to the broad statement in White finding impact on commerce relevant only after
market participant status is denied, see supra text accompanying note 71, it is noteworthy that
in no case affording market participant status has state participation raised a virtual barrier to
interstate commerce. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460
U.S. 204, 209 & nn.5-6 (1983) (noting that the "record does not readily support a finding of
'significant impact' on firms employing out-of-state residents" and that the order affects only
50 % of the workers on public projects comprising approximately 15 % of all construction contracting in Boston); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 & n.17 (1980) (offering, in
justification of South Dakota program, the continuing availability of cement through the secondary market, the ability of private firms to establish competitive facilities, and the lack of
unique access to raw materials); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10
(1976) (insisting that no trade barrier prevents the flow of hulks out-of-state). But cf generally Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1128-29 (1980) (questioning whether the interstate
burden from a massive state spending program to support the price of a local commodity
might not be greater than that resulting from a minimum price regulation designed to achieve
the same result). Professors Wells and Hellerstein find "no cogent reason ... for not inquiring
directly whether the particular action substantially affects interstate commerce." Id.
108. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444.
109. See supra note 73 and text accompanying note 64 where these concerns are discussed in the White dissent and in Reeves.
I 10. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984).
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tional precedent against state-compelled private sector preferences
for local residents and businesses."1 The question is to what extent a

state appears to be regulating, and thereby effecting the same result,
by conditioning its market transactions?" 2
The Wunnicke Court found the boundary line lying at contractual conditions having a substantial regulatory effect outside the nar-

rowly-defined market in which the state participates.11 3 The inquiry
offered is a practical one assessing: (1) the nature of the state's marketplace activity, particularly whether it resembles that of a hypothetical "private trader" and deserves similar protections from federal constraints; and (2) whether the condition takes effect

"downstream" once the state has lost a continuing proprietary interest in the subject matter of the contract."

This contributes little to

11. Id. at 99. See also supra note 73 and text accompanying note 64 where these concerns are discussed in the White dissent and in Reeves.
112. The different outcomes in Alexandria Scrap and Wunnicke illustrate that this is a
question of degree. Compare Varat, supra note 63, at 562-63 (interpreting Alexandria Scrap
as involving a conditional distribution where Maryland "offer[ed] a bonus to those who dealft]
with residents") with Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 476-77 (1989) (interpreting Alexandria
Scrap as involving an unconditional bonus available to local or foreign processors, but on separate terms, thereby inducing commercial concerns to prefer in-state processors). Professor
Varat would be quite correct in stating that the differential in terms for receiving the subsidy
"had the plain effect" of limiting the subsidy payments to Maryland processors, but Professor
Coenen seems better guided by focusing on the nature of the condition. For the private sector
timber purchaser, the Alaska condition removed all discretion to go elsewhere for processing.
See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 95. The terms of the Maryland subsidy, however, merely made it
more lucrative for suppliers to favor Maryland processors. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 & n.15 (1976). There was nothing in the Maryland ordinance to
prohibit the supplier from accepting the greater costs (assuming, perhaps too quickly, that the
costs would be greater) of dealing with non-Maryland processors and still receive the bounty.
113. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97-98. The White decision demonstrates that at times the
boundary line may be unclear. In dissent, and in an effort to cabin 1he Court's holding, Justice
Blackmun suggested that the White holding is tied to the idiosyncratic hiring methods practiced in the construction industry. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 222 & n.6 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In these circles, "many construction contractors hire a substantially different work crew
for each project they undertake." Id. at 222. There is little cause to anticipate that the preference will have continuing significance in the contractor's subsequent private contracting. More
precisely, the preferred employee most assuredly will be let go upon termination of the public
contract, whereas, if the hiring practices were ordinary, there would be more cause to believe
that the employer would keep the employee and perpetuate the preference "downstream" into
the employer's subsequent private economic dealings. If the dissent is correct in reasoning that
it was this employment practice that led the Court to find that "[e]veryone affected by the
order [was], in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city[,]' " then the mayoral
order might be said to have affected only those within the narrow market "in which the city
[was] a major participant." Id. at 211 n.7.
This view of the idiosyncratic hiring practices in the construction industry brings the hiring restraints within the "narrow market" language of Wunnicke and assures less possibility of
downstream restraints. See Coenen, supra note 112, at 467-68 (finding precedential value of
White limited to cases involving hiring by construction contractors).
114. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 98-99.
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the definition of "narrow market," yet this should come as no surprise as the Court in Wunnicke offered no definitive test. Nonetheless, "downstream regulation" can be described generally as state

market participation that restrains trade beyond the narrowly-defined market in which a state maintains a proprietary interest. In
such instances, the private trader's long-recognized right freely to
choose its trading partners is threatened1 18 and the state appears less
deserving of the benefits appurtenant to private trade. 6

Concern with downstream restraints also comments on the formalistic nature of the market participant doctrine. Where downstream regulation exists, the fact that a state might effect the same
result through direct subsidization of the targeted downstream industry has been found in no way to change the outcome.117 The
Court's reluctance to extend the doctrine to all forms of direct subsidization also signals a heightened regard for formalism." 8 Perhaps
the Court has cued into the fact that a state might do through selective, conditional subsidization that which it may not do through sales
or purchases of state-owned resources coupled with downstream restraints." 9 And, perhaps the Court understands this as presenting
115. See supra note 73 and text accompanying note 64 where these concerns are discussed in the White dissent and in Reeves.
116. See supra text accompanying note 64 where the Court speaks of "evenhandedness."; see also supra text accompanying note 92.
117. See supra note 84 where the Court rejected Alaska's contention that the cost of the
downstream restraint was roughly equivalent to what would have been the cost to secure the
same preference through direct subsidization of the timber processing industry. See also
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1984) ("We reject
the contention that a State's action as a market regulator may be upheld against Commerce
Clause challenge on the ground that the State could achieve the same end as a market participant."); White, 460 U.S. at 220-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that Boston's freedom to build projects itself accompanied by discriminatory hiring
practices in no way shelters it from the Commerce Clause when it chooses to have the work
done privately).
118. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 & n.14. (1980) (Perceiving South
Dakota as "unquestionably fit[tingJ the 'market participant' label more comfortably than a
State acting to subsidize local scrap processors[,I" the Court found it unnecessary to consider
the propriety of extending the doctrine to subsidy programs unlike the one in Alexandria
Scrap.).
119. See Coenen, supra note 112, at 476 (observing that conditional direct subsidization
creates problems similar to state sales or purchases coupled with downstream restraints and,
therefore, should receive similar judicial scrutiny). Consider, for example, a state that seeks to
bolster the competitive position of its local timber processing industry. One alternative might
be to condition the sale of state-owned timber on the "downstream" restriction that the purchaser commit to in-state processing. A second alternative might be to subsidize directly private state timber purchasers (through a flat payment) conditioned upon their committing to
local processing. One commentator has suggested that in a competitive market, the cost/preference to the state should be roughly the same in both instances. See Mark P. Gergen, The
Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1143-44 (1988) (finding downstream
restraints economically equivalent to subsidies because of a firm's reluctance to enter into a
transaction without covering increased marginal costs). According to Professor Gergen, in the
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very different problems than targeted unconditional subsidization.12
Together, these concerns counsel against bright-line rules applied
with an indifference to the form of state participation.
III. The Commerce Clause and State Preferences: National Unification and Free Trade Values
For many, the market participant precedent outlined in Part II
has aroused suspicions of economic balkanization 2 1 - the antithesis
of free trade. For others it might be viewed as "a peculiar manifestation of the 'new federalism' run amok; states rights in drag." 1"' To
be sure, the doctrine condones state-sponsored discrimination "burdening" the interstate market based, in part, ont principles of state
former alternative, one might assume a discounted price offered by the state seller equal to the
extra costs borne by the state timber purchaser necessary to perform the downstream restraint.
Under the latter alternative, the private purchaser of Alaskan timber will process locally and
receive a direct subsidy only to the extent the additional costs are covered by the subsidy.
120. Consider an unconditional direct subsidy to a state's local timber processing industry. Next, consider either a downstream restraint effecting an indirect subsidy to the same
industry, or a direct subsidy to an upstream industry conditioned on its dealing with the local
downstream industry. See supra note 119. What makes downstream restraints or conditional
subsidies more problematic derives from the differences between the unconditional and conditional nature of the transactions. With the unconditional direct subsidy, there is no guarantee
that it will result automatically in lower prices equivalent to the subsidized amount. As such,
one cannot be certain that it will produce the same magnitude of preference as would have
been produced indirectly through a discount coupled with a mandated downstream restraint,
or a direct subsidy conditioned on a local preference downstream. See Varat, supra note 63, at
562-63 (arguing that unconditional direct subsidization leaves open the possibility that the
subsidized industry may use the funds for other purposes). Significantly, the downstream restraint or the conditional direct subsidy provide certainty because they remove all discretion
from the private trader to receive the benefit without performing the local preference, thereby
solidifying the benefits to the state. See supra note 84 where the Supreme Court in Wunnicke
noted that Alaska's processing restriction narrowed the purchaser's freedom to choose its
processor in a manner more hostile constitutionally than a hypothetical, unconditional direct
subsidy to the local timber processing industry.
To allow downstream restraints or conditional direct subsidization on the assumption that
they secure a preference, i.e., affect the flow of interstate commerce, in a manner equivalent to
that obtainable through unconditional direct subsidization, would be to ignore the realities of
the free market and the unconditional nature of the subsidy. That unconditional subsidies tend
to tread less on a private trader's freedom to choose its trading partners suggests greater concern for state attempts at employing the more efficient form.
121. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 119, at 1142-43 (expressing concern that publiclyowned enterprises might displace private ones); A. Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling America's Magic Mountain, 32 U.
KAN. L. REV. I11,133 (1983) (decrying state-produced goods immunity from dormant Commerce Clause review as "without merit and . . .contrary to the interests in interstate comity"); Carol A. Fortine, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications For State
Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 601, 617 (1982) [hereinafter Geo.
Wash. Note] (finding that "Reeves exemption is flawed because, through it, a state can effectively 'isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade' ").
122. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 88.3 F.2d 245, 262 (3d Cir.
1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
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sovereignty. Therefore, as with any judicially-crafted exception, the
market participant exception must safeguard established constitutional values and eliminate the potential for states to end-run established precedent while achieving an indistinguishable result.
The courts have dealt squarely with "market regulation" in the
context of dormant Commerce Clause review. Part III will examine
the values typically associated with the Commerce Clause and its
"dormant" counterpart and, in conjunction with Part IV, will provide a constitutional framework to answer whether "[t]he basic distinction . . . between States as market participants and States as
23
market regulators makes good sense and sound law.'
Section A identifies the central values embodied in the Commerce Clause by placing the Clause in historical perspective. Section
B shifts focus to the "dormant" or "silent" component of the Commerce Clause and notes that while the core Commerce Clause values
remain the same, an accommodation of national and local interests,
with a heightened regard for state sovereignty, is compelled due to
its dormant character. The analysis continues with a case approach
depicting this judicial accommodation. Part III concludes with a distillation of the core constitutional values safeguarded by the dormant
Commerce Clause.
A.

The Commerce Clause: A Historical Perspective

The Commerce Clause proclaims that "Congress shall have the
power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States
... "" The Clause has enjoyed constitutional primacy owing
largely to the historical setting of the late eighteenth century, a setting that many attribute as the primary impetus for calling the Constitutional Convention preventing economic balkanization.12 5
Widespread commercial warfare and trade restrictions, however.,
plagued not only the economy, but the unity of the Nation as well.' 2 6
123. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
125. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 (1983) (Stephens, J., concurring) ("[T]o secure freedom of trade, to break down barriers to its free flow" was the
"central problem that gave rise to the Constitution itself.") (quoting, in part, WILEY RUTLEDGE,A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH, 25-26 (1947)); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325 (1979) (observing that for the Union to succeed, Commerce Clause must dispel tendencies
toward economic Balkanization); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533
(1949) (noting that after the Revolution, tendencies of parochial legislation threatened the
Union); see generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 259, 260 (1833).
126. Alexander Hamilton opined that the grant of the Commerce Power to Congress
was an effort to suppress the "interfering and unneighborly regulations among the several
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As such, the free trade and antidiscrimination goals of the Commerce Clause should be viewed not simply as ends in themselves, but
as a means used by the Framers to reach the goal of national
unification.
Immediately, this suggests a subordinate constitutional value
found in the preservation of free trade. To be sure, when the economy is balkanized, there can be no solidarity. But what is economic

balkanization? Economic balkanization is a phrase used to describe
an economy so clogged by customs barriers, tariffs, embargoes, quotas and regulations as to remove all semblance of a freely trading
capitalistic society. Certainly each and every impediment to the complete realization of a free market economy cannot be seen as having
the propensity toward retaliation and trade wars resulting in the
eventual balkanization of the national economy. More poignantly, to
elevate free trade and economic efficiency to the position of a "core"
constitutional value: (1) ignores the substantial discretion left with

Congress to burden the national economy;127 (2) disregards a state's
sovereign discretion to provide for its citizens despite incidental effects on trade; 12 8 and (3) subordinates that which seems to be the
more fundamental purpose of the Commerce Clause -

national

unification.'2 9
Indeed, it would be a myopic reading of the Constitution (and
the Commerce Clause) to define its core ambitions through a rigid

view of its impetus. Moreover, the preamble declares a more radical

a°

approach: "We the People . . .in Order to form a more per-

States[j" the effect of which, "if not restrained by national control," would result in "serious
sources of animosity and discord." THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed., 1961).
127. The work of Professor Eule, then at Temple University School of Law, reflects this
concern. Grounded on a history of congressional regulations burdening and restricting interstate trade and on Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate as well as
burden free trade, Professor Eule reasons that the "commerce clause thus cannot be said to
establish and protect free trade or a national marketplace as a fundamental constitutional
value." Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ.425, 434
(1982).
128. According to Professor Varat, to safeguard other constitutional values necessarily
"prevents complete realization of a national free-trade unit." See Varat, supra note 63, at 518.
It is well known that the federal structure envisioned by our Forefathers provided for the states
to retain a considerable degree of sovereign lawmaking authority. See generally infra Part
III.B. Pursuant to this discretion was a "recognition of some state power to deviate from the
apparently flat prohibition against state discrimination on the basis of residence." Varat, supra
note 63, at 520.
129. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 112, at 433 ("[T]he core goal of the commerce clause
was and is to engender national solidarity."); Varat, supra note 63, at 518 ("The antidiscrimination principle of the commerce clause . . . was designed to forestall divisions along
state lines.") (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949)).
130. More radical than the Articles of Confederation, the primary purpose of which was
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fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility . . . secure
the Blessings of Liberty . . . do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION . ... "' Suffice it to say, the grave threat of economic
balkanization was an immediate concern for many supporters of the
Commerce Clause. Others regarded economic balkanization as both
an obstacle to a national free market conducive to economic prosperity and a nation composed of "united" states. In the end, the Framers advocated a form of government incompatible with a total laissez-faire attitude toward free trade. What is paramount is that the
Framers included the Commerce Clause to insure every citizen equal
opportunity to share in the prosperity of the Nation. With this, both
values are served.
As a practical matter, Congress has wielded its Commerce
Power in a myriad of situations in response to a growing and concentrated economy; one would be hardpressed to isolate a singular value
espoused therein. Significantly, the core values might best be derived
through an examination of the restraints the Commerce Clause
places on state legislative discretion. Justice Jackson suggested this
when referring to the "negative" or "dormant" aspects of the Commerce Clause: "Perhaps even more than by interpretation of [the
Commerce Clause's] written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to
these great silences of the Constitution. 1 3 2
B.

The "Dormant" Commerce Clause and Federalism

The Commerce Clause is at once both a grant to Congress of
' 13 3
the power to regulate "Commerce . . . among the several States
and a corresponding divestment by the states to regulate the same. 4
Nowhere, however, does the Commerce Clause deprive the states
from "affecting," "burdening," or "interfering" with interstate comto secure free trade with each state retaining its core sovereignty.
131. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
132. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949); see also Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (holding that the Commerce Clause acts as a restraint on state regulatory authority even in the absence of congressional action).
133. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
134. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (concluding that
states are powerless to regulate interstate commerce even in the absence of conflicting congressional enactments). Chief Justice Taney excepted from this interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. Although his views never won general acceptance, the Chief Justice felt that where
Congress abstained from regulating, the states remained free to regulate interstate commerce.
See The License Cases, 5 How. 504, 573 (1847) (separate opinion of Chief Justice Taney); see
generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 50 (1937); TRIBE, supra note 59, § 6-3, at 405 n.6.
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merce in the absence of congressional regulation. This is not merely
a semantical difference without significance, but rather a necessary
analogue to federal authority respecting the separate existence of the

states. 3 ' Concern for the value of federalism rises in a dormant
Commerce Clause context not only because the doctrine is a judicially-imposed limit based on the "great silences" of the Constitution, but also because the Framers contemplated that the states
would retain a considerable degree of sovereign lawmaking authority. Such authority coexists with the plenary power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce."3 '
A state's sovereign rulemaking authority finds its origin in the
American federal scheme defined historically as a form of govern-

ment envisioning a compound republic with a degree of independence within the respective federal and state spheres of authority. 37
The Framers chose a decentralized form as a compromise between a
strong national government and the retention of state political autonomy.1 a8 Most notably, the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution 3 9 reflects this compromise and recognizes the indispu135. See Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989) (noting the "Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by
state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual
States within their respective spheres") (footnotes omitted); see also Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (noting that where Congress has not acted,
there is a residuum of state power to affect, or even to some extent, regulate, interstate
commerce).
136. Historically, during the rein of Chief Justice Marshall, the prevalent view was that
the Commerce Clause did not remove the states' sovereign "police" powers. See, e.g., Willson
v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829) (measures calculated to protect health
reserved to the states as long as they did not conflict with national authority); see generally
RUTH ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STATE POLICE POWER 10 (1957). The
revered case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (1851)
gave substance to this infant dormant Commerce Clause doctrine by answering why a state's
sovereign police powers were somehow special. Looking at the "nature" of the state regulation,
the Cooley Court reasoned that where regulation was "local" in character "demanding the
diversity" of the states, as opposed to "national" "demanding a single uniform rule," residents
would be provided for best "not by one system, . . . but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable to the local particularities." Id. at 319. Accordingly, Cooley furnished the states with a regulatory discretion bottomed on a policy that a
state can best fulfill its essential role in our federal system th:.ough local governance. The
protection of each citizen's particularized needs would be assured by those most familiar with
local conditions. See also supra note 128.
137. See generally Tarlock, supra note 121, at 115 & nn. 14-16 (citing secondary
sources).
138. See generally Varat, supra note 63, at 516 (1981); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos.
1, 15, 21, 22, 30, 85 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 38, 41, 42 (James Madison) for the national
view, and THE FEDERALIST Nos. 17, 31, 32, 34 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 45,
46 (James Madison) for the state sovereignty view.
139. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people .
U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
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table proposition that the states retain a "special role" in the American federal structure. The Tenth Amendment, however, leaves "unanswered the crucial questions of the scope of each regime's power
and the means for resolving intolerable conflicts."' 4 The same can
be said for the Commerce Clause, for it provides the federal government with the power to regulate interstate commerce, yet fails to
offer any guidance when Congress has not acted. In other words,
while the Constitution is explicit in establishing a continued role for
the states within the federal system, the precise nature of that role
has remained largely undefined.
Unremarkably, this omission by the Framers has left the judiciary with the unenviable task of defining the boundaries of state regulatory authority in the absence of congressional action. Tension lies
in the fact that parochial state regulation often has interstate commercial repercussions. As such, there is a potential for conflict with
the values of national unity and free trade intended to be safeguarded by vesting in Congress sole authority to regulate interstate
commerce. It is with a view of accommodating these competing values that the Supreme Court has articulated "dormant" implications
from the Commerce Clause to prevent the qualified state allowance
to "affect" interstate commerce from swallowing up the rule against
state regulation of interstate commerce.
1. Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Review.-It is within
this constitutional residuum of state authority that a modern dormant Commerce Clause test has developed - a test balancing competing state and national interests:
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits . . . . If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.''
The Pike test is an accommodation that summons the courts to review on an individual basis both the ends sought and the means used
by evenhanded state regulation burdening interstate commerce. Sig140.
141.

Tarlock, supra note 121, at 115.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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nificantly, the test presumes "evenhanded" regulation, suggesting a
two-tier approach through which the Court initially determines
whether a regulation discriminates. This is a useful conceptual
framework because the Supreme Court consistently has rebuffed

state legislative attempts that effect "simple economic protection-

ism, '"142 "facially discriminate,"14 3 or produce a "discriminatory ef142. Where "simple economic protectionism" is shown, a virtual per se rule of invalidity
will apply. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). "Simple economic protectionism" is a term used to describe a generic form of regulation - regulation that
has the purpose or effect of altering the natural flow of interstate commerce to produce a local
economic benefit at the expense of out-of-state economic concerns. See. e.g., New Energy Co.
of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (Economic protectionism inheres when regulatory measures are designed to benefit in-state economic interesti by burdening out-of-state
competitors.); J. Filiberto Sanitation v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913
(3d Cir. 1988); see generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1094-95, 1113
(1986) ("Protectionism does not merely harm some foreign interests in the process of conferring an independent local benefit. Rather, it takes away from the foreigners in order to give to
local residents exactly what has been taken away."). This "wrenching" from foreigners, perhaps more than anything else, is what makes state regulation effecting economic protectionism
so hostile.
Simple economic protectionism inheres, for instance, when a state attempts to restrict
access to its local sales market with the prospect of guarding local competition from the
greater efficiencies and lower prices of out-of-state commercial en':erprises. See, e.g., Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). In Baldwin, the State of New York set up a
system of minimum prices to be paid by milk retailers to milk producers. The statute extended
the minimum price constraints to retailers selling milk produced out-of-state. Although evenhanded in application, the New York regulation was merely a measure designed to guard local
businesses from the cheaper prices and greater efficiencies of neighboring competitors. Consistent with the definition of "economic protectionism," New York effectively neutralized a competitive advantage earned by out-of-state milk producers and conferred that advantage onto its
less efficient in-state producers. The State placed itself in a "position of economic isolation"
and this it could not do. Id. at 527.
Alternatively, and to assure a constant supply for its own residents, a state might attempt
to restrict the access of out-of-state purchasers to locally-produced goods and services. See,
e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949). In Hood, New York
enacted legislation that denied licenses to interstate distributors of New York-produced milk
on grounds that interstate distribution would be destructive to local competition. Id. at 526-29.
This regulation represented a facially discriminatory measure enacted with the avowed protectionist purpose of promoting the local competitive market by curtailing the flow of interstate
commerce. The Court, per Justice Jackson, referred to the "lack of [State] power to . . .
constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage [as] deeply rooted in both
our history and our law." Id. at 533. Plainly, to restrict the interstate operations of milk distributors was to confer a corresponding economic benefit on local milk distributors.
143. Facial discrimination of the per se invalid type is a particular type of economic
protectionism characterized by regulation that overtly distinguishes between interstate and intrastate commerce with no "reason, apart from origin, [for] treat[ing] [the articles of commerce] differently." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). In Philadelphia, the Court was content to rely on the fact that the New Jersey regulation, on its face
and in plain effect, discriminated by according foreign articles of interstate commerce differential treatment based solely upon origin. This clearly violated established principles of nondiscrimination. Id. at 627. See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800-02 (1992)
(facially discriminatory statue mandating 10% minimum purchase of Oklahoma coal by
Oklahoma utility companies); Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989) (facially
discriminatory statute applying to brewers and shippers of beer engaged in interstate commerce only); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (facially discriminatory stat-
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fect.'

144

At the same time, the Court has shown greater solicitude

where only incidental burdens on interstate commerce flow from
evenhanded, non-discriminatory legislation having no protectionist
effect. 14 5
Essential is a judicial awareness that: (1) discriminatory regula-

tion often threatens the values embodied in the dormant Commerce
Clause; (2) economic protectionism, not discrimination per se, is the

primary cause for concern; and (3) "simple economic protectionism"
is not a necessary corollary to state discriminatory legislation, but
rather is a conclusion reached only after a court is convinced that
discriminatory regulation does no more than "protect" the local
economy through redistributing to in-state economic actors a competitive advantage earned elsewhere, i.e., that there exists no legitiute prohibiting the interstate transport of locally seined minnows while leaving the intrastate
market intact); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (facially discriminatory statute limiting the importation of hazardous wastes with no legitimate reason, apart from origin, for treating the waste
differently), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
144. To confound matters even further, the Court has been known to distinguish between regulations that facially discriminate and evenhanded regulations that produce a discriminatory effect. Both, however, will meet with heightened scrutiny. See Bacchus Imports,
LTD. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984-) (recognizing that a finding of "economic protectionism" subjecting a regulation to the stricter rule may be made on the basis of discriminatory
effect) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)); see also Norfolk
Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding line of heightened scrutiny
hazy after Hunt and Bacchus, the court resolved to treat "discriminatory effect" cases as "purposeful discrimination" cases subject to heightened scrutiny).
Regulations with an impermissible discriminatory effect are those regulations that treat
interstate and intrastate commerce evenhandedly, yet confer a discriminatory benefit on local
economic actors, i.e., they effect economic protectionism indirectly. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (observing that despite
facial neutrality, where discriminatory impact on interstate commerce is shown, burden falls
on the state to defend regulation in terms of local benefits and unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (A Madison, Wisconsin
ordinance prohibited local sale of milk unless the milk first was processed and bottled at an
approved local pasteurization plant. The ordinance was found to be evenhanded in application
to Madisonians and non-Madisonians alike, yet discriminatory in effect by creating a protectionist economic barrier in favor of local industry.); cf. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (evenhanded regulation effecting economic protectionism was met with a
virtual per se rule of invalidity).
145. Where discrimination is absent, the Court will invalidate only those statutes producing incidental interstate burdens "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (minimal state interest insufficient to justify burden on out-of-state economic concern to relocate in-state). For cases where
the balance tips in favor of the state regulation, see, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (securities regulation); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449
U.S. 456 (1981) (environmental protection); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978) (regulation directed at local economy); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas
Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (measure aimed at preventing rapid depletion of natural resources);
Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (local health measure);
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (safety
measure).
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mate (nonprotectionist) basis to discriminate' 46 and/or less discriminatory alternatives are available. 47 Indeed, per se rules represent no

more than a judicial appreciation that discrimination often is accompanied by an undisclosed, yet predictable counterpart - economic
protectionism. Thus, where a regulation discriminates, a court will
invoke strict scrutiny of the state's purported interests, the degree to
which the measure serves the purported state interests, and the avail-

ability of less discriminatory alternatives.'

8

It is important to recog-

146. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, ,528-29 (1978) (finding New
Jersey unable to establish compelling health interest to support a variance from virtual per se
rule of invalidity); see also cases cited supra note 142 (particularly Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc. and H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond) and supra note 144 (particularly Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison) where state
regulation was unsupported by a compelling nonprotectionist purpose. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (Despite facial discrimination, "[a]s long as the State does not
needlessly obstruct trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,' . . . it
retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens.") (citation
omitted); but see also Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
495 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1985) (An injunction permitted continued disposal of solid waste from local
New Jersey tri-county area, but barred continued disposal of solid waste from outside limited
tri-county area. The injunction was considered a valid emergency health measure aimed at
postponing closure of an exhausted landfill.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1008 (1985).
In Maine, the Supreme Court upheld an import ban on live baitfish enacted by the Maine
legislature. Significantly, baitfish were the subject of a flourishing domestic industry that remained unaffected by. the Maine statute. Maine, 477 U.S. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding "something fishy about this case"). The statute epitomized overt facial discrimination.
It denied out-of-state commercial enterprises access to the bait market, while leaving the local
market intact. Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun, writing for an eight-member majority, explained that the Commerce Clause "does not elevate free trade above all other values . . .
[and that the State] retains broad regulatory authority to proteci the health and safety of its
citizens." Id. at 151 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Continuing, the Court held that
even overt discrimination may be justified where a state offers legitimate and particularized
reasons, apart from origin, for treating out-of-state commerce differently and where that purpose cannot be attained in a less discriminatory manner. Id. at 151-52 & n.19. In sum, the
majority was satisfied that the State carried its burden of proving that the Act was not protectionist insofar as the imported baitfish were a particular source of environmental evil to the
State's ecology.
147. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (suggesting
that discriminatory tax credit on ethanol might stand where it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be served adequately by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 & n.20 (1979) (indicating that method chosen by
Oklahoma to conserve minnows was not a "last ditch attempt at conservation" but a type
"most overtly discriminat[ing]" against interstate commerce); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (holding that Madison had available less burdensome alternative of
charging foreign distributors a local inspection fee).
148. The circuit courts have relied with increasing frequency on the availability of less
discriminatory alternatives when invalidating state regulations and county ordinances limiting
the importation of foreign wastes. Currently, there exists a conflict in the circuits. Compare
Bill Kettlewell Excavating v. Michigan DNR, 931 F.2d 413 (6th 'Cir. 1991) (import restriction
on solid waste conditioned on county approval held valid and non-discriminatory through application to both in-state (out-of-county) and foreign (out-of-state) waste transporters equally),
cert. granted sub nom., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992) with Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 939 F.2d
941 (11 th Cir. 1991) (unable to characterize the interstate burdens as "incidental," the court
invalidated a county regulation indistinguishable from that in Kettlewell under Pike analysis
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nize that the standard of judicial scrutiny differs with respect to
whether or not a court finds discrimination. The next section illustrates this differential treatment.
a. From Per Se Rules to Means/Ends Balancing: A Value
Continuum.-Four cases provide a particularly insightful contrast.
The first illustrates "simple economic protectionism" and the "virtual per se rule of invalidity." The second illustrates "effectual" eco-

nomic protectionism as found under a heightened scrutiny standard.
on grounds that the legislative purposes could have been met with less discriminatory means).
The reasoning in Kettlewell is questionable. There, the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources ("MDNR") attempted to distinguish City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978) by arguing, first, that the Michigan Solid Waste Managmenet Act ("MSWMA").
did not provide for an aboslute ban on out-of-state and, second, that it was nondiscriminatory.
Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 415. Apparently, disposal of out-of-state waste was possible with approval by the County Board of Commissioners, a two-thirds vote of the communities within the
county, and approval by the MDNR. With this, the Sixth Circuit found no discrimination:
This policy treats both out-of-county Michigan solid waste and out-side Michigan solid waste equally. If, in fact, it were alleged or proven that all counties in
Michigan, pursuant to MSWMA or MDNR direction or policy, banned out-ofstate waste, we would be facing a different and difficult problem under City of
Philadephia v. New Jersey. Instead, we are now concerned with the policy in
one Michigan county, authorized by state statute, which effectively bars importation of solid waste ....
Id. at 418. Just this term, the Supreme Court rebuffed such restrictive reasoning under dormant Commerce Clause principles:
The practical effect of [Oklahoma's] statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the
challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of the
other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State
adopted similar legislation.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491
U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). The problem with Kettlewell lies in the fact that if one county may
legally discriminate, then so too may all other counties. Kettlewell threatens the proactive
force of the dormant Commerce Clause. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a state
discriminates against interstate commerce even where some in-state concerns are burdened in
a like manner. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 & n.4 (1951); see generally
GERALD GUNTHER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277 (llth ed. 1985); Regan, supra note 142, at
1230. As for the discretionary aspects or conditional nature of the Michigan regulation, the
fact remains that Michigan counties have authority to ban the local disposal of out-of-state
waste for no reason apart from origin. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabaman
Dept' of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 717, 719-21 (lth Cir. 1990) (invalidating
facially discriminatory regulation under the test of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey even
where acceptance of out-of-state hazardous waste was conditioned on satisfaction of several
requirements), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2800
(1991).
While the Eleventh Circuit in Diamond Waste appears to have reached the correct result,
the court would have been better guided by acknowledging that county regulations which treat
out-of-county and out-of-state waste on an equally discriminatory basis (relative to in-county
waste) are facially discriminatory and ought to be decided under the heightened scrutiny standard. The court, although expressly embarking on a Pike analysis, did, however, assess the
availability of less discriminatory alternatives in a manner consistent with the stricter standard. Diamond, 939 F.2d at 944-45; see also Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv. v.
Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 770 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (observing that nondiscriminatory alternative of
slowing all waste into Indiana landfills was available).
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The latter two illustrate nonprotectionist regulation marked by a
lesser standard of review.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey' 9 serves as a unique example, both as a case where facial discrimination ended the judicial
inquiry short of a Pike 5 ' balancing and as dormant Commerce
Clause precedent in the arena of landfill jurisprudence. In Philadelphia, New Jersey legislated to prohibit the import of nearly all exogenous solid waste. 15 ' Thus, New Jersey sought to extend the solid
waste disposal capacity of its landfills, but chose a means that
facially discriminated against foreign articles of interstate commerce
with no "reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." 152 Specifically, on its face and in effect, the New Jersey regulation embargoed the import of most solid waste and, thereby, reserved for New Jersey residents all potential landfill space, both
publicly- and privately-owned.
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 55 the
Supreme Court invalidated a facially neutral North Carolina law
prohibiting the importation of apples packaged in closed containers
and bearing a grade of the exporting state. 54 The plain effect of the
regulation was to discriminate against Washington apple growers
since Washington apples were uniformly marked according to Washington's own grading scheme. North Carolina had no established
grading and inspection system.' 55 The statute operated to the advantage of local producers. By raising the costs of doing business in
North Carolina, the State "wrenched" from its 'Washington competitor a competitive advantage earned by that State's reputable grading
program; hence, there was a "discriminatory effect" emanating from
facially benign regulation. North Carolina was unable to meet its
heightened burden of showing a compelling non protectionist purpose
and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives. 56
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 57 Maryland, with
149. 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
150. See supra text accompanying note 141 for the Pike :ormulation.
151. The New Jersey statute provided, in pertinent part: "No person shall bring into this
State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of
the State.
...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978.).
152. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627; see also National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (invalidating import
restrictions on hazardous wastes and following closely the reasoning offered in Philadelphia),
modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (1I1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.. 2800 (1991).
153. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
154. Id. at 335.
155. Id. at 340.
156. Id. at 353-54.
157. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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the avowed purpose of preserving retail trade in gasoline sales, regulated to the effect that all vertically integrated oil producers or refiners must divest themselves of their retail operations in order to sell
within the State. The Supreme Court upheld the Maryland law and
had no difficulty distinguishing the case from Hunt. As opposed to
the advantage gained by North Carolina apple growers in Hunt, the
Court was persuaded that despite a pronounced burden on out-ofstate integrated oil companies,' " independent Maryland retailers experienced no competitive advantage over out-of-state independent retailers unaffected by the legislation. There was no trade barrier limiting or eliminating competitiveness among independent retailers. 5 9
Moreover, the interstate burden was not excessive because there was
no reason to believe that the resulting shortage would be replaced by
local refiners. 6" The Court explained that the Commerce Clause
"protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from
prohibitive or burdensome regulations"' 6'1 and held that the Act
neither established a barrier to interstate commerce, nor treated independent Maryland retailers favorably. 6 Although the dimensions
of the market had changed, without establishing a burden on the
flow of commerce within the market as a whole similar to erecting a
trade barrier, there could be no discrimination as defined by the
majority.16
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery" was a more difficult case.
There, the Court squarely recognized that the Minnesota pulpwood
industry was a local industry likely to benefit at the expense of foreign "plastics" competitors.' 65 In Clover Leaf, Minnesota banned the
158. Significantly, 95% of the retail .businesses affected by the statute were foreign,
creating an enormous differential in burden. Id. at 137-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 125-26.
160. Id. at 127.
161. Id. at 127-28.
162. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1978).
163. In dicta, the Court suggested that a different result might have followed if a "discriminatory effect" was shown. Id. at 126 n.16. Justice Blackmun wrote separately, finding the
case indistinguishable from Hunt. According to Justice Blackmun, the North Carolina law in
Hunt was invalid not because it discriminated universally against all out-of-state growers, but
because it discriminated against a particular segment, namely, Washington apple growers.
Likewise, the Maryland law in Exxon discriminated against a segment of out-of-state industry, namely, those producer/refiners who owned retail businesses in Maryland. Id. at 146-47
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
165. Id. at 473 (The Court observed that "[plulpwood producers are the only Minnesota
industry likely to benefit significantly from the Act at the expense of out-of-state firms.") Id.
(emphasis added). In a previous paragraph, however, the Court stated that "there is no reason
to suspect that the gainers will be Minnesota firms, or the losers out-of-state firms". Id.
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local sale of milk packaged in plastic nonreturnable containers allegedly to promote conservation and to minimize solid waste.16 6 Paper
packaging, the closest substitute, is a pulpwood product and pulpwood was a major Minnesota industry.167 The plastic industry producing the banned containers was exclusively foreign.' 66 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the milk packaging law by finding the burdens
on out-of-state firms "exaggerated 6 9 and by finding no reason to
believe that the disadvantaged firms would be exclusively out-ofstate firms. 7"
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Values Distilled from Precedent.-If one were to distill a predominant constitutional value by
comparing the above-cited cases involving per se rules and those
where a formal means/ends balancing test prevails, the value would
be national unification. It is not suggested, however, that free trade
as a constitutional value is insignificant. Rather, the statement recognizes a judicial proclivity to subordinate free trade goals when national unity is not threatened. This assessment accords with Commerce Clause values viewed in historical perspective. 17 1 More
specifically, what Philadelphia,Hunt, Exxon, and Clover Leaf each
had in common was a burden falling discriminantly on interstate
firms, yet the latter two cases passed constitutional muster.
What made the burdens acceptable in Exxon and Clover Leaf,
but not acceptable in Hunt or Philadelphia,was the absence of a
"discriminatory effect" protecting the local economies. In neither
case was the Court persuaded that the regulations would have the
effect of readjusting the interstate market in such a manner as to
confer a significant competitive advantage on in-state economic interests at the expense of their foreign counterparts. By contrast, due
to New Jersey's suitability for dumping, the State's regulation at issue in Philadelphia had the effect of advancing New Jersey's com166. Id. at 465.
167. Id. at 473.
168. The District Court expressly found an illegitimate economic purpose because certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries benefitted at the expense of the foreign plastic industry. Id. at 475 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Only the resale of milk in plastic nonreturnable bottles was prohibited by the Minnesota regulation. Plastics still could be imported when used in plastic returnable bottles and
plastic pouches. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981).
170. Id.
171. See generally supra Part IlIl.A; see also Varat, supr'a note 63, at 520-22 (by investing the states with a continued, albeit qualified, independent lawmaking authority, the
Framers loosely compromised the national free trade objectives of the Commerce Clause); see
supra notes 127-29, 136.
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mercial interests 1 2 by forcing haulers of exogenous waste to look
elsewhere at considerably greater expense. Any conservation would
be at the expense of out-of-state firms, for the disposal of New
Jersey waste remained unaffected by the regulation. Similarly, in
Hunt the "statute tend[ed] to shield the local apple industry from
the competition of Washington apple growers . . .[and] had the ef-

fect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the competitive and economic advantages it ha[d] earned for itself .... 173
In fact, Exxon and Clover Leaf merely represent an absence of

that which is objectionable in economic protectionism. Economically
protective regulation is most threatening to national unification because it artificially readjusts interstate competition in such a manner
as to "wrench" from the interstate market an economic advantage
earned elsewhere and thereafter confers the advantage on local economic concerns. Indeed, regulation of this variety might properly be

considered the paradigm of a dormant Commerce Clause violation.
The regulations in Exxon and Clover Leaf are less prone to retaliation and interstate disunity because their form did not fit the paradigm and enable the states to isolate their economies from the vicissitudes of the interstate market at the expense of foreign

competitors. The contrast serves to illustrate the evil in protectionism. Protectionist legislation jeopardizes national unity because it is
inequitable; it invites animosity and hostility as well as the potential
74
for retaliation and trade wars.
172. The Act conferred on New Jersey residents and the haulers of New Jersey waste
the economic benefit of assured disposal capacity and, thus, effectively postponed the day when
New Jersey would be compelled to look elsewhere at greater expense for its disposal needs. See
supra note 142 for Justice Jackson's statement in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond criticizing similar protectionist legislation.
173. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977)
(emphasis added).
174. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), Justice Cardozo articulated what may be the overarching problem with parochial state economic legislation. He
found that the trouble lurked in the potential thatone state's efforts to provide for local economic security might lead other states to do the same: "[Tihe door [would be] opened to
rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the
states to the power of the nation." Id. at 522. Clearly, Justice Cardozo was concerned not
simply with the regulatory tendency to suppress competition among the states (free trade), but
also with national solidarity if such commercial activities were tolerated based upon a plea that
the state simply was invoking its police power to protect local health. See also H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc, v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949) (belief that the commercial interdependence of the states solicits the protection of the free movement of goods at the risk of reprisals
and trade rivalries).
Several commentators share a similar view of the dormant Commerce Clause. See generally Gergen, supra note 119, at 1106 (Referring to local economic protectionism as "interstate
theft," Professor Gergen believes that "[o]nly by weighing the costs and benefits of a challenged action and locating them geographically or by communal affiliation can one determine
whether the state action merely takes from outsiders to give to citizens."); Regan, supra note

96

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1992

Apart from a concern with the form of interstate commercial
burden (protectionist or nonprotectionist), the cases also illustrate a
judicial preoccupation with the extent of commercial burden,
namely, whether national free trade values have been compromised
significantly. Trade barriers, with few exceptions, 17 5 simply reflect
the end product of properly calibrated economicaftly protective regulation, the effect of which is to isolate a local industry or resource
from the national economy. Significant in Exxon and Clover Leaf
was that the avenues to interstate trade and free market competition
remained open, only the dimensions of the interstate market
changed. In Philadelphia, by contrast, free trade values were severely imperiled by New Jersey's invocation of an absolute barrier to
interstate commerce. After all, if the statement that "our economic
unit is the Nation" has the necessary corollary "that the states are

not separable economic units[,]' 176 then any effort that wholly and
completely isolates a state from one form of interstate commerce
must be the archetypal form of impermissible trade barrier. The

New Jersey regulation appears most disruptive to the interstate market because it foreclosed all options available to the private interstate trader in foreign commerce. Not only was the foreign trader
denied the availability of purchasing disposal rights at public and
private177 landfills alike, he also was denied the opportunity to
purchase property in New Jersey for the purpose of accommodating
his interstate disposal needs.
The contrasting results highlighted above confirm that burdens
on free trade alone are an insufficient predicate for a dormant Commerce Clause violation. 7 What is apparent is that the more closely
an activity fits the paradigm and approaches a trade barrier, the
142, at 1113 (describing state protectionism as incompatible with the "concept-of-union" and
tending to incite "resentment" and "retaliation" since it involves taking from foreigners and
giving to local residents).
175. See supra note 146 and Maine v. Taylor for one exception; see also the quarantine
cases, Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
176. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, :537-38 (1949).
177. The PhiladelphiaCourt also found prior "natural resources" precedent on point.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) ("Also relevant here are the
Court's decisions holding that a state may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of
access over consumers in other states to natural resources located within its borders."). See
generally supra note 73 for precedent supporting the proposition that a state cannot regulate
the preferential distribution of privately-owned natural resources.
178. Two "natural resources" cases offer further substantiation. See Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (nondiscriminatory coal severance tax applying
evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state purchasers held valid despite the fact that the burden
of up to a 30 % tax fell disproportionately (90%) on out-of-state concerns); Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (state legislation fixing increased local
well-head price for conservationist reasons held valid despite 90% foreign consumption).
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greater the infringement on another state's separate sovereignty and
the greater the potential for interstate discord. State participatory
activity must be gauged through an appreciation of the values supported by the dormant Commerce Clause and the centrality of economic protectionism.
a. The Political Process as a Check.-Analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause would be incomplete without mentioning
that the political process often serves as proxy for the safeguard of
dormant Commerce Clause values. In South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,' 8 Justice Stone reasoned that where a
regulatory burden does not fall exclusively on those detached from
the regulating state's political process, viz., out-of-state concerns, local democratic processes will serve as a check. 1'8 0 Indeed, it has been
suggested that the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses
were designed as safeguards for the disenfranchised.' 81 More recently, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery' 2 and J. Filiberto
Sanitation v. Department of Envtl. Protection,'83 the Supreme Court
and the Third Circuit found it significant that foreign economic interests were "virtually" represented by local industry. After all, con179. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
180. Id. at 187. For a view similar to that in espoused in Barnwell Bros., see Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945). Professor Tribe argues that in-state
consumers may serve as surrogates for those out-of-state business concerns adversely affected
by protectionist legislation. See TRIBE, supra note 59, § 6-6, at 412-13. In essence, Professor
Tribe feels that since trade barriers tend to drive up prices, local residents might voice a dissent in opposition to protectionist legislation. See TRIBE, supra note 59, § 6-6, at 412-13. This,
however, is quite different than to say that discriminatory state regulation satisfies dormant
Commerce Clause review when some in-state interests are burdened. See supra note 148.
181. Dean Ely describes the function served by the Commerce and Privilege and Immunities Clauses as one of "virtual representation," for it was through "constitutionally tying the
fate of outsiders to the fate of those possessing political power, the framers insured that their
interests would be well looked after." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101
(1980). Professor Varat takes this one step further and notes that the reason nonresidents
should be "well looked after" is because the constitutional ban on discrimination was adopted
"primarily as an instrument of national unification." Varat, supra note 63, at 517-18 (emphasis added). See generally TRIBE, supra note 59, § 6-5, at 409.
182. 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981) (holding that foreign producers were adequately protected by local Minnesota concerns adversely affected and joined as parties to the litigation).
In a similar vein, part of Justice Blackmun's concern in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.
stemmed from the fact that Maryland's legislature was not held accountable by those adversely affected by the Maryland law. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 17, 151
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988). As provided in the New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, waste collected within New Jersey counties was to be deposited at assigned transfer
stations for processing and subsequent disposal. The Act was held nondiscriminatory on its
face and in practical effect. Since the interstate flow of waste was not affected and the full
burden inured to in-state collectors, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey was held distinguishable. Id. at 920-22.
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fidence in the local political process supports notions of fairness and
accountability that are essential for interstate accord.
IV. The Commerce Clause, Federalism, and the Market Participant Doctrine: A Unified Approach
Part IV serves to harmonize the constitutional values distilled in
Part III with market participant precedent set forth in Part II. The
inquiry serves a dual function. First, the constitutional analysis suggests that when acting as market participants, heightened concerns
for state autonomy, coupled with a lesser encroachment on the values of national unity and free trade, counsels in favor of excepting
this form of state activity from the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, what should emerge is a test of market participation that is both true to established Commerce Clause principles and sensitive to the values of state sovereignty.
A.

State Spending and the Market Participant Doctrine

At first, state market participation might appear suspect since
the doctrine condones facially discriminatory state market activity
advantageous to local economic actors. However, as indicated
above,184 the Commerce Clause responds principally to state regulations effecting "simple economic protectionism" -- not "simple" discrimination. Thus, the conclusion followed that virtual per se rules
represent no more than a judicial appreciation that discrimination
often is accompanied by an undisclosed, yet predictable counterpart
- economic protectionism. 185 Recall the paradigm of a dormant
Commerce Clause violation: regulation that artificially readjusts -the
interstate competitive market in such a manner as to "wrench" from
the interstate market an economic advantage earned elsewhere and
which thereafter confers the advantage on local economic concerns.18 6 Paramount is that a state may not regulate with the purpose or effect of advancing its commercial interests at the expense of
others. 8 7 Objectionable is that like efforts will be: used in opposition,
thereby paving the course toward trade wars - the antithesis of national solidarity.188
184.
185.
186.
187.
benefitted
interstate
188.

See generally supra Parts IIl.B.I.a. and III.B.2.
See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Part III.B.2.
See supra note 146, particularly Maine v. Taylor, wheie a state health regulation
local commercial interests at the expense of their foreign competitors, but where the
burden was merely incidental to an otherwise compelling nonprotectionist purpose.
See supra notes 142, 174.
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State spending,"' 9 on the other hand, is a form of state activity
bearing little resemblance to regulation fitting the paradigm of a

dormant Commerce Clause violation, not because it lacks the potential to burden the interstate market, 9 but because state spending

programs: (1) are less threatening to national unification goals since
the costs of a preference are borne primarily by local residents; (2)
pose a lesser potential to erect trade barriers; and (3) demand a
heightened concern for state sovereignty.
1. Costs Borne by Those Preferred.-In each of the cases up-

holding state market participant activity, the Supreme Court underscored the fact that a local preference was the product of a state
spending program.1"' The commentators agree with respect to the
significance of state spending, either as a primary justification for
the market participant doctrine, 19 or in defense of a qualified state
discretion to prefer local residents in a more general sense.' 9 What
distinguishes state spending programs from protectionist regulation

is the form or manner by which local residents are preferred.
When a state spends from its treasury to effect a local preference, no economic advantage is "wrenched" from the interstate mar189. State spending should be defined to encompass measures undertaken by a state (or
its political subdivisions) involving the disbursement of anything of value from the public fisk.
These include, but are not limited to, state programs of subsidization, production, and sales.
190. Professor Coenen offers the analogy that the burden on interstate commerce from a
nickel/gallon subsidy directed to in-state milk retailers will have the same practical effect as a
nickel/gallon tariff on out-of-state milk. In both instances in-state milk will sell at a discount
relative to out-of-state milk in proportion to the tariff or subsidy (assuming the subsidy is
passed through to purchasers in a correspondingly lower price). See Coenen, supra note 112,
at 415.
191. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Thomas K. Anson and P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REv. 71, 89 (1980) (viewing the distribution of state-owned resources as "a return of capital to some of the resources' true individual
owners"); Coenen, supra note 112, at 423 ("As a matter of both equity and accepted notions
of the nature of property, the citizens of a state may reap where they have sown.") (citation
omitted); Regan, supra note 142, at 1194 (channeling locally those benefits purchased with, or
consisting of, state funds viewed generally as less "coercive" than regulatory programs or taxation with similar purposes).
193. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 119, at 1105, 1135 (Professor Gergen disapproves of
purely "redistributive" measures aimed at favoring domestic industry, but finds other programs that "produce wealth or increase the sum of human happiness" beneficial to the economy. He also finds "somewhat convincing" the defense that the costs of "pure subsidies" are
borne largely in the state.); Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention,
69 VA. L. REV. 563, 585 (1983) (arguing that where the cost of a preference falls on the state
rather than on private actors, there is more reason to believe that the state weighed the relative
costs and benefits of its preference); Varat, supra note 63, at 523 (offering "Lockean labordesert theory" as a presumptive justification for preferring state residents in the distribution of
public goods and services derived from state revenues); Wells and Hellerstein, supra note 107,
at 1130-35 ("[Sltates enjoy considerably more freedom from commerce clause restraints when
dealing with their own resources than they do when dealing with the resources of others.").
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ket and conferred on local concerns. To be sure, the competitive efficiencies of in-state actors are augmented,"0 4 yet the competitive

efficiencies earned by out-of-state concerns remain intact, only lower
in a relative sense. 19 Any increase in the competitive position exper-

ienced by local actors relative to their out-of-state counterparts is
financed from the local treasury and, indirectly, by local residents at

large. As Professor Varat notes:
[11n sum, when a state uses state revenues to create public goods
and services, it has a prima facia justification for allocating
those resources to state residents (either preferentially or exclusively), simply because residents as a class combined to establish
them [through tax monies paid to the state], and nonresidents as
a class did not. 96
194. Consider the subsidy in Alexandria Scrap, or the preferential distribution in
Reeves. In both instances local economic actors received a competitive advantage. In Alexandria Scrap, local processors could offer a higher price for automobile hulks. In Reeves, South
Dakotan cement customers could purchase cement at a cost lower than out-of-state suppliers
purchasing through the secondary market.
195. But cf. cases cited supra notes 142-44 where economic protectionist regulation was
found to redistribute competitive efficiencies. For example, in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond
and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., New York was attempting to guard its economy through
"appropriating" for its residents the greater efficiencies earned elsewhere. See H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (State "advanc[ing] (its] own commercial interests" by eliminating interstate competition); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527
(1935) (describing New York's regulation as tantamount "to a rampart of customs duties
designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin"); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey's "appropriation" from Philadelphia
and the nation generally of its share of, or right to, the interstate market in landfill space.).
196. Varat, supra note 63, at 529-30. According to Professor Varat, the validity of a
local preference will turn on the source of the funds used to produce the preference. Professor
Coenen, however, "object[s] to Professor Varat's analysis insofar e.s it "suggests that this consideration essentially stands alone in justifying the rule." Coenen, supra note 112, at 409. In
keeping with tradition, my objection to Professor Coenen's comment is that by suggesting that
there are other independent justifications for the rule apart from spending, he distracts the
focus which rightly belongs with state spending; the other rationales simply follow as a natural
corollary.
Professor Varat eschews reliance on the regulatory/proprietary dichotomy offered in defense of the market participant exception. Varat, supra note 63, Et 504-07. Instead, Professor
Varat defines his theory around state citizenship. While his theo:.y exalts state taxing as the
primary justification for preferential treatment (referred to as the Lockean labor-desert theory), Professor Varat considers this the beginning of the inquiry, each step of which necessarily requires an appreciation of the fundamental constitutional values implicated. Conceding
the existence of limitations on resident preferences made pursuant to state spending programs,
Professor Varat believes that such limitations must be resolved through an accommodation of
the often competing constitutional values of interstate equality znd the continued vitality of
the states. The accommodation will vary according to the burden imposed on a state if nonresidents must be allowed to participate and the burden on nonresidents if participation is denied.
Varat, supra note 63, at 530-3 1. Specifically, the extraterritorial burden likely will differ with
respect to the type of resource a state is hoarding.
The benefits of Professor Varat's theory stem from its forthrght approach to the competing values safeguarded by the Constitution and the accommodation that must follow. His theory can be seen as offering greater flexibility than a test of proprietary versus regulatory activity. This is not to say that Professor Varat's test will lead to results different from those
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This form of activity is quite different from using the state's regulatory arm to reach purely private transactions. When a state unilaterally adjusts the natural contours of the interstate market, the impact
on the economy is considerably more severe. Not only does it have
the potential of depriving consumers of an alternate supplier operat-

ing with greater efficiencies and offering lower prices, 197 but when a
state regulates, the resulting market dislocation is limited only by
the ingenuity of the state's legislators. 19 8
The value of national unity is protected. State spending programs are less prone to resentment and retaliation because they lack

the unfairness found in protectionist regulation. The state does not
merely readjust, unilaterally and at no cost, the contours of the interstate market with the burdens of such action flowing out-of-state
and the corresponding benefits flowing in-state. To the contrary, the
extent of the economic burden flowing out-of-state in the form of a
competitive disadvantage correlates precisely with the economic burden suffered in-state by depriving the state's residents of an alternative redistribution of their tax revenues.
In addition, this analysis suggests that a state market participant has a nonprotectionist reason for treating foreign commerce,
commercial actors, or nonresidents differently.' 99 Local commercial
actors and residents stand on a distinctively different footing than
produced through application of the test of market participation, but only that it properly
focuses on the judicial inquiry.
197. State subsidization and state participation as seller in the market are beneficial in a
sense that tariffs and state protectionist regulations are not. Local industry is the only beneficiary under a tariff levied on foreign commerce. This is because once a tariff has been levied,
local consumers lose the price benefits issuing from the least-cost producer and, at the same
time, the foreign producer loses the benefits of his greater efficiencies.
Contrast this with a direct subsidy used to augment local productive efficiencies. Both
foreign and local consumers receive the benefit of lower prices. See Gergen, supra note 119, at
1135 (subsidies benefit foreign buyers); Varat, supra note 63, at 544 (in the short-run, subsidies "may even enhance consumer access to cheaper goods in the interstate market"). The only
casualty remains with foreign producers, yet there are reasons to believe that this may be
transient. See generally infra Part IV.A.l.a. discussing how the expensiveness of direct production subsidization may serve as a constraint on proliferation.
Similar logic applies when a state participates as a seller in the market. In Reeves, with
"no indication, and no way to know, [if] private industry would have moved into [the cement
market]," the Supreme Court felt constrained not to "discourage similar state projects . . .
[for this] would rob South Dakota of the intended benefit of its foresight, risk, and industry."
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 (1980) (emphasis added). Foreign economic actors
benefitted from South Dakota's effort since "it is quite possible that [Reeves, Inc.] would never
have existed - far less operated successfully for 20 years - had it not been for South Dakota
cement." Id.
198. But see generally infra Part IV.A.I.a. discussing how the expensiveness of state
market participation may serve to limit proliferation.
199. See supra note 143 where the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey found this clearly wanting.
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their out-of-state counterparts. The former have funded the local
treasury, as well as the preference (indirectly), whereas the latter
seek merely to reap the benefits at no cost to themselves or their
states. It has been argued that the state, "as guardian and trustee
for its people," 20 0 has not only the authority to benefit those contributing to the treasury, but has the affirmative obligation to discrimi-

nate in their favor.20 1
a. Expensiveness and the Local Political Process as Con-

straints.-Preferences conferred pursuant to a program of state
spending have a built-in limitation not found in state protectionist
regulation. When a state regulates, it readjusts the contours of the
interstate market at no real cost to the state, administrative costs
notwithstanding. Market participation, as marked by state spending,

however, provides its own limitation on proliferation since it is inherently circumscribed by its expensiveness to the state. 20 2 Because all
spending programs are not equal, the utility of the expensiveness

limitation demands further refinement.
When a state enters the market as a seller of goods or services,
as did South Dakota in Reeves, the expense incurred is unlike that
experienced either by Maryland in Alexandria Scrap or by Boston
in White. State subsidies and hiring preferences are dependent upon
the renewed grace of the local legislature, city, or town council for

their continuance. As such, they are visible, 20 3 direct, and recurring
costs to the state checked through both the political process and the
state budget. 20 4 This design is altered when a state participates in
200. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (citing Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903))).
201. See Anson and Schenkkan, supra note 192, at 88 (Florida statute mandating the
local purchase of printing services by state agencies) (citing American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,
339 F. Supp. 719, 722-23 (M.D. Fla. 1972), affid mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972)).
202. "Expensiveness" as a check on market participation has been suggested by at least
two constitutional scholars. See Coenen, supra note 112, at 435 & n.244; Regan, supra note
142, at 1194-96. When state market participation involves spending, the expense generates a
direct cost to the state visible to the state legislature. Accordingly, through both the political
process and the general availability of funds, preferences are constrained.
203. See Coenen, supra note 112, at 435 (viewing the costs of discriminatory regulations
and tariffs, such as the administrative costs and higher prices, as "less direct, less visible, and
less likely to be significant than the costs that flow from conscious decisions to pay more or less
by choosing to deal with only resident trading partners"); Levmore, supra note 193, at 585
("[Clonscious funding" of subsidies or preferences assures that costs and benefits will be considered to a greater extent. State regulation merely readjusts the market at the expense of the
private trader.).
204. For the view that expensiveness serves as a significant check on proliferation in the
context of direct production subsidization, see Coenen, supra note 112, at 475 ("costliness"
check on proliferation reaches its "apex" in the context of direct subsidization); cf. Regan,
supra note 142, at 1196 (finding that the "carefully calibrated subsidy ... passed on to con-
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primary manufacturing that turns a profit. The market participation
program ceases to be dependent upon the state treasury for funding,
and local preferences continue at little or no direct cost to the state.
For instance, the cement plant in Reeves presumably was self-sufficient, i.e., it financed current operations (as well as its preferential
distribution scheme) through revenues. As a result, there may be less
reason to believe that the state treasury and the expensiveness of the
state's participation in the market will serve to curb proliferation.20 5

That a state can become "efficient" in its preferential distribution
scheme is manifest.
Guarding against the socialization of the American economy
are notions of capitalism firmly entrenched in American culture.
When the free market is operating properly, there is little reason to

doubt that the needs of the local constituency will be provided for by
existing industry. Consequently, no compelling reason exists for the
state to participate in the market and displace potential private entrepreneurial ventures.20 6 Market participation without a compelling
justification would be to turn a profit for the general welfare - a
profit that might have gone directly into the hands of local entrepreneurs. Nothing could be more hostile to American capitalism and
repugnant to local as well as foreign commercial interests.2 °7 Professor Coenen is on point in stating: "American sensibilities eschew
sumers in a relatively competitive market [may] achieve a substantial redirection of business
to local producers at very little cost," yet, due to the great "informational demands for designing the dangerously cost-effective subsidy[,]" they would be rare, if nonexistent, in practice).
205. Professor Regan found the Reeves opinion "troublesome indeed" because it enabled
a state to perpetuate a preference at little or no direct expense to the state. See Regan, supra
note 142, at 1196; cf. Gergen, supra note 119, at 1142-43 (concerned that "preferences such
as that in Reeves cannot be tolerated if we are to prevent state ownership of commercial
enterprises from undermining our common market").
206. A caveat is required where a state enjoys unique access to a natural resource. In
these instances, a private trader's economic interests may contrast with a state's interest in
conserving for its residents a future supply of the resource. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 334 (1979) (recognizing state interest in regulating the exploitation of important resources); see also id. at 341-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that a state has a "substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of fish and game and other natural
resources within its boundaries for the benefit of its citizens"). As a result, a state might be
induced to enter an otherwise efficient market to provide for the general welfare. Conduct of
this nature appears more appropriately left for a state; therefore, few local residents (apart
from local industry) will take umbrage and serve as a political check. See infra note 207 and
accompanying text. However, as suggested infra Part V.B.3., doctrinal limitations may under
certain circumstances counsel against extending market participant status where states participate in the market for natural resources.
207. Accordingly, the local political process should serve a significant deterrent function.
See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (case
where local Massachusetts construction industry brought suit to challenge local Boston mayoral order); see generally supra Part IlI.B.2.a. where the principle of surrogate representation
is outlined; Manheim, supra note 63, at 568 & n.73 (observing that foreign firms are virtually
represented to the extent that the local constituency identifies with their interests).
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state-managed economies."2 0° Moreover, the inclination of state and
local legislators must be to leave alone that which adequately serves
their constituencies. State entry, therefore, is most likely when the
local market is operating improperly, i.e., when capital requirements
or business risks are so substantial as to deter private entry. In these
instances, expensiveness will serve as a significant constraint on
proliferation and state initiative is desirous.
When the state manufacturer/seller finances operations through
local and foreign revenues, this is unlike "pure" spending from the
state treasury. Recall that the primary justification for allowing a
preference is the redistribution of benefits to those who have combined to produce them.20 9 The question becomes whether application
of the market participant doctrine should depend upon the source of
funding both in a program's incipiency and during subsequent
operations.
As to the source of funding in a program's incipiency, the White
Court found the source of funding relevant in defining whether analysis should be within a market participant or an affirmative Commerce Clause context.2 10 The question of whether the market participant doctrine would extend to support a preference in the absence of
congressional sanction, however, remained unanswered. Following
the theory that state preferences are justified, in part, by a state's
sovereign redistributional interest, when funds derive exogenously,
from whatever the source, the recipient state's interest can be seen as
inextricably tied to the offering state's (or states') remaining interest(s) in nondiscriminatory access. With federal funding, states' interests are protected by conditioning an individual state's preferential distribution as a market participant on a finding of affirmative
congressional sanction. Absent affirmative sanction, to add a
prefrence to Congress' design after federal funds are appropriated
and distributed conflicts with Congress' Spending Power and runs
the risk of thwarting congressional intent. The source of funding in a
program's incipiency is relevant.
As to the source of funding during subsequent operations, the
issue is whether the doctrine should distinguish between preferential
distribution of state monies funded by local tax revenues - as compared to the preferential distribution of state-produced resources
208. Coenen, supra note 112, at 418; see also Varat, supra note 63, at 530 n.175 ("As
to the incentive to socialism that the distinction creates, it seems unlikely in our society that
the desire to be protectionist often will outweigh disincentives.").
209. See generally supra Part IV.A.I.
210. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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that owe their existence to operations funded by foreign and local
sales. The answer is no. When a state participates as a seller in the
market, it resembles a private market participant.2"1 ' Foreign and local purchasers are free to choose for or against transacting business
with the state market participant. Regulatory implications are at
their lowest ebb since there is no coercion 12 or market barrier to
effective competition. Foreigners contribute only by choice. As such,
those contributing through purchases cannot complain when they
have voluntarily contributed to a state's revenues. State activity remains market participatory because of its voluntary character. There
is no cause to threaten national unity because the transactions are
open market and equitable in nature.
2. Lesser Potentialfor Trade Barriers.-When the costs of a
state program are borne by those receiving the preference, this is
unlike state regulation because it fails to fit the paradigm of a dormant Commerce Clause violation. State spending programs differ in
yet another respect from state regulatory programs in that they pose
a lesser potential for trade barriers found above21 3 to be hostile to
national solidarity and the national economy. Trade barriers, with
few exceptions," simply reflect the end product of properly calibrated economically protective regulation, the effect of which is to
isolate a local industry or resource from the national economy. So
long as the market participant doctrine cannot be used as an alternative to regulation tending toward trade barriers, it will remain less
hostile to established dormant Commerce Clause values.21
When a state participates as manufacturer or seller in the market, as did South Dakota in Reeves, its market influence is inherently
limited not only by its "market power," but also by the limits Wunnicke places on the state's ability to condition initial distribution
"downstream." For these reasons a state manufacturer or seller is
211. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
212. See Regan, supra note 142, at 1194 (viewing state spending programs generally as
less "coercive" than regulatory programs sponsored by the state). Professor Regan is hesitant
to extend the market participant rule beyond the narrow parameters of state spending found in
Alexandria Scrap. Regan, supra note 142, at 1195-96. His concern lies with programs, such as
the one in Reeves, which are conceived through an initial investment of local monies, but are
not limited by the same. If coerciveness is indeed relevant to the inquiry, then market participant activity, whether expensive or not, would not seem any more coercive as it becomes less
expensive to the state.
213. See generally supra Part IIl.B.2.
214.

See supra note 175.

215. Keep in mind that the tendencies toward trade barriers will likely differ with respect to the form of state market participation.
377
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seen not as announcing a general rule of trade within the market as
a whole - the essence of regulation - but rather as working
through traditional free market channels to exert its will.2 16 A state
market participant's business decision to prefer local residents does
not interfere with its competitor's business discretion and, hence, is
less disruptive of the free market. This was true in Reeves and in
White.21 7
As a general proposition, the market participant doctrine is illsuited for the task of erecting the type of absolute trade barrier attempted by New Jersey in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.21 6
While local competitiveness certainly is augmented, local industry is
not isolated from the efficiencies of the interstate competitive market. At all times the avenues to free private interstate trade remain
open. In this sense, and with respect to free trade, state market participation more closely resembles state conduct described in cases involving nonprotectionist legislation "burdening" the interstate
market.
State market participation "burdens" the interstate market in
the sense that foreign business concerns must meet the augmented
efficiencies of local firms. Burden alone, however, was held insufficient to support a dormant Commerce Clause violation in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland. and Minnesora v. Clover Leaf
Creamery.2"' The Supreme Court reasoned that, despite what might
have been an immediate benefit to local industry, there was no reason to expect that local industry would benefit at the expense of outof-state concerns or perpetuate any immediate increase in market
share. 220 As a result, the regulation did not fit the paradigm of a
dormant Commerce Clause violation. Combined with the fact that
the burden fell discriminantly on out-of-state concerns, Part III ended with the conclusion that national unity, rather than free trade in
some "absolute" sense, must be the overarching value served by the
dormant Commerce Clause.221
The same can be said for market participation. While the inter216. See cases cited supra note 73 for the proposition that a state cannot compel private
traders to prefer local residents.
217. The mayorial order in White had no effect on the hiring patterns practiced by
contractors not working for the city of Boston.
218. But see Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 121, at 617 (finding "trade rivalries as likely
to arise.from protectionist actions taken by states as market participants as from those taken
by states as market regulators").
219. See generally supra text accompanying notes 157-70.
220. See generally supra text accompanying notes 157-70.
221. See generally supra Part III.B.2.
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state commercial burdens differ in kind from the burdens emanating
from nonprotectionist legislation, there is no cause to believe they
are any more inimical to national solidarity and established principles of free trade. Since the burdens emanate from a program of
state spending, heightened concerns with state sovereignty, discussed
below, 22 counsel against the need for Pike balancing. As discussed
above,2 2 a state market participation does not fit the paradigm of a
dormant Commerce Clause violation and, accordingly, does not implicate core nationalist values, which likewise reduces the need for
Pike balancing. Justice Blackmun's statement in Reeves serves well
to isolate why it is that state market participation poses a lesser potential for trade barriers:
[O]ut-of-state [competitors] are not removed from the market
altogether; to compete successfully with in-state competitors,
however, they must achieve additional efficiencies or exploit natural advantage such as their location to offset the incremental
advantage channelled by the State's own market behavior to instate [industry].24
a. The Antitrust Laws as a Potential Constraint.-If by
market participation a state may apply its superior economic
strength to thwart private market participation, then the state has
acquired the capability to erect trade barriers indirectly. In Reeves,
the Supreme Court chose not to ignore the possibility that state market participation might be used to erect trade barriers, but merely
parted with the dissenting Justice's plea to exalt the value found in
the natural functioning of the interstate market over a more practical inquiry into the impediments to free interstate trade. 2 5 The
Court was less concerned with South Dakota's "market share" than
with the degree to which South Dakota had sufficient "market
power" to exclude competition either through: (1) unique access to
the raw materials necessary for production; (2) restrictive regulation
impeding local competition; or (3) state ownership of, or regulations
restricting private access to, the raw materials necessary for effective
private competition. 2 6
These concerns bear close resemblance to principles of "monopolization" and "attempted monopolization" under § 2 of the Sher222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See generally infra Part IV.A.3.
See generally supra Parts IV.A. and IV.A..
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 n.17 (1980).
See supra note 59 and text preceding note 107.
See supra note 66 and text accompanying notes 108-09.
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man Act of 1890.27 Monopoly power (a high degree of "market
power") is defined as the power to control price or exclude competi-

tion. 228 Traditionally, a firm's market share within the relevant product and geographic markets was used to define market power.

29

Added to this structural inquiry has been a concern with barriers to
entry.28 0 Applied liberally to Reeves, it follows that the Court has

intimated a reluctance to extend the market participant doctrine to
those areas off-limits to private enterprises under the antitrust laws.
Perhaps this suggests that where a private firm lacks the capacity or
the intent to exploit those with whom it deals, the same should hold
true for state market participants. Conversely, to the extent a state
has the capacity and the intent to exclude competition (through
trade) and impede entry within the relevant geographic and product
markets, the state solidifies its market share to give it market power
sufficient to satisfy the test of monopolization. By manifesting a concern with barriers to entry and intention/conduct in both contexts,
the Court has remained true to the principles of free trade protected
by the antitrust laws - presuming their applicability to state market
participants 23 1 - and has offered a manageable constraint on state

market participation.
b. "Downstream" or "Upstream" Regulation: Disguised
Trade Regulation?-Concern with "downstream"' regulation is evi-

dence of the Supreme Court's willingness to re-route disguised economic regulation back into dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1991). See infra note 318 for the test of "monopolization" and infra
note 308 for the test of "attempted monopolization."
228. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST, § 9, at 33 (1977).
229. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(using measurement of market share within relevant market as a basis for assessing market
power).
230. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953)
(barriers to entry solidify a firm's market share in such a way as to give it market power),
affd per curiamn, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see generally SULLIVAN, slupra note 228, § 23, at 79
(interpreting United Shoe as standing for the proposition that "no share of any market accords
power . . . except to the extent that the market is insulated from rapid and easy entry by firms
beyond its borders").
231. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor apparently have made this assumption. See
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 102 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that "the antitrust laws apply to a State only when
acting as a market participant") (citing Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 154 (1983)). In the context of municipal anticompetitive activity,
the Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to extend Parker antitrust immunity. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) ("Parker doctrine exempts
only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or,
by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.") (emphasis added).
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Downstream regulation is market participation with a coercive component - ostensible market participation with regulatory overtones.
Remaining true to the market participant/regulator distinction,
when the market participant characteristics are lost, all subsequent
restraints not only coerce the purchaser by foreclosing his or her
freedoms of trade, but also resemble less the activity of a free trader
exercising the long recognized right to choose his trading partners.2 32
Furthermore, market participant activity must be cabined narrowly
as it runs a fine line with well-settled constitutional doctrine that a
state cannot compel private economic actors to deal preferentially or
exclusively with local residents.2 3
Simply announcing this general constraint on state market participation says little about how to identify those situations falling
within its purview. The Court in Wunnicke noted that "a state market participant has a greater interest as a 'private trader' in the immediate transaction than it has in what its purchaser does with
goods after the State no longer has an interest in them."2 34 In
Reeves, the Court referred to the "the long recognized right of the
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal [and that] . . . [elvenhandedness suggests that
when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing
freedoms from federal constraints."2 3 5 It would be inaccurate, however, to believe that a state market participant strips itself of its sovereign responsibilities and becomes a greed-driven profit maximizer
analogous to its private counterparts.2 36 It also would be inaccurate
to believe that the world of trade encompasses two exclusive forms of
market activity: regulatory and nonregulatory profit maximizing.
Private business decisions are not so narrowly confined and perhaps
manifest what may be considered "regulatory" overtones.23 7 The test
232. See supra text accompanying note 64.
233. See supra notes 73, 119-20.
234. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 98.
235. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (emphasis added).
236. See sources cited supra note 63 for views of those admonishing the Court for embracing this so-called "private-actor analogy." Professor Varat notes that when a state trades
in the market, it is more likely than a private trader to be motivated by noneconomic political
influences. See Varat, supra note 63, at 506. While this may be true, the state also is more
prone to make economic choices when it participates in, rather than regulates, the market. In
fact, because market participation is intimately connected with the public fisk, a disregard for
economics would be unwise.
237. Verticle non-price restraints come to mind. Manufacturers are known to assign
product retailers exclusive "sales territories" that govern the retailers' freedom of contract
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (Relying on "ancient rule" against restraints on alienation, Court
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of "downstream regulation" should not amount to an exercise in
pigeonholing, but should accept from state economic actors that
which is acceptable from private economic actors.
A state regulates downstream (or upstream)"" when it uses its
market leverage in one transaction to effect a preference in a separate transaction in which it does not have a proprietary interest. The
test first must isolate those situations involving downstream or upstream restraints. The paradigm is where by conditional purchasing,
sales, or subsidization, state X coerces seller, purchaser, or recipient
Y to alter its private, separate economic transactions with its (Y's)
trading partner(s) Z. If the state's influence does not extend beyond
the X-Y relationship, then the analysis should end, for where there is
no downstream restraint, afortiorithere can be no downstream regulation. If the state's influence does extend into the Y-Z relationship,
then the second step is to ascertain whether the restraint is supported
by a proprietary interest in the Y-Z transaction or whether the restraint can be dismissed as necessary and incidental to the state's
proprietary interest in the X-Y transaction. Downstream regulation
is a conclusion reached when no proprietary interest serves to justify
the restraint, at which point the state can be seen as dictating private economic choices outside its narrowly-defined market contrary
to established precedent.23 "
Reeves presented no issue of downstream or upstream restraints.2 4 0 White involved a downstream restraint because the mayfound that once manufacturer parts with dominion, all subsequent attempts at controlling distribution arc per se unlawful under § I of the Sherman Antitrust Act.) with Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (overruling per se rule against vertical
nonprice restrictions announced in Schwinn and decrying relevance of so-called "ancient rule"
as "irrelevant" in modern American economy).
The terms of trade announced by private manufacturers arguably govern their trading
partners' separate economic relationships. However, such conduct comports with well-settled
concepts of private trade. Justice Brandeis' statement made nearly six decades ago sums up the
difficulty in assuming that every condition affecting a private trader's independent discretion is
"regulatory" in design: "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains
. . . [t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
238. The stream of commerce flows from where an article of commerce is created to
where it comes to rest. Relative to the position in this stream occupied by the state and its
nearest trading partner, a restraint influences transactions either downstream or upstream.
239. Id. at 99. See also supra text accompanying note 64 and note 73 for precedent
against state regulation affecting with whom private economic actors might deal.
240. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (observing that a unilateral
refusal to deal accords with the customary "right of the private trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal"). In Reeves, the preferential sale by South Dakota to local
concerns left open the option of arbitrage whereby the purchasers were free to resell the cement at a profit in the interstate market. Similar to the private seller, the state released its
hold once the sale was consummated and removed the prospect of "downstream regulation."
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oral order conditioned the award of a public contract on a private
contractor's agreement to reserve 50% of the positions on the project
to Boston residents. The Court held that Boston had a proprietary
interest in the workforce hired by its private contractor because
"[e]veryone affected by the order [was], in a substantial if informal
sense, 'working for the city.' "241 The same can be said of the upstream restraint in Alexandria Scrap. Maryland conditioned its subsidy payments on a processor's purchase of Maryland-titled hulks
only.24 2 To the extent Maryland influenced transactions between the
subsidized processor and its scrap haulers, scrap haulers can be seen
as merely responding to whatever incentive the processors passed
through as part of the subsidy. Moreover, the restraint also can be
explained as necessary and incidental to Maryland's proprietary decision to subsidize local processors. In Wunnicke, Alaska sold stateowned timber on the strict condition that a purchaser commit to instate processing. This condition acted as a downstream restraint on
the purchaser's subsequent transactions with its processors. The restraint cannot be justified by a proprietary interest in its purchaser's
timber processing transactions, nor was it necessary and incidental to
its proprietary decision to sell timber. With no basis to support the
restraint germane to Alaska's proprietary decision to sell its timber,
the restraint resembled an attempt at regulating outside the narrowly-defined timber market.
3. Heightened Regard for State Sovereignty.-Notions of
state sovereignty factored into the test of market participation in
Reeves: "Restraint in this area is also counseled by a consideration
of state sovereignty . . . . States may claim some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for
241. See supra note 113 for an analysis of the "working for the city" rationale offered in
White. Two cases involving state-mandated hiring preferences are helpful in locating the
boundary line between a state's proprietary choice of with whom it will deal and state downstream regulation of private economic choices. Compare White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (mayoral order requiring private construction
contractors to hire locally on public projects held within the realm of proprietary activity) with
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1978) ("Alaska Hire" law forcing virtually all businesses that benefitted "from the economic ripple effect" of Alaska's decision to develop stateowned oil and gas reserves held too broad and beyond the scope of the State's proprietary
interest).
242. See generally Coenen, supra note 112, at 469-70. As indicated above conditional
state subsidization creates much the same type of problem as state sales or purchases coupled
with downstream (or upstream) restraints. See supra notes 119-20. Both of these "means" are
to be measured against the proffered test of downstream regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
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whose benefit to deal. ' 248 This section depicts the market participant
doctrine as sounding a harmonious note with the views of federalism
advocated in National League of Cities v. Usery and Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. However, by analogy, the
doctrine begets a heightened regard for federalism because: (1) it
lies on the "negative" rather than "affirmative" side of the Commerce Clause; (2) it jeopardizes to a lesser degree the values associated with the dormant Commerce Clause; and (3) states can claim a
greater sovereign interest in preferring their citizens when a preference takes the form of market participation. 4 4 Initially, this section
digresses to consider the modern federalism debate. Implications in a
market participant context will follow.
a. The Federalism Debate: National League of Cities v.
Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.-In National League of Cities v. Usery,24 5 a case involving the
applicability of minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees, the Supreme Court
gleaned from the Tenth Amendment express constitutional support
for a "policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system."24 The Court spoke of the "State [as] . . .itself a
coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union" and concluded that "[tihis exercise of
congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of
government embodied in the Constitution. 21 7 Indeed, it was the continued independence, vitality, and meaningful existence of the states
that the Court sought to preserve by holding that "insofar as the
challenged amendments [to the FLSA] operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of 'traditional governmental functions,' they are not within the authority
granted Congress by [the Commerce Clause]." 24 8
243. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 & n.10 (1980).
244. Chief Judge Gibbons argued vehemently in his Swin dissent in support of the following proposition: "Garcia has since expressly dispensed with the doctrine of [National
League of Cities] . . . .In so doing, it has also effectively eliminated the Dixiecrat basis for
Alexandria Scrap, its progeny, and the market participant exception." Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). Although the Chief Judge's arguments will not be given
particularized attention, this section will serve generally as a critical response to his theory.
245. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
246. Id. at 843 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542. 547 n.7 (1975)).
247. Id. at 852.
248. Id.
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On strikingly similar facts, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority24 sounded the demise of National League of Cities while claiming a singular faithfulness to the values of federalism.
The traditional/nontraditional dichotomy announced in National
League of Cities was found not only "unworkable" in practice, but
also "inconsistent with principles of federalism." 25 The Court relied
on what often are cited as the foremost values of state sovereignty experimentation and diversity. The majority's rationale is worth setting out in full:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of
authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States
must remain equally free to engage in any activity that their
citizens chose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox
or unnecessary anyone else - including the judiciary - deems
state involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to
the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which
ones it dislikes. "The science of government . . . is the science
of experiment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821),
and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay the
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different
society left in private hands. " '
Garcia formulates a review construct providing equally less2" 2
protection from congressional regulation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Power. At the same time, the Garcia formulation eliminates all incentive to stagnate in the traditional. States are left with
equally less judicial protection to experiment in nontraditional programs or to continue with traditional governmental programs.2 "
249. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, a metropolitan transit authority sought Tenth
Amendment immunity from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA. Id.
at 530.
250. Id. at 531.
251. Id. at 546; see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (discussing "social experiments . . . in the insulated chambers afforded by the
States").
252. What had been a dual check on congressional overreaching (Tenth Amendment
limitations on the Commerce Power and the political process) became one - the political
process.
253. The two divergent views of state sovereignty focus on the manner by which the
Liebmann ideals can be safeguarded best. Compare E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265
(1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Permitting Congress, rather than the state, to dictate deci-
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Thus, the Supreme Court articulated a theory of state sovereignty
critical of the judicial crafting of "freestanding conceptions of state
sovereignty" based on a liberal reading of the Tenth Amendment.2 54
Instead, the Court chose to place greater reliance on the deliberate
"structur[ing] of the Federal Government." 2 55 While this treatment
may relegate much of the Tenth Amendment to a constitutional
platitude - freestanding values, the protection of which must be
found outside the Judiciary - the Court felt constrained not to
"carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may
not employ its delegated powers to displace."2 5 Indeed, by relinquishing to Congress the responsibility to check its own behavior, the
Court in Garcia emphasized the paucity of constitutional support for
the National League of Cities doctrine.
b. Implications in a Market Participant Framework.-Whether National League of Cities or Garcia is cited., one is
left with a sense that the Supreme Court was attempting to preserve
the values of federalism.2 57 The opinions differ only in their historical
and constitutional interpretation of the means envisioned by our
Forefathers to protect this high value. Despite the distinct constitutional bases (Tenth Amendment/Commerce Clause), it serves the
purposes of this Article to examine briefly the constitutional and theoretical weakness of the National League of Cities doctrine to establish whether similar impediments will arise in a market participant
context.
Unconvinced that the Tenth Amendment was adopted to serve
the unprecedented task of guardian of state sovereignty and dissatisfied with the test of traditional/nontraditional governmental functions, the Court in Garcia resolved to look elsewhere for such protections.258 The primary reason for the Court's reluctance was a belief
that the structure of the Constitution counselled against applying
sions on the age standard of state law enforcement officers turns the Liebmann ideal on its
head by removing all flexibility for a state "to find the best solutions to its own problems."
Indeed, this forces the states into a "Procrustean national mold.") with Garcia, 469 U.S. at
546 (Despite the greater vulnerability this approach entails, experimentation cannot flourish
when a state must pay the "added price" of uncertainty when its; sovereign interests are surrendered to the scrutiny of an unelected judiciary; a state should not have to choose between
the sanctuary of the traditional versus the perilous path of the nontraditional.).
254. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
255. Id. at 550-58.
256. Id. at 550.
257. See supra note 249; see generally supra Parts III.B. and IV.A.3.a.
258. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550 (referring to the deliberate structuring of federal
government).
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"freestanding notions of state sovereignty," especially when this

would remove from the federal government a power divested to it
explicitly in the Constitution, viz., the Commerce Power. At the
same time, the "structure" of the Federal Government itself provided an acceptable alternative - an alternative championed by the
Framers.
The Garcia Court's restrictive view of the constitutional sources

of state sovereignty does not transfer into a dormant Commerce
Clause or a market participant context. While most of the same federalist values remain, such as the states serving as "laboratories for
social and economic experiment ' 25 9 and the notion that some degree
of state autonomy is necessary to serve the states' differing and myriad needs, an affirmative abdication of state regulatory and participatory autonomy to the federal government is absent. Indeed, the
'dormant Commerce Clause is merely a judicially-implied limitation
on state power and, as such, warrants heightened judicial sensitivity

for concerns of state sovereignty. Furthermore, in a dormant Commerce Clause or a market participant context, there is no claimed

lack of congressional authority to displace state regulation or participation since, by definition, dormant Commerce Clause and market

participant jurisprudence exists when Congress has not yet spoken.260
Nor does the Garcia Court's reliance on Congress to safeguard
state sovereignty transfer well into a dormant Commerce Clause or a
market participant context. It is quite different to say that a state's
sovereignty is limited only by affirmative congressional enactments
than to say that a state's activities invalidated under the dormant
Commerce Clause are redressable through the political process. In
the former, the inertia of the federal government weighs on the side
of state sovereignty whereas, in the latter, the converse is true.2 61 In
259. See supra text accompanying note 251; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 438, 442 n.10 (1980).
260. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289-90 (1986)
(market participant doctrine has no application in those instances where Congress has acted);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (judicial review undpr the dormant
Commerce Clause is always subject to affirmative Commerce Clause revision by Congress).
261. Cf. Duckworth v. State of Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 394 (1941) ("there are many
matters . . . which, because of their local character and their number and diversity, . . . may
never be adequately dealt with by Congress"); see generally Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 222 (1957)
(adopting the view that congressional evaluation of state commercial regulation places "the
inertia of government . . .heavily on the side of the centrifugal forces of localism"); Manheim, supra note 63, at 614 (viewing redress through Congress as "impos[ing] on [the states]
the onus of overcoming Congress' 'inherent political inertia' "). Coupled with a belief that the
judiciary is institutionally incompetent to balance national and state interests, Professor Manheim argues not for a market participant exception, but for a complete judicial abdication of
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fact, it is the parochial view that the states should act as laboratories
and retain the flexibility "to determine as conditions demand, what

services and functions the public welfare requires

262
'

that frustrates

a national remedy by Congress. Congress would be hardpressed to

legislate in favor of the subsidy in Alexandria Scrap, the preference
in Reeves, or the hiring scheme in White because the programs were
localized and affected, at most, a small region. Waiting for Congress
to become sufficiently animated is the antithesis of the flexibility
sanctioned by the Court.
It also is useful to examine whether the market participant/reg-

ulator distinction tends to disserve the values of state sovereignty in
a manner reminiscent of the traditional/nontraditional distinction.
The two tests, to be sure, are no more than labels used to perform an
"accommodating function. ' 263 The Garcia Court disparaged the
traditional/nontraditional distinction because of its "unworkability"
and penchant for inconsistent results.26 The test's unworkability
stemmed from the absence of an articulated standard enabling the
judiciary to distinguish between that which was, or was not, a
"traditional governmental function." 26' 5 The label had no consistent
meaning beyond its utterance because the characterization necessarily involved a value judgment based on no settled criteria as to
whether a particular type of activity was "traditional. ' 26 6 The mar-

ket participant/regulator label, by contrast, hinges not on whether a
particular type of activity is involved, but on the form of governmental involvement.26 7 Market participation is a conclusion based on a
dormant Commerce Clause review in cases involving nondiscriminatory measures. See Manheim, supra note 63, at 610-16 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985)). Thus, Professor Manheim would retain dormani: Commerce Clause balancing only in those cases traditionally decided under a rule of strict scrutiny. See generally supra
Part III.B.I.
Cases decided under the market participant rule involve facial discrimination.
Therefore, Professor Manheim would advocate a rule of heightened review in such instances.
On this point we disagree. This Article suggests a contrary view based on a historical review of
the values supported by the dormant Commerce Clause.
262. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938)).
263. See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 107, at 1135-39 (advocating an analysis that
looks past the label toward the "accommodating function" performed by the governmental/
proprietary distinction).
264. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39, 547 (citing numerous cases involving either "traditional" or "nontraditional" governmental functions, but "find[ing] it difficult, if not impossible,
to identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first group on one side of
a line and each of the cases in the second group on the other side").
265. Id. at 541-42.
266. Id. at 539.
267. Professor Manheim argues that the proprietary/regulalory distinction used in market participant analysis falls of the same weight as the traditional/nontraditional distinction
used in affirmative Commerce Clause analysis pre-Garcia. See Manheim, supra note 63, at
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pool of relevant legal questions, most notably, whether the activity
involves state spending. Based on this and other concrete legal inquiries, the propriety of extending the exception can be evaluated. In
fact, as the doctrine is later refined, the dividing line should become

more rather than less clear.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the market participant/

regulator distinction breeds flexibility for the very reason that the
traditional/nontraditional distinction did not. A primary motivation
for overruling National League of Cities was the toll it placed on
state experimentation with the nontraditional. 68 In this respect, the
Garcia opinion and the market participant doctrine sound a harmonious note. So long as the form of a state's participation fits the mar-

ket participant construct, the type of activity is irrelevant. There is
no incentive drawing a state to a particular activity or disincentive
causing a state to opt against an activity.2" 9 Thus, states are accorded the sovereign flexibility to structure their operations with the
foremost thought being how best to serve the needs of their citizens.
Concerns for state sovereignty counsel in favor of the market
participant doctrine and Garcia lends inferential support. The next
question becomes why heightened concerns for state sovereignty
eliminate the need for a state market participant anticipatorily to

conform its activities to withstand dormant Commerce Clause review. Several reasons might be offered. First, the Tenth Amendment
states that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the
States respectively, or to people ... "27 One may presume that if
606-10. Labels notwithstanding, the Supreme Court in Garcia held that "[a]ny rule of state
immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which it dislikes." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 546 (1985). The test of market participation looks not to characterize the ends as in
Garcia, but to characterize the means by which a state accomplishes whatever it is doing.
268. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
269. To be sure, market participant immunity will influence the means utilized by a
state (proprietary versus regulatory) to achieve a given end. See Manheim, supra note 63, at
602-03. Market participant immunity should not, however, encourage one end over another
(traditional versus nontraditional). But see Manheim, supra note 63, at 602 (market participant immunity "encourages state entry into previously private realms"). To the contrary,
states remain equally free to partake in previously private or public activities under the market
participant rule.
To accept Professor Manheim's view of purported market participant activity, see supra
note 261, is to create an incentive toward a particular means - regulation - a much more
efficient means to any given end limited, according to Professor Manheim's theory, only by
affirmative act of Congress. But see generally supra Part IV.A.La. where the expensiveness of
state market participation delimits its efficiency.
270. U.S CONST. amend. X. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Tenth Amendment states but a truism that all is retained
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the values associated with the Commerce Clause and its "dormant"
component are not jeopardized by state market participation, then a
fortiori the states possess a stronger constitutional claim to be free
from federal constraints. The greater part of this Article has sought
" ' Second, when a state
to explain why this is so. 27
is expending its
citizens' tax dollars, local citizens can claim a greater interest in the
preferential redistribution back to themselves272 because, as a group,

they have funded the preference.
And last, market participation offers the states a unique vehicle
to enter markets otherwise left unexplored by the private sector be-

cause of significant market risks, prohibitive capital requirements, local public opposition, or heavy regulation. It is precisely where business risks are deemed unacceptable by the private sector that state
experimentation and creativity is needed. A state has the capacity to
spread the risks of a program to its citizenry as a whole, making this
form of activity an attractive solution. To subsidize a fledgling local
industry is another possible alternative. What is paramount is tlhat
the states retain the sovereign flexibility to choose, as conditions demand, how best to provide for their constituencies. A free-ride,
where neighboring states reap the rewards of another state's risk,
2 73
foresight, and industry, might discourage similar state programs.
The unavailability of preferential distribution thus may influence the
means utilized by the state to meet any given end. It is this influence

that conflicts with the freedom necessary to encourage "the science
of experiment" and to provide the freedom for "states [to] serv[e] as
'

social laboratories.

274

A formal test of state market participation can be offered: The

test of state market participation first asks the objective question of
whether state sales, purchases, or subsidizes are made available
through a program of state spending or otherwise involve property,
which has not been surrendered) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 11I,120 (1941)).
271. See generally supra Parts III and IV.
272. See supra notes 60-61 and notes 194-96, 200-01 and accompanying text.
273. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 249, 446 & n.19 (1980); see also supra note
197 and accompanying note 61.
274. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (citing
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See
generally Coenen, supra note 112, at 428 ("If states may limit the distribution of state resources to state residents through some channels (such as by building and operating schools)
but not through others (such as by building and operating cement plants), then we should
expect the states to favor the former type of activity over the latter.") (footnotes omitted);
Gergen, supra note 119, at 1112 ("Forced sharing of state-created goods may prevent the
people of a state from maximizing their value."); Varat, supra note 63, at 522 (Preferential
distribution is most desirable "whenever the requirements of equal sharing with nonresidents
would result in no program being created for anyone.").
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goods, or services owned by the state in a nonfictional sense. If so,
then the constitutional balance tips presumptively in favor of the
measure in light of the state's heightened sovereignty interest coupled with a reduced threat to nationalist and free trade values. At
this point, a party challenging the measure may seek to rebut the
presumption with evidence that serves to readjust the market participant balance, as will be discussed below.2 75 This test is the essence of
the shorthand proprietary/regulatory dichotomy.
V.

Principles Applied to the Swin Decision

What remains is to apply the principles set forth above to the
Court of Appeals' reasoning in Swin set forth generally in Part I.
Most of what is troubling about the Swin opinion is not what was
said, but what was overlooked. In light of the current controversy
surrounding the market participant doctrine's theoretical underpinnings, 76 a more precise application of the doctrine is warranted.
Part V seeks to harmonize the approach taken by the Third Circuit
with the test of market participation set forth in Part IV.
A.

Is the Lycoming Landfill a Product of State Spending?

An initial shortcoming of the Swin opinion derives from the
court's rather cavalier response to Swin's contention that "Lycoming
cannot be a market participant because the landfill is on federal government land and its start-up costs were paid for, in part, with federal funds. '2 77 Consider the one sentence response: "[T]he identity
of Lycoming's lessor is irrelevant, and a federal subsidy cannot distinguish Lycoming's preference for local garbage from Boston's hiring preference for jobs on construction projects funded by city administered federal grant money. '2 78 The record indicates that at
virtually no direct cost,2 79 Lycoming secured from the Federal Bureau of Prisons a permit to occupy and construct a public landfill on
a 130-acre tract of land at the Federal Prison Camp Reservation,
Allenwood, Pennsylvania.2 8 ° Additionally, a significant if not pri275. See generally infra Parts V.B.3. and V.C.
276. See, e.g., Christine Kellett, The Market Participant Doctrine - No Longer "Good
Sense or Sound Law," 10 TEMP. ENV'L. L. & TECH. J. 169 (1991) (favoring complete judicial
abdication of the doctrine).
277. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
278. Id.
279. See infra note 290.
280. Swin, 883 F.2d at 247. Specific statutory authorization is found at 43 U.S.C. §
931(c) (1986). Section 931(c) authorizes the "head of any department or agency of the Gov-
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mary source of funding for the initial construction of the Lycoming
facility- (totalling $1,300,000) was federal grant money obtained
through the Appalachian Regional Commission ("ARC"). 8 1 These
facts combine to raise the issue of whether Lycoming was redistributing benefits to those who combined to produce them "82 or simply
"sowing someone else's oats?" 2 83 Overlooked was that state market
activity might lose its market participant character and implicate,
more acutely, dormant Commerce Clause values, associated with economic protectionism in light of the source of funding employed by a
state entering the market.
Perhaps the court's brusque treatment can be explained by considering language directly preceding the court's above-quoted one
sentence response. Through a series of analogies the court likened
Lycoming's preference to market preferences receiving Supreme
Court imprimatur:
If Maryland may decree that only those with Maryland auto
hulks will receive state bounties, it would seem that Lycoming
can similarly decree that only local trash will be disposed of in
its landfill on favorable terms.
If South Dakota may give preference to local concrete buyers
when a severe shortage makes the resource scarce, it would seem
that Lycoming may similarly give preference. to local garbage
(and hence local garbage-producing residents) when a shortage
of disposal sites makes landfills scarce.
And if Boston may limit jobs to local residents, we see no reason
why Lycoming may not limit preferential use of its landfill to
local garbage (and hence local garbage-producing residents). 8'
The court is misguided to the extent it suggests, that factual similarities between the types of preferences or between the extents of interstate commercial burdens define the test of market participation.
Properly focused, the test of market participation looks to the manernment of the United States . . . to grant . . . permits . . . for a period not to exceed thirty
years . . . for the purpose of constructing and maintaining on such lands public buildings or
other public works." id. (emphasis added).
281. See Swin, 883 F.2d at 248. Statutory authority for the grant is found at 40 U.S.C.
App. §§ 1-2 (1986).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 196, and notes 200-01 and accompanying
text.
283. This is a parody on Professor Coenen's "sowing and reaping" rationale. See
Coenen, supra note 112, at 423 ("As a matter of both equity and accepted notions of the
nature of property, the citizens of a state may reap where they have sown.") (citation
omitted).
284. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County. 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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ner by which a preference is made, i.e., the form or means by which
a state prefers its citizens.288 It is not, as intimated by the Swin majority, because a preference affects commerce in a more or less
threatening manner from a perspective of free trade. To be sure, the
extent of the interstate commercial burden is relevant to a determination of whether a state has erected a trade barrier or is merely
regulating in disguise,2 86 but this step need only be reached after a
preliminary judicial determination of whether the state is using either its spending or regulatory power. In sum, the Swin court's cryptic analogies that compare only the types of preferences without considering the reasons why the Supreme Court has held such
preferences to be sufficiently narrowly-tailored to fit the market participant model seem rather superficial and unhelpful.
That this misstep immediately preceded review of Swin's
claimed lack of state spending explains the court's countenance of
the similarities between Lycoming's and Boston's preferences. More
importantly, it illustrates a preoccupation with whether Lycoming
looked like a participant in the market, rather than whether Lycoming acted like a market participant. Hence, the court overlooked the
centrality of state spending viewed as a return of capital to those
responsible for funding the state treasury and, specifically, the logic
of White and its teachings that special consideration is warranted
when market participation is marked by the influx of foreign
funds. 87 Two alternatives were available: (1) the court might have
considered the propriety of extending the market participant rule to
those instances where an alleged market participant program is
funded partially through foreign funds; or (2) the court might have
shifted to an affirmative spending power context and addressed
whether Congress, by funding the program, "affirmatively permit[ted] the type of parochial favoritism"2 88 practiced by Lycoming.
Initially, a broad reading should be afforded the term "funding"
which, in this instance, appropriately includes not only the
$1,300,000 ARC grant money, 289 but also the value of the land per285. See generally supra Parts IV.A.l. and IV.A.2.
286. See generally supra Parts IV.A.2.a. and IV.A.2.b.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79 and 210-12.
288. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 467 U.S. 209, 213
(1983); see supra note 86 where the Wunnicke plurality clarified that congressional sanction
must be "clearly expressed;" see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802 (1992)
("Congress must manifest its unambiguous intent before a federal statute will be read to permit or to approve such a violation of the Commerce Clause.
...
).
289. Although not in the record, research by the author indicates that ARC funding
represented well over 50% of the landfill's original construction costs.
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mit granted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.29 Significantly, the
value of both the permit and grant monies derived pursuant to fed-

eral statute. The facts, therefore, solicit an inquiry into whether
Congress affirmatively permitted Lycoming's parochial favoritism. A
review of the ARC charter reveals a clear expression by Congress to
provide economic support to a defined geographic region, 91 much
like the federal program in White was designed to benefit residents
in the local Boston project area. Likewise, a fair interpretation of 43
U.S.C. § 931(c) authorizing the issuance of federal permits to occupy federal land "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining
on such lands public buildings or other public works" also reveals a
clear intent by Congress to subsidize local governments so that they
may better serve their local constituencies.

Accordingly, insofar as Lycoming applied local revenues to construct the landfill, there was state spending consistent with the test

of market participation;2 92 insofar as the Lycoming landfill was sub-

sidized through a federal ARC grant and a federal land permit,
Lycoming was acting pursuant to affirmative sanction by Congress,
and the dormant Commerce Clause and the market participant doctrine are no longer relevant.2 93 Ultimately, to remain true to the doc-

trine's constitutional underpinnings and to interject a limiting principle as well as a workable standard, the courts should not consider

the origin of state funding "irrelevant."
B.

Are There Tendencies Toward Hostile Trade Barriers?

Concern with trade barriers forms a central theme of this Article: whether the market participant doctrine allows the states to do
by market participation what the Court in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey was trying to prevent them from doing directly. The an290. In full consideration for the permit, Lycoming agreed to accept at no charge all
wastes from both the U.S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, PA, and the Federal Prison Camp, Allenwood, PA. Complaint, exhibit C at 15, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County,
678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (No. 87-1565). To say that Lycoming received a bargain
would woefully understate the value of this land. That it supplied a primary component to
Lycoming's operations wholly rebuts its "irrelevance."
291. See The Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, 40 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-2,
Title I § 2 (1986) ("It is, therefore, the purpose of this Act to assist the region in meeting its
special problems . . . .The public investments made under this Act shall be concentrated in
areas where there is a significant potential for future growth.
...
) (emphasis added); see
also id. Title II, Part C. § 224 ("In considering programs and projects to be given assistance
under this Act . . .[pertinent is) the population and area to be served by the project or class
of projects . . . and the unemployment rates in the area . . . or the economic and social
development of the area served by the project.") (emphasis added).
292. See generally supra Parts III.B.2., IV.A., and IV.A.I.
293. See supra text accompanying note 288.
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swer has three components: (1) whether Lycoming's landfill operations pose a danger of creating trade barriers such that Pennsylvania
might become isolated from the interstate market in solid waste disposal; (2) whether there looms the potential for proliferation such
that concerns identical to those in the first component are realized,

raising national hostilities, resentment, and implicating core dormant
Commerce Clause values; and (3) whether a "gpecial rule" should be
applied where a state claims participation in the market for natural
resources. Considerations of state sovereignty will be discussed in
passim, particularly in Part V.B.3. This section will conclude with
an evaluation of whether Lycoming was regulating "upstream."
1. The Lycoming Facility: A Microcosm.-When a state exer-

cises its spending (rather than regulatory) power, there inheres a
lesser potential for trade barriers. 9 4 Lycoming participated as a
seller in the market. As with any seller in the market, Lycoming's

market influence was limited by its market power to control price or
exclude competition. Specifically, foreign waste haulers/processors

had the remaining options of either searching for alternate recycling/disposal sites within Pennsylvania (either public or private),
or purchasing land (or a landfill) within Pennsylvania to accommodate their interstate disposal needs.29 5 Hence, Lycoming's policy to
294. See generally supra Part IV.A.2.
295. As a practical matter, these options have been curtailed somewhat by Executive
Order 1989-8 issued by Governor Casey. Exec. Order No. 1989-8, reprinted in, 19 PA, BULL.
4598 (1989). Executive Order 1989-8 calls for an interim moratorium on DER review of applications and the issuance of new permits for municipal waste landfills unless the applicant
demonstrates that at least 70% of the municipal waste proposed to be received at the facility
is generated within Pennsylvania. Id. at §§ 7.471 (a), (a)(1). The Order does not raise an issue
of market participation, for it is clearly regulatory in application to public and private landfills
generally. Indeed, it is this type of activity that directly implicates the concerns addressed by
the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
An en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently declared Executive Order 1989-8 invalid, not on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, but "because the Governor had neither constitutional nor statutory authority to issue [the] executive order." National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Casey, 600 A.2d 260, 265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
Constitutional separation of powers doctrine divests the Governor of Pennsylvania of authority
to legislate by executive fiat. Id. (citing Shapp v. Butera, 348 A.2d 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975)).
For an interesting dormant Commerce Clause analysis of Executive Order 1989-8, see
Johnson, supra note 73. The commentator takes the position that due to Pennsylvania's regulation and mandated recycling of municipal waste, Pennsylvania cannot be seen as discriminating against foreign municipal waste when it conditions the award of a permit for a new landfill, resource recovery facility, or landfill capacity expansion on the assurance that no more
than 30% of the waste sent to these facilities will be of foreign origin. Johnson, supra note 73,
at 149-53 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 955-56 (1982)).
Sporhase involved a Nebraska statute that required any person intending to withdraw
ground water from a Nebraska well to apply for a permit. A permit would be granted if the
"request [was] reasonable, [and] not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water
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limit the importation of waste from outside the 51/2 county area did
not dictate with whom its Pennsylvania competitors might deal or

who might enter the market as a competitor. 9 Concern with trade
barriers and/or state "hoarding" was minimal because alternatives
were available over which Lycoming had no control. This activity
bears little resemblance to "market regulation" wherein a state announces a general rule of trade. It poses a lesser potential to embargo the flow of waste at state lines as seen in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey.2 97 In this respect, the Swin opinion is consistent with
a growing body of landfill jurisprudence finding like conduct suffi2 98
ciently distinguishable from that in Philadelphia.

.NEB.
REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). Nebraska also had enacted "severe withdrawal
and use limitations on its own citizens," including mandated installation of water flow meters,
specified amounts of water to be used for irrigation per acre, and strict limitations on the
intrastate transfer of ground water. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955. The Supreme Court felt that
the standards applicable to the interstate transfer of ground water "may well [have been] no
more strict in application than the limitations upon intrastate transfers" and offered four reasons to support the Nebraska effort. Id. at 956-57. Evenhandedness was animating the Court
in Sporhase.
Pennsylvania has enacted no volume restrictions on the disposal of Pennsylvania waste,
much less volume restrictions nearly as severe in application to the disposal of Pennsylvania
waste as the relative 30% volume cap on foreign waste. To be sure, mandated source-separation and collection of recyclables, and the separation of leaf wastes, see 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 4000.1501(c) (Supp. 1991), should have the effect of reducing the volume of Pennsylvania waste landfilled in Pennsylvania. The stated goal of recycling 25% of all Pennsylvania
municipal waste and source-separated recyclable material by January 1, 1997 is laudable.
Mandated recycling, however, absent express landfill use (volume) restrictions, is considerably
less strict in application than is an express use restriction on foreign waste.
The Supreme Court in Sporhase sanctioned as "evenhanded" regulation that treated foreign and local commerce differently. But while differing means were utilized to regulate local
and foreign commerce in ground water, the burdens were very much the same. In each instance, the use of Nebraska ground water was restricted. Executive Order 1989-8, however,
creates an import cap similar to a partial trade barrier against foreign waste destined to specified Pennsylvania facilities. No such cap or use restriction applies to local waste. As such,
familiar concerns with trade barriers and economic protectionism increase. See generally
supra Parts III.B.I.
and III.B.2. No credit is given to foreign waste imported from states with
comparable recycling plans or operative recycling programs. Nor is it clear why the October
1989 executive order can be supported by recycling programs not yet in place. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.1501(a), (b) (Supp. 1991) (based on population, municipalities had until
either September 28, 1990 or September 28, 1991 to establish and implement their programs).
Measured against the four reasons offered in support of the Nebraska program, none serves to
support Executive Order 1989-8 to the degree found in Sporhase.
296. See generally supra Part IV.A.2. for a description of how state market participants
work through the free market whereby their market influence is limited by their market power.
297. See supra text accompanying note 172 where an absence of alternatives animated
the Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
298. See, e.g., Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987) (holding
that the practical effect of a local waste disposal preference adopted by a state-owned landfill
agency was indistinguishable from the regulatory effect in Philadelphia, yet the preference
was upheld because the landfill was purchased and partially funded by the State of Rhode
Island); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Service Distr., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or.
1986) (applying the market participant exception and finding Philadelphia distinguishable as
involving the hoarding of all land available for landfills), af"d on different grounds, 820 F.2d
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Lycoming's pricing scheme operated to the economic advantage
of local haulers and the local community at-large by offering low-

cost disposal and postponing the day when it would have to look elsewhere at greater cost for its disposal needs.299 But, as seen above,300
interstate commercial burden alone, without attention to the form of
the burden (protectionist or nonprotectionist) and whether the burden emanates from a program of state spending, provides an insufficient basis upon which to determine the requisite level of dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, or whether dormant Commerce Clause
review even is necessary. Quantitatively, the amount of market distortion (local "benefits" or interstate "burdens") radiating from the
Lycoming pricing scheme parallels the burden on the local fisk necessary to construct and operate the Lycoming facility. Qualitatively,
there is no "wrenching" of a competitive advantage earned elsewhere
thereafter conferred on local economic actors.30 1 Lycoming's prefer-

ential disposal policy (within this micro-perspective) has neither a
propensity to burden free trade in a manner tending toward hostile

trade barriers, nor a resemblance to a form of state activity implicating core nationalist values under the dormant Commerce Clause.
2. Proliferation: A Macro-Perspective.-At least two commentators have suggested that state participation in the landfill disposal market has the potential of engendering economic Balkaniza1842 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirmed under traditional dormant Commerce Clause review); Waste
Aid Sys., Inc. v. Citrus County, 613 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (finding no "hoarding"
under Philadelphia where interstate transport of waste remains viable and otherwise unaffected beyond a ban on disposal at county-owned landfill); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (Philadelphia held inapposite where ordinance
preferred local waste at District-owned landfill); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984); but cf. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (state statute banning all interstate transportation and
storage of out-of-state hazardous waste held invalid despite state proprietary ownership of the
site), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
Spellman presents a unique blend of both proprietary and regulatory activity. The State
of Washington, proprietor of the Richland low-level radioactive dump site, enacted a statute
prohibiting not only the disposal of foreign low-level waste at its site, but also denying the
importation of all foreign low-level radioactive waste (including criminal and civil penalties for
violations thereof). The Ninth Circuit found the "initiative [to be] cast in state regulatory
rather than in proprietary terms [and] based on public safety rather than economic considerations." Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631. Two factors impelled the court: (1) the regulation closed
the State's borders to the importation of all low-level radioactive waste (not just to the Richland site); and (2) the measure established criminal and civil penalties "which only a state and
not a mere proprietor can enforce." Id.
299. Recall that what was offensive in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey was that New
Jersey foisted upon "out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's
remaining landfill space." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
300. See generally supra Parts III.B.2. and IV.A.2.
301. See generally supra Part lI1.B.2.
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tion by eliminating or preventing private sector competition.3 0 2 To be
sure, continued private participation in the landfill disposal market is
desirous, but an apocalyptic concern for its survival is unwarranted
at this time. Several reasons suggest why this is so.
The form of market participation should frustrate any stateattempted withdrawal from the private sector of the inputs necessary
for private market entry, viz., land.303 But what precludes a state
from applying its fiscal resources to the same end, creating a competitive market barrier to private market participation? 304 In practice, so long as an interstate market exists, any state competitive
trade barriers designed to eliminate the local private sector would be
in vain, or violative of the antitrust laws (presuming their applicability to state market participants). In theory, the market participant
doctrine should not extend to permit such anticompetitive behavior.
On the practical side, consider a hypothetical program of state
participation in the landfill disposal market coupled with an operational plan of state-owned landfill subsidization. Presumably, the
state could make it uneconomical for state-generated waste disposers
to deposit at non-state-owned landfills. Privately-owned landfills
would receive little local business, forcing them either to accept
waste at the lower "state" rate (at the risk of not meeting costs), or
to turn to the interstate market for business. As a practical matter,
this program would prove of limited utility since it creates incentives
antithetical to the reduction of foreign waste importation. Further3 06 of
more, both the enormous expense35 and political unpopularity
such a program would serve as effective deterrents.
But what if the interstate market slowly evaporated? Conceivably, one state's competence might be another state's incentive to follow suit, thus paving the way toward state self-sufficiency." 7 Principles of "attempted monopolization"30 8 and "predatory pricing"3 9
302. See Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 804-10 (state participation in the
landfill services market tends toward destruction of private sector competition); cf. Gergen,
supra note 119, at 1142-43 (troubled that publicly-owned enterprises might displace private
ones).
303. See infra notes 339-45 and accompanying text; see also generally Part IV.A.I.a.
304. See Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 804-05 (observing that through the
use of operational subsidies states derive an unfair competitive advantage over private sector
competitors); see generally supra note 63.
305. See generally supra Part IV.A.l.a. (discussing how the expensiveness of state market participation may serve to limit proliferation).
306. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part Ill.B.2.a.
where the elimination of the private sector would be politically accountable.
307. See generally infra Part VI.B. Self-sufficiency may be a worthwhile goal, but not at
the expense of the private sector.
308. The seminal case of "attempted monopolization," Swift & Co. v. United States,
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embodied in § 2 of the Sherman Act may serve as additional checks
if the antitrust laws are applied to state market participants. 10 With
a dwindling interstate market, the relevant geographic market could
be defined by a state's territorial boundaries.3 11 Within this geographic market, any state-attempted exclusion or elimination of private market participation absent proof of superior efficiency - be it
through subsidization (where pricing falls below average variable
cost) or through exclusionary regulation - could be seen as an "attempt at monopolizing" the landfill market, a market characterized

by high entry barriers.31 2
Practical difficulties and potential antitrust concerns notwithstanding, any state attempt at eliminating private market participation by anticompetitive means would be inconsistent with the market
participation doctrine's theoretical underpinnings as a return of capital to those who fund the state treasury. It should be recalled that
state spending programs were found generally less hostile constitutionally because a state was seen not as announcing a general rule of
trade or otherwise regulating free market entry. 1 3 State market participation characterized by anticompetitive behavior is merely an al314
ternative vehicle for a state to regulate a local market indirectly
absent dormant Commerce Clause constraints. 31 5 To allow this type
196 U.S. 375 (1905), sets forth a tripartite test of: (1)a specific intent to control prices or
eliminate competition; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing this
unlawful purpose: and (3) a dangerous probability of success. See also Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (advertising policy adopted with the specific intent of
destroying or eliminating competition). See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, §§

6.1-6.5 (1985).
309. Predatory pricing is evidence of the "conduct" element under a claimed "attempt
to monopolize" trade. See supra note 308. Professors Areeda and Turner are credited with the
test of predatory pricing. See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see
also PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, vol. 3, at 154-72 (1978). Their
economic test of predatory pricing reduces to three ecumenical conclusions: (1)pricing above
average total cost is nonpredatory; (2) pricing at or above average variable cost (a surrogate
for marginal cost) is presumed nonpredatory; and (3) pricing below average variable cost is
conclusively presumed predatory. Compare Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) (pricing above average total cost presumed nonpredatory), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983) with Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227
(Ist Cir. 1983) (pricing above average total costs conclusively presumed nonpredatory).
310. See supra note 231.
311. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575 (1966) (finding "the nation" to be the geographic market because, inter alia, "the manufacturing business of [defendant] is interstate").
312. See supra note 208 and accompanying text for the significance of entry barriers
with respect to market share and market power.
313. See generally supra Parts IV.A., IV.A.I., and IV.A.2.
314. Cf. supra note 59 discussing the Supreme Court's departure from the pre-1938
"direct"/"indirect" distinctions found in early dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
315. To the extent a state develops sufficient market power to exclude private-sector
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of market participant end-run wherein a state's borders remain open
in theory, but closed in fact, creates the same problems as those confronted in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. To allow a state to
thwart private market entry is to burden the interstate market in
return for local resource security. Such indirect market regulation

raises familiar concerns of isolationism, trade barriers, and economic
protectionism.
Unfortunately, while perhaps sound in theory, these statements
say nothing of the circumstances that place certain state market activity on one side of the participant/regulator line and not on the
other. A proper balance must be maintained between beneficial state

market participation even in the face of a pronounced lack of private
market participation, and deleterious state market participation
eliminating the prospects of viable private market participation. As a
rule, substantial state police regulation of an industry (the waste disposal industry in particular) should not deprive the state of the opportunity to participate in the regulated market. 3 6 Traditional dormant Commerce Clause doctrine will serve as a check on direct state

regulation applied to augment a state market participant's market
share."1 Antitrust principles of "monopolization" ' 1 8 and "attempted
monopolization" '1 9 should help to discern state proprietary conduct
from indirect market regulation. The antitrust laws (if applicable) or
traditional dormant Commerce Clause review should serve as a
check on indirect state regulation disguised as market participation.
The bases for these conclusions are offered below.
Several commentators have assumed that states can and will,
under the guise of market participation, augment their competitive

market position by use of discriminatory regulation.320 Can a state
competition, it regulates market entry similar to a monopolist's competitive exclusion of
competition.
316. But see Geo. Note, supra note 63, at 579-80 ("If jurisdictions are simultaneously
regulating the landfill services market and participating in it, they :;hould not be allowed recourse to the market participant exception.").
317. See generally supra Parts IlI.B. and II1.B.1.
318. The test of "monopolization" includes two elements: (I) market power in a relevant
market; and (2) the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by anticompetitive
or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes. See Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985) (reiterating the test of "monopolization" announced in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
319. See supra note 308 for the test of "attempted monopolization."
320. See Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 809-10 (concerned that the state as
"regulator" of landfill permitting, siting, operations, etc., might "discourage private entrants to
the field and accomplish exactly the goal that the State of New Jersey attempted to accomplish indirectly").
The commentators note:
[W]hen the state enters the disposal market by constructing a disposal facility
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regulate to: (1) amend its landfill licensing provisions so as to deny
permits to private market participants; (2) repeal its landfill licensing provisions once state market dominance is established; or (3)
condemn and purchase all private landfill facilities, where such regu-

lation is coupled with an operational plan of state participation in
the market? Alternatively, as a fourth option, can a state subsidize
private landfill operators conditioned on their promise not to accept
out-of-state waste?

State market participation derives from a state's spending
power - a power that must be kept distinct from its power to regulate for the general welfare. The state regulator of landfill permitting, siting, and monitoring cannot disguise protectionist regulation
and evade dormant Commerce Clause review simply by participating
in the landfill disposal market. Any one of the above-enumerated
regulatory options unaccompanied by a compelling nonprotectionist
purpose and an absence of less discriminatory alternatives, 2 1 would
be assailable as regulation discriminatory in effect indistinguishable
a22
from the regulatory plan in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
limited to in-state wastes, while having the power to enact regulations that operate to impede the disposal of out-of-state operated facilities within the state, the
state is using its position as regulator to guarantee market share rather than
market competition.
Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 809; see also Geo. Note, supra note 63, at 579, 581
("States conceivably could keep out all out-of-state waste by banning out-of-state waste from
publicly owned landfills and by preventing the construction of privately owned landfills.");
David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1337-38 (1989) [hereinafter U. Pa. Comment] (suggesting that a state, consistent with
the market participant doctrine, might "run . . .every [landfill] facility within its territory"
and, further, might either "repeal . . . its licensing provisions, or [maintain a] past practice
demonstrat[ing] [an] unwillingness to license private facilities").
321. See generally supra Part III.B.I. A complete state regulatory disability is not suggested, however. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has acknowledged for over a century the
"importance to its people that a state have the power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) (quoting Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)); see also id. at 341-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that state has a "substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of fish
and game and other natural resources within its boundaries for the benefit of its citizens.");
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951, 953 (1982) (strong state interest in
preserving and conserving scarce water resources). In fact, the Philadelphia Court assumed
that New Jersey could regulate the exhaustion of its landfill resources as long as the State
"pursue[ed] [these] ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills,
even though interstate commerce may be incidentally affected." City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
322. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (plain effect of import restriction was to protect the
local economy by eliminating interstate commerce in solid wastes); see also Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma effort guarding the local economy by prohibiting
the interstate shipment of locally seined minnows); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (effect of apple grading regulation was to protect local
industry); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (regulation of licensing
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The market participant doctrine would be inapposite as each of these
options clearly involves market regulation or, as for the fourth option, "downstream" market regulation. s2 a The absence of state monopoly control of the inputs, i.e., regulatory control of landfill permitting/siting in neighboring states,33 2 or a similar burden falling on
local private industry, 2 5 would be irrelevant.
A complicated duality exists, however, when a state acts as both
market regulator and market participant. Market conditions may afford a state participant considerable market share, and, simultaneously, state regulation may create significant barriers to private entry effectively solidifying the state's market share into market
power.3a 6 The Court in Reeves was not presented with this situation,
yet hinted that prohibitory regulation could have made a difference.3 27 As a rule, both state and private market participants should
remain equally liable for compliance with evenhanded environmental
regulations that serve important state ends. In fact, when evenhanded regulations deter private entry, one might argue that state
market participation in some form is most desirous.3 28 Returning to
protecting the local economy).
At least one state has attempted to augment its market posi:ion in the landfill disposal
market with discriminatory regulation. See Stephen D. Devito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v.
RISWMC, 700 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1991), affid per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (Ist Cir. 1991)
(protectionist measure held invalid where all waste originating or collected in-state had to be
disposed at state-licensed facilities). More than being facially discriminatory, the regulation in
DeVito Trucking had the discriminatory effect of conferring a benefit on Rhode Island as
proprietor of the State's largest landfill. Id. at 777, 782.
323. Consistent with the proffered test of downstream regulation, see supra notes 238-42
and accompanying text, conditional subsidization of this nature restrains downstream transactions between the private landfill operator and his waste suppliers. Unlike the subsidy in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), involvinE the proprietary decision to
bid-up the price of automobile hulks, the subsidy to landfill operators is nothing more than the
purchase of a promise to discriminate against out-of-state waste. Because the subsidy creates a
barrier to downstream transactions, those affected adversely cannot be seen as "working for
the state," nor can the state justify the restraint on the basis of a pass-through benefit to the
downstream industry. To the extent that the purpose of the subsidy is to restrain downstream
private transactions, it cannot be seen as necessary and incidental to an otherwise legitimate
public purpose as in Alexandria Scrap.
324. But see U. Pa. Comment, supra note 320, at 1338 (suggesting that despite exclusive state ownership of disposal facilities, similar licensing practices would be permissible because the state does not have a "monopoly on the inputs necessary to create disposal capacity
elsewhere"). In Philadelphia, it was no excuse that the state was powerless to blockade the
import of wastes to neighboring states.
325. See supra note 148 for the proposition that a state cannot defend its legislation on
the ground that some local industry is subject to the same constraints as interstate firms.
326. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
327. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980) ("Nor has [South Dakota] restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up [cement] plants within its
borders.").
328. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446; see also supra notes 273-74 and preceding text. But
see U. Pa. Comment, supra note 320, at 1311 (noting that since ,I% of the nation's landfills
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the "monopolization" analogy, when general economic constraints
and regulations supported by important state interests serve to limit
private entry, a state's market power can be viewed as unaccompanied by the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by

anticompetitive or exclusionary means.329 Direct state regulation of
the market in which it participates should stand or fall as a product
of traditional dormant Commerce Clause review.
Absent direct, protectionist state regulation, state market par-

ticipation characterized by anticompetitive behavior may become an
alternative vehicle to regulate a local market indirectly; the question
is how to isolate such behavior. State market participation is damaging when it becomes exclusionary. Exclusionary state market partici-

pation is that which inhibits private market participation by anticompetitive or exclusionary means, be it through predatory pricing
or through attempting to monopolize the factors of production, to list
two examples. When, however, state-created competitive barriers to
private market participation remain at a minimum and private sector opportunities remain, there is greater reason to afford market
participant status even when private market participation is lacking.330 In fact, in each case applying the market participant exception, the Supreme Court recognized the potential for indirect regulation, yet found the state's market influence to be narrowly-tailored in
scope.3 3 1 By analogy, it was suggested above33 ' that just as a private
firm with significant market share lacks the power to exploit those
with whom it deals when market entry barriers are minimal, the
same should hold true for a state market participant.
Since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, courts
have grappled with the proper balancing of acceptable business
are owned and operated by state and local government, "the practical impact of these rulings
on the interstate transportation of solid waste is to let the exception swallow the Philadelphia
v. New Jersey rule"). The Philadelphia rule was one against economic protectionism and trade
barriers. See supra notes 143, 146 and 148. This rule can and does survive despite heavy state
or local participation in the landfill market. Indeed, where free market forces, i.e., capital
requirements or the high costs of regulatory compliance, deter private entry, state participation
in some form is desirous. One commentator has needlessly compounded the cause for alarm by
equating the 81 % ownership figure with a "proliferation of state-owned landfills." Manheim,
supra note 63, at 597 n.293. This figure, however, merely represents the statistical distribution
of landfill ownership as of 1988.
329. See supra note 318.
330. Compare Lefrancois v. State 6f R.I., 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1206, 1212 (D.R.I. 1987)
(despite public ownership of Rhode Island's only landfill that would accept all categories of
non-hazardous waste, four license applications for private landfills were pending at the time of
suit) with Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir, 1984) (state monopoly
control of all available sites over which oil concern could transport off-shore oil).
331. See supra note 107.
332. See generally supra Part IV.A.2.a.
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growth versus growth that is harmful to competition. Applied to

state market participants, well-settled principles of "monopolization"
and "attempted monopolization" should provide an adequate theoretical approach for discerning state proprietary conduct from indirect state market regulation. The antitrust law3 (if applicable) or
traditional dormant Commerce Clause review should serve as a
check on indirect stdte regulation disguised as market participation.
3. State "Hoarding"and a Limited Natural Resource Exception: Readjusting the Balance.-Undeniably, a primary component
used in the construction of solid waste landfills is land - the quintessence of a natural resource. 33 Mindful of their value, the Su-

preme Court has denounced state hoarding of natural resources.33
Swin borrowed from dicta in Reeves"3 5 and argued in favor of a natural resources exception. The Court of Appeals' initial response, itself dicta, is disturbing: "[D]espite the Supreme Court's dicta, ex-

cepting natural resources from the reach of the doctrine is
inconsistent with the doctrine's theoretical foundation, as a state selling a natural resource is 'participating in the market.' ""' In its
holding, the Swin majority avoided the "difficult question" of
"[w]hether there is a natural resource exception to the market participant doctrine." ' 7 Drawing on the logic of Reeves, the court first
noted: "The Lycoming landfill is . . . 'not simply happenstance,' but
is at least to some extent like South Dakota's cement plant in that

government funds were needed to construct it."'' 3 Second, the court
rejected the notion that the Lycoming landfill is a "natural resource"
simply because it was built on land. 339 The court felt a more particularized inquiry was warranted:
Rather than land in general, one might consider the natural re333. "Natural resource" should be defined to encompass 2.11resources supplied by nature, either replenishing, nonreplenishing, living, inanimate, scarce or plentiful, for which
human invention can fashion no substitute.
334. Associated with natural resources is firmly-established constitutional precedent
against parochial state legislation restricting their movement interstate. See supra note 73.
335. See generally supra note 66 and accompanying text.
336. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 252 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). See supra full paragraph accompanying note 287

where the court incorrectly focuses on Lycoming's "participation in the market."
337.
338.

Id.
Id. (citation omitted). As a corollary, the court found "another complication in

relying upon a natural resource exception . . .[as] flow[ing] from the idea that local benefits
should follow local burdens." Id. at 253. Few communities welccme landfill sites and, according to the Third Circuit, those who are burdened by their exis;tence should also derive the
benefit of preferential access. Id.
339. Id. at 253.
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source to be the land that is practicably available for the construction of a landfill. Such land could, presumably, be distinguished from land available for the construction of a cement
plant through the introduction of evidence that land available
for cement plants is plentiful and land available for landfills is
scarce.
Although it would make some sense . . . to distinguish between land in general and land practicably available for the construction of landfills, it would nevertheless be problematic to use
such an availability figure to determine whether landfills constitute a natural resource . . . . To the extent that a shortage of
landfill-available land is caused by . . . political factors, characterizing landfill-available land as being in short supply (and
hence distinguishable from land available for cement plants)
would seem inconsistent with a "happenstance" rationale for the
natural resources exception to the market participant doctrine,
as past and present political choices are not the product of geological happenstance.340
In conclusion, the court in Swin believed that it was not presented
with a case "in which the state ha[d] hoarded a resource like coal or
oil that [was] geologically peculiar to [the] state."'3 4 While conceding the possibility of a natural resources exception, the court nonetheless found that:
The present case is not one in which a state has "hoard[ed] resources which by happenstance are found there" . . . . Furthermore, given Lycoming's recycling program, one could say, as the
Supreme Court did with respect to Nebraska's water conservation program, that "the continuing availability of [the landfill] is
not simply happenstance; the natural resource has some indicia
of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may
favor its own citizens in times of shortage."'"4
Perhaps an even more "particularized" inquiry is warranted.
Review of natural resources precedent counsels that a narrowly-defined "natural resources exception" is consistent with the market
340. Id. at 253-54. See infrd note 367 for a criticism of this passage.
341. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir.
1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
342. Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980) and Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982)). Citation to Sporhase based on Lycoming's
recycling efforts was improper. On review of an order of dismissal, the court was bound to
accept as true Swin's allegation that: "In applying for the grant, Lycoming represented that it
would establish a recycling facility, but it has not done so." Complaint at 4, Swin Resource
Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 678 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (No. 87-1565). See
supra note 7 and accompanying text for the standard of review.
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participant doctrine's theoretical underpinnings 34 3 (contrary to the
Third Circuit's dicta). Natural resources precedent can be explained
roughly on two grounds: (1) each citizen has a unique claim of equal
access to the Nation's natural resources; and (2) left unchecked,
each state could limit the interstate movement of local natural resources by parochial regulation.
Beginning with the second ground, the fact that the cases of
natural resource "hoarding" involved state regulation of the flow of
all privately-owned natural resources weakens their precedential
value when a state preference takes the form of market participation.344 On point is Hicklin v. Orbeck,3 " where the Supreme Court
declined to announce a per se rule against the preferential distribunatural resources. 47 Notably, the state
tion of state-owned"
"owner" of natural resources possesses a lesser capacity to hoard its
natural resources than the state "regulator" of the same. A state's
capacity to "hoard" is cabined not only by the extent of its ownership interest, but also by the limits placed on its ability to condition
343. Thus far, a natural resources exception has attracted at leave five advocates. See,
e.g., Coenen, supra note 112, at 454-58; Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 48, at 810-13; Geo.
Note, supra note 63, at 577-79; Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 121, at 616-22. Kovacs, Anderson, and Meyers advocate that landfills should be included within the exception.
344. See supra note 65.
345. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
346. See supra note 102 for a useful definition of nonfictional ownership. Fictional ownership has no place in the analysis.
347. Compare Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 530-31, 533 (1978) (unanimous decision) (crediting Alaska's ownership interest, but finding Alaska's scheme of preferential distribution too attenuated with such interest) with New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,
455 U.S. 331 (1982) (state ownership of river too tenuous to support local preference by private electricity generator). See generally Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court,
The Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 7982 (1979) (reading Hicklin as supportive of the proposition that the Commerce Clause does
not forbid states from preferring their residents in the distribution of state-owned natural resources under some conditions); Varat, supra note 63, at 498 (finding that at most, Hicklin
supports the view that through ownership states share "some undefined portion of the autonomy possessed by private proprietors"). Significantly, the Court in Hicklin indicated that "a
State's ownership of the property with which the statute is concerned is a factor - although
often the crucial factor - to be considered." Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 529.
While nominal "ownership" has some place in the analysis, the commentators have split
over its significance in a market participant context. See generally Coenen, supra note 112, at
454-58 (1989) (arguing in favor of a natural resources exception based, in part, on a state's
lesser claim of "ownership"). But see generally Anson and Schenkkan, supra note 192, at 71,
92 (condoning preferential distribution of state-owned natural resources under Reeves analysis,
yet concerned that the Court should keep a close watch for state attempts to control the resource's later movement through conditional sales); Hellerstein, at '76-77 (finding Alexandria
Scrap supportive of the view that to deny states the allowance to prefer their residents in the
distribution of state-owned natural resources would "deprive States of an important attribute
of their separate existence as independent political units in the federal system . . . [and]
would undermine the relationship between the States and their residents).
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distribution downstream,84 8 i.e., once reduced to private ownership, a

state cannot compel private economic actors (natural resource owners) to deal preferentially with local residents.34 9 In addition, bringing natural resources under state "ownership" usually will entail prohibitive fiscal costs. 5

Even so, as the first ground suggests, natural resources occupy a
special position in our national economy. The degree to which certain factual variations combine may argue against extension of the
market participant rule. They are: (1) natural resource scarcity, national dependence, and limited natural resource availability through
the secondary market; and (2) minimal state risk, foresight and industry applied to create natural resources. Doctrinally, what these

factual variations suggest is the. complement of that suggested in
Part IV above: market participation involving natural resources will,
at times, implicate to a greater extent nationalist values safeguarded
by the dormant Commerce Clause while, at the same time, a state's
sovereign claim to prefer its constituency will be minimal. The test
illustrates the very essence of the market participant doctrine:
Heightened concerns with state sovereignty coupled with a reduced
threat to nationalist and free trade values not only compel extension
of the market participant rule in certain instances, but also counsel

against extension when certain factual variations readjust the
balance.35 '
A heightened regard for equal access to natural resources de-

rives from the free trade and national unification values embodied in
the dormant Commerce Clause. "Naturally" limited in supply, na348. See generally supra Part IV.A.2.b. and infra Part V.C.
349. See supra note 73.
350. See generally supra Part IV.A.l.a. discussing how the expensiveness of state market participation may serve to limit proliferation. The timber, gas, and oil reserves "owned" by
Alaska in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, and Hicklin v. Orbeck pre-

sent an exception. The timber, gas, and oil producing lands were granted to Alaska by the
federal government as a contribution to Alaska's statehood. See supra note 102. Absent any
expense to the state, one might argue that a state's sovereign claim to prefer its residents is
reduced. See infra note 351.
351. The Ninth Circuit appears to have struck the proper balance in Shell Oil Co. v.
City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1987). Shell involved a 3.9 mile stretch of
pipeline traversing the City of Santa Monica under its streets. Id. at 1054. Pursuant to a
franchise arrangement with Shell, Santa Monica raised its fee for the right to transport oil
under its streets. Id. The court properly denied market participant status. Heightened national
interests stemmed from the fact that the lands owned by the City were recognized transportation corridors and that the high cost of securing alternate delivery (partly because natural
resources were involved) gave the City a considerable degree of monopoly power. Id. at 1057.
In addition, the City's sovereign interest was limited because the lands had been acquired by
dedication and not through purchase. Id. at 1058 n.5. See generally Coenen, supra note 112,

at 451 n.335.
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ture has blessed certain states with a greater abundance of such vital
resources as natural gas, coal, and crude oil, to name a few. 5 2 Pro-

fessor Coenen suggests that the Nation enjoys an inchoate claim of
nondiscriminatory access to each state's natural resources: "Our con-

ception of nationhood entails states as being equals - not in natural
abundance but in the opportunity to be productive."3 53 Restrictions
on access to a state's natural resources are considerably more severe

than restrictions on access to a state's subsidies or state-manufactured goods. In fact, restrictions on access to a state's natural resources are even more severe than restrictions on access to a state's
local purchasing and sales markets through burdensome, protectionist regulation. Such restrictions have the potential of foreclosing not
only an isolated market (the state), but also have the potential of
foreclosing competition entirely by withdrawing the factors of production necessary to compete. Perhaps the Reeves Court recognized
this fact when it stated that "South Dakota has not sought to limit
access to the State's limestone or other material necessary to make
cement . . . nor does South Dakota possess unjique access to the
materials needed to produce cement. 3 54
States also enjoy a lesser sovereign claim to prefer their residents in access to natural resources located within their borders as a

matter of geological fortuity.

55

The intrinsic value of natural re-

sources is supplied not by human intervention, but by nature. "[Nat352. One author details the statistical distribution of natural resources within the United
States:
Six states - Montana, Wyoming, Illinois, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania - contain 76% of the country's coal. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
DEMONSTRATED RESERVE BASE OF COAL IN THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY 1.

1976 6 (1981). Montana and Wyoming alone contain 40%. Id. Louisiana and
Texas hold approximately 51% of the nation's proved natural gas reserves. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS AND NATURAL

GAS LIQUIDS RESERVES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 18, Table 9 (1981). Those two
states plus Alaska account for approximately 67% of proved natural gas
reserves. See id. Approximately 87 % of total estimated proved crude oil reserves
lie beneath Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, and California. See id. at 14, Table 6.
Geo. Wash. Note. supra note 121, at 620 n.132.
353. Coenen, supra note 112, at 456 ("Major concern of tho commerce clause" was to
"avoid[] any state's exploitation of its geographical or resource pcsition 'to the disadvantage
and displeasure of [its] less strategically situated neighbors.' ") (citing TRIBE, supra note 61, §
6-8, at 423)); see also U. Pa. Comment, supra note 320, at 1329 ("The lone fact that the
Paleozoic era deposited more coal under Pennsylvania than New Jersey gives Pennsylvanians
no greater claim to the coal's use.").
354. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980).
355. Cf. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 383 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1989) ("Unlike a manufactured product or the provision of a human service, a state does not
have the ability to develop a natural resource if it has not had the fortuity to be favored with
such a resource."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
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ural] resources exist without the need for communal cooperation. 356
Thus, to speak of the value found in condoning state preferences as
57
an incentive toward experimentation, risk, foresight, and industry
generally is misplaced in a natural resources context. Since nature
supplies a natural resource's primary economic value, to sanction
preferential distribution might be to discourage experimentation in
conservation technologies and to remove any incentive to maximize
the resource's value to the state or to the nation.358 On the other
hand, if a state devotes considerable effort to conserve its natural
resources, then such natural resources may have "some indicia of a
good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its
own citizens in times of shortage." ' 9 It is quite different, however,
for a state to justify preferential access to its natural resources based
wholly on a nominal "ownership" interest, as there is an obvious incentive for states to "own" natural resources for the sole purpose of
hoarding.
When state market participation involves natural resources, a
blanket exception is not advocated. In fact, Hicklin v. Orbeck 6 0
counsels against the notion that resident preferences cannot be maintained as an extension of a state's "ownership" of natural resources. 61 The point is that when natural resources are implicated,
certain factual variations may readjust the market participant balance in favor of traditional dormant Commerce Clause review.
Turning to the facts of Swin, when state market activity can be
characterized by other than nominal state "ownership" of natural
resources and, when, in light of the natural resources implicated
(plentiful or scarce), the national interest in nondiscriminatory access is reduced, the combination of these two factual variations fails
to readjust the balance in favor of applying a natural resources exception. To say that natural resources are "involved" in the Lycoming landfill says little of the national interest in nonpreferential dis356. Varat, supra note 63, at 555-56 ("Indeed, to the extent that these natural blessings
provide the states in which they are found with a sounder tax base and greater economic
potential, residents already enjoy a relative advantage over nonresidents. A further advantage
is not deserved, nor is one necessary to fulfill state responsibilities, just because the resources
happen to be located within the state.").
357. See supra text accompanying note 61 and notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
358. See Gergen, supra note 119, at 1112-13 (questioning the preferential distribution
of natural resources as a means toward conservation).
359. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982) (case where Nebraska's conservation efforts served to preserve a continuing supply of ground water). See
supra note 295 for a discussion of Sporhase.
360. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
361. See supra note 345-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hicklin.
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tribution or Lycoming's sovereign claim to prefer its residents. Most
production operations undertaken by public and private participants
will include natural resources in one form or another. A better approach is to ask whether the state is "participating in the market for
natural resources" or purchasing natural resources in the free market as "factors of production" (or, through vertical integration, some
combination of the two).
Consider two polar positions: (1) when a state "participates in
the market for natural resources," at times local preferences derive
solely from its "ownership" interest such that the state can be seen
as controlling the distribution of resources "which by happenstance
are found there[;]" 3 62 (2) when, however, a state purchases resources
in the free market as "factors of production," al. times the state can
be seen as controlling the distribution of "the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on
raw materials." 3 3 In Reeves, cement was distinguished from natural
resources such as coal, timber, wild game, or minerals not because
natural resources are absent in cement, but because: (1) the cement
was the end product of a costly state spending program; and (2)
South Dakota did not possess unique access to the component natural resources, i.e., limestone, water, etc.
The "complex process" language offered by the Court in Reeves
has received criticism because it fails to account for the fact that
"[t]he extraction of natural gas for example, could hardly occur except through a 'complex process whereby a costly physical plant and
human labor act on raw materials.' "64 After all, what the extraction/processing of natural resources such as natural gas, coal, crude
oil, and mineral deposits has in common with the manufacture of
cement or the construction of a landfill, is thai each in varying degrees combines productive inputs of labor and machinery with natural resources owned by the state. These programs, however, offer
factual variations that affect the market participant balance
differently.
The national interest in nondiscriminatory access to natural resources will tend to vary proportionately with natural resource scarcity and national dependence, and inversely with resource availabil362. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 448 n.2. (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Geo. Wash. Note, supra note 121,
at 621 (finding both natural gas and slurried coal "arguably governed by the Reeves exemption"). But see Coenen, supra note 112, at 460 (finding natural gas the "archetype of a natural resource located by happenstance in only a few states").
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ity through the secondary market. Land available for landfill sites
simply is not "scarce" in the same sense that natural gas, coal, and
crude oil are "scarce." Specifically, while there is a present and
growing shortage of landfill capacity,3n " each state presently possesses land available, or which could be made available, for landfill
sites. Inapposite are principles against state "hoarding." When a
natural resource is not unique to any one state,3 6 states that leave
their like resources undeveloped enjoy a lesser claim of nondiscrimi-

natory access to a neighboring state's publicly-owned resources, especially when access entails substantial social and environmental
costs. As such, the potential for retaliation and interstate discord are
reduced. Moreover, to suggest that landfill sites are natural resources

because: (1) siting is complicated by heavy regulation in the states;
(2) social antipathy and the ever-growing "not in my back yard"
(NIMBY) effort inhibit siting; and (3) local zoning ordinances limit

the availability of land, would be misplaced, as these are "artificial"
factors dictated not by nature but by local social and political decisions . 6 7 For the definition of landfills as natural resources to vary
nationally based on artificial factors would present a curious situation: the individual states could claim nondiscriminatory access simply by altering local social and political decisions. The national interest in nondiscriminatory access to natural resources must be defined
as a product of natural or geological scarcity. Following Reeves,
neither Lycoming nor Pennsylvania possess unique access to the nat-

ural resources needed for participation in the landfill disposal
365. Two commentators have noted some recent statistics:
Since 1978 an estimated 14,000 municipal solid waste landfills have closed. Today, approximately 5500 operating landfills handle 187 million tons of municipal
solid waste annually. By the year 2013, only 1003 of these landfills will be operating and will have a capacity to handle only nineteen million tons of municipal
waste annually.
Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 781-82 (citing statistics from DRAFT EPA MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE REPORT, SUBMITTED FOR PEER REVIEW TO UNITED STATES EPA MUNICIPAL

11.3.D. Landfill (May 20, 1988)).
366. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980) (observing that South Dakota
did not possesses "unique access" to the materials necessary for the manufacture of cement);
see also Coenen, supra note 112, at 461 (referring to landfills, Professor Coenen notes that
"all states have them").
367. But see Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 63, at 810-13 ("The complexity of the
[siting] process, coupled with NIMBY-ism, makes the development of new sites almost impossible. Conversely, such difficulties make the delivery of landfill services at any operation site a
true natural resource.); but see also Bradford C. Mank, Out-of- State Trash: Solid Waste and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25, 49 (1990) (reading the Swin
opinion as one advocating restrictions on interstate commerce where local scarcity is a product
of "artificial" factors, i.e., where political, not geological, factors are responsible for the scarcity). This author reads the statements by the Swin majority differently. See supra text accompanying note 340 and infra note 371.
SOLID WASTE TASK FORCE PEER REVIEWERS, ch.

96

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1992

market.
A state's sovereign interest to prefer its constituency was
credited by the Supreme Court in Reeves: "[T]o rob South Dakota
of the intended benefit of its risk, foresight and industry . . .would
be to discourage similar state projects . . .[with] no indication, and
no way to know, that private industry would have moved into
[Reeve's] market area, and would have assured a supply of cement
to [Reeves]."368 The Court's language suggests that states should be
given the sovereign flexibility to design programs to meet local demands, and that state initiative is particularly desirous where market
s 9 No one doubts
risks or imperfections deter private market entry E
a
state's police authority to regulate in a nonprotectionist manner the
conditions of local solid waste disposal, or a state's authority to dedicate land for specific uses. In addition, no one doubts the local constituency's influence in the landfill siting process. While perfectly legitimate, each of these factors serves to constrain landfill siting.
These factors (while irrelevant in defining a natural resource) argue
in favor of affording states greater sovereign flexibility. Indeed,
where free market forces fail to provide adequately for local demands, this is precisely where state experimentation and creativity is
most needed. Conversely, where the market is operating properly
and state participation simply displaces private ventures, such as
might be the- case in the natural gas, coal, and crude oil markets,
then the need for state experimentation and creativity serves less to
justify a program. Since the primary value of these resources is supplied by nature, there is little reason to expect that they will remain
unexploited .370
In sum, state participation in the landfill disposal market does
not invoke core constitutional concerns with the "hoarding" of natural resources. This is true because: (1) residents of one state have a
weak claim of nondiscriminatory access to another state's public
landfills; and (2) a state has a sovereign right to enjoy the benefits of
its risk, foresight and industry, especially when entering a market
368. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 (1980).
369. Id. at 446. See also supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
370. An interesting analogy exists with Pennsylvania tax law. To stimulate local industry, Pennsylvania exempts local "manufacturing" activities from its capital stock and franchise
taxes. See PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 72, § 7602(a) (1990). The exemption, however, does not extend
to the appropriation of an article that is provided by nature. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Welsh Mountain Mining & Kaolin Mfg. Co., 108 A. 722 (Pa. 1919) (mining nonexempt);
Commonwealth v. National Oil Co. Ltd., 27 A. 374 (Pa. 1893) (capital invested in crude oil
production nonexempt); Commonwealth v. Custer City Chemical Co., 16 Dauph. 46 (Pa. C.P.
1913) (timber foresting nonexempt).
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characterized by high regulatory, economic, political, and social barriers. So long as: (1) a state does not burden private participation in
the landfill disposal market with direct, protectionist regulation; (2)
a state does not use its superior economic resources to regulate the
market indirectly by creating competitive barriers to entry; and (3)

the states generally possess geologically suitable land available for
privately-owned landfills, 1' then a state's participation in the landfill
disposal market will not encroach established constitutional bounda-

ries. The Lycoming facility satisfies this test.
C. Is Lycoming Regulating "Upstream"?
Herein lies the primary area of disagreement between the twoJudge majority and the dissenting Judge in Swin. Contention centered on whether the Lycoming preferential rate schedule was an

attempt at regulating outside the narrowly-defined market in which
Lycoming maintained a proprietary interest. Specifically, was
Lycoming by its rate structure attempting to govern the private eco-

nomic relationships of its trading partners, i.e., Swin's transactions
with its New Jersey waste suppliers, and thereby dictating private

economics choices?"' 2 Answering in the negative, the majority held
that despite incidental effects on trade, at no time did the Lycoming
pricing scheme, "by [its! own terms, regulate what may be done

with the garbage outside the market transactions in which Lycoming
engaged." 37 The Chief Judge, unpersuaded, could find no principled
way to distinguish Lycoming's market participation from that held
invalid in Wunnicke,37 4 save that the former hindered pre-purchase
371. Counsel for Swin did not plead statistical facts tending to prove geological scarcity.
This would not, however, have made a difference, for the majority decried the use of an availability factor. See supra text accompanying note 340 where the court found landfill availability
complicated by local political choices. To be sure, landfill availability is a product of local
political choices, but it also is a product of other factors, see supra note 367 and accompanying
text, including geological scarcity. The majority's analysis is incomplete because it fails to
acknowledge that landfill availability is indeed pertinent to the analysis to the extent availability is a product of geological happenstance. Perhaps the court might have spoken in less absolute terms should the availability of geologically suitable land change.
372. Conduct of this nature offends the private trader's right to select freely those with
whom he shall trade. See supra notes 73, 106-08, and text accompanying note 64.
373. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (emphasis added). The Swin majority distinguished
Wunnicke on grounds that "the state's conditions on sales of state timber, by their own terms,
set down rules as to what may be done with the timber." Id. (emphasis added).
374. The Chief Judge understood the pricing scheme as an attempt to restrict the
amount of out-of-state waste accepted by Pennsylvania waste processors disposing at the
Lycoming landfill. The dissent was convinced that this was merely a scheme governing the
"private economic relationships of [Lycoming's] trading partners," specifically, transactions
between Swin and its waste suppliers in New Jersey. Id. at 259 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
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activity ("upstream regulation") and that the latter hindered postpurchase activity ("downstream regulation"). Was Lycoming, as a
seller in the market, restraining upstream transactions and, if so, was
it regulating upstream? 7 5
The Chief Judge cannot be faulted for observing that the
Lycoming rate structure "restric[ed] waste processors from purchasing waste from outside the county and state3 7 6 and, therefore, had
the plain effect of dictating the terms of trade between Swin and its
foreign waste suppliers. Indeed, Swin had the option either of altering its economic relationships with foreign suppliers or suffering the
penalty of a prohibitively high rate for continued disposal rights.
With this, the dissent found "upstream regulation. 3 77 The majority
disagreed and noted that "Lycoming's conditions on what garbage
may be dumped in its landfill [did] not, by their own terms, regulate
what may be done with the garbage outside of the market transaction in which Lycoming is engaged. 378
Neither position is completely correct. While the dissenting
Judge accurately describes the practical market effects of Lycoming's pricing policy, a finding of "upstream regulation" does not necessarily follow and is assailable on grounds that virtually all commercial decisions of a downstream industry produce incidental ripple
effects upstream. The majority's statement fails to consider that "upstream" regulation can be accomplished indirectly and that the market effect of Lycoming's rate schedule is indistinguishable from what
might be considered a more forthright policy of announcing that
processors and/or transporters of foreign waste limit their transactions with foreign waste suppliers. Each policy by its terms will restrain upstream transactions and will discriminate against commerce
based on origin. The Court in Wunnicke did not suggest that conditions on the immediate transaction have no regulatory effect, but
that conditions unaccompanied by a legitimate proprietary interest
have a greater regulatory effect insofar as they restrain transactions
outside the narrowly-defined market in which the state participates.3 79 Such conditions can be seen as "attempt[s] [at] govern[ing]
375. The test for downstream regulation is set forth supra Part IV.A.2.b. These principles apply with equal force when upstream regulation is alleged.
376. Swin, 883 F.2d at 259 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077
(1990).
377. Id.
378. Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (emphasis added).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. The Court in Wunnicke distinguished
White by noting that Alaska's "restriction on private economic activity takes place after the
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the private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners"
380
in violation of well-settled constitutional doctrine.
By amending its rate schedule, Lycoming restrained private upstream transactions in the waste transportation market. Once a restraint is found, the second phase of the analysis looks to whether
the restraint is supported by a proprietary interest between Lycoming and Swin's New Jersey waste transporters, or whether the restraint can be dismissed as necessary and incidental to Lycoming's
proprietary interest in its transactions with Swin. The latter serves to
justify this particular restraint. It is helpful to begin by asking
whether proprietary reasons exist germane to Lycoming's landfill
operations for adopting the discriminatory trade policy. Numerous
legitimate proprietary reasons immediately appear. First, foreign
wastes are a source of public animosity, as well as a source of additional solid waste transportation through the local environs."8 ' A
plan of discriminatory access is a rational means to appease the local
constituency. Second, due to the natural limitations on any landfill
and the unpredictability of future disposal needs, the prudent landfill
operator reasonably might seek to conserve landfill space and forego
short-term profits for assured long-term capacity.382 Likewise, foreign waste rather than local waste is the probable candidate for such
cutbacks. And last, it is reasonable for a publicly-owned landfill operator to consider the needs of the local constituency first when the
local constituency has provided funding for a landfill.38 3 While not
exhaustive, this list serves to demonstrate that just as the private
trader "has a greater interest . . . in the immediate transaction than
it has in what its purchaser does with the goods after the State no
longer has an interest in them[,] ' 38 4 if a decision made by a state
seller in the market is rationally related to its market operations,
then there is less cause to complain that the resulting interstate burcompletion of the parties' direct commercial obligations, rather than during the course of an
ongoing commercial relationship in which [Boston] retained a continuing proprietary interest
in the subject of the contract." South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 99 (1984) (emphasis added). Alaska had ventured beyond merely choosing its trading
partners and was seen as attempting to govern the separate, private economic relationships of
its trading partners. Id. Similar concerns arise when a state conditions pre-purchase activity
before the establishment of direct commercial obligations. See infra text accompanying note
387.
380. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 99; see also supra text accompanying note 64 and note 73
for precedent against state regulation governing with whom private economic actors might
deal.
381. See Swin, 883 F.2d at 253 n.3 (citing sources of public antipathy toward landfills).
382. See supra note 26.
383. See generally supra Parts IV.A. and IV.A.1.
384. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984).
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dens are regulatory in nature.
The test of "upstream regulation" must be sensitive to the fact
that many business decisions involve coercion of a sort in restraint of
trade.3a 5 The Swin court should have focused less on the terms of the
restraint and their propensity to restrain private transactions and
more on whether the resulting market influence comported with established concepts of private trade in the waste disposal industry.
When legitimate proprietary bases germane to the market participant's business serve to justify a restraint, ensuing "upstream burdens" should be considered necessary and incidental and not in derogation of a private trader's right to choose its trading partners freely.
The fact that similar restraints are commonplace within the industry
forecloses any claim that they are beyond the realm of allowable
commercial burdens. "Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as
proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce
Clause." ' Lycoming's rate policy withstands a claim of "upstream
regulation."
An example of invalid "upstream regulation" under this definition should serve as an insightful contrast. Suppose that a hypothetical state-owned and operated landfill adopts a policy of selling disposal rights only to those waste processors who wiill accept waste from,
and transport processed waste via, local waste transporters. Such a
policy would likely fall under the weight of Wunnicke because the
state can be seen as using its economic leverage in the landfill disposal market to regulate private transactions in the "upstream" waste
transportation market.38 7 The waste transportation market is outside
the narrowly-defined landfill disposal market 'because no rationally
related proprietary basis germane to the state's landfill operations
supports the policy. 88 Without a proprietary basis to justify the upstream restraint, the trade policy is less like an exercise of the cus385. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
386. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980).
387. In Wunnicke, South-Central Timber, Inc. wanted to 'purchase Alaskan timber. The
options presented to South-Central were either to forego the purchase, or purchase with the
understanding that they would have to process locally. If South-Central opted for purchase,
then Alaska would set the "terms of trade" "downstream" by including a condition subsequent
in the contract. In either instance (the hypothetical or Wunnicke), once the decision to
purchase is reached, the buyer's discretion in its separate economic dealings is equally constrained. See also supra notes 119-20 to see how conditional state subsidization raises similar
regulatory concerns.
388. Of course, this is subject to change. Alaska's downstream restraint in Wunnicke
would fail this test as there was no proprietary basis germane toits operations in the timber
sales market to explain the restraint.
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tomary right of the private trader to choose its trading partners and
is more like an attempt at regulating private economic choices.
VI.

Recent Decisions and Congressional Policy Implications

Two recent decisions have applied the market participant exception to uphold discriminatory state buy-local legislation. Both present difficult questions of market participation. This Part begins with
a statement of the facts and holdings of each of these recent decisions and continues with a commentary on their holdings measured
against the test of market participation offered in Part IV. The Part
ends with a summary of current congressional activity addressing the
problems associated with the interstate transportation of solid waste.
Implications for state market participants will conclude the Article.
A.

Recent Decisions

The Third Circuit recently addressed the Pennsylvania Steel
Products Procurement Act 89 ("Steel Act") in Trojan Technologies,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania.390 The Steel Act provides that:
Every public agency shall require that every contract document
for the construction . . .of public works contain a provision
that, if any steel products are to be used or supplied in the performance of the contract, only steel products as herein defined
shall be used or supplied in the performance of the contract or
any subcontracts thereunder.3 91
The Steel Act defines "public agency" broadly to include not only
Commonwealth departments, boards, commissions, and agencies, but
also Commonwealth counties, cities, boroughs, townships, school districts, and any other governmental unit or district."9 "Steel products" likewise is defined broadly to include: "Products rolled,
formed, shaped, drawn, extruded, forged, cast, fabricated or otherwise similarly processed . . . from steel made in the United States
. . .or containing steel components." 393 Willful violators are prohibited from submitting bids to a public agency for a period of five
years from the date of the determination of a violation. 394
Appellant, Trojan Technologies, Inc. ("Trojan"), a manufac389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

§§ 1881-87 (Supp. 1991).
916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1884(a) (Supp. 1991).
Id. § 1886.
Id.
Id. § 1885(b).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
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turer of ultraviolet light water disinfection systems comprised of less
than 15% steel components, sought an injunction and a declaration
of the Steel Act's unconstitutionality measured against the dormant
Commerce Clause.395 Responding to the Commonwealth's claim of
market participant status, Trojan argued that the Commonwealth itself was not a buyer of the disinfection systems and that Trojan's
customers were local governmental units distinct from the Commonwealth.396 Drawing on this distinction, Trojan maintained that the
397
Commonwealth was regulating actors other than itself.
The court rejected Trojan's argument and the analysis offered
by the Seventh Circuit in W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi398 upon
which Trojan relied. Thus creating a conflict in the circuits, W.C.M.
Window is a case invalidating an Illinois preference law and withholding market participant immunity, whereas Trojan is a case upholding analogous provisions of the Pennsylvania Steel Act under the
same doctrine.
In W.C.M. Window, Judge Posner addressed a discriminatory
Illinois preference law providing that a contractor on "any public
works project or improvement for the State of Illinois or any political
subdivision, municipal corporation or other governmental unit
thereof shall employ only Illinois laborers on such project or improvement." '9 9 Violation of the preference law 'was a misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum jail sentence of 30 days and a maximum
fine of $500.00.400 Thus, for purposes of market participant analysis,
W.C.M. Window is materially indistinguishable from Trojan - both
involve state preference laws that apply to political subdivisions
without regard to the source of funding used to sustain the statutory
preference. Also, both contain penalty provisions for noncompliance.
While neither court explored the theoretical significance of the
penalty provisions, the significance the courts afforded the source of
funding used to sustain the statutory preferences serves to distinguish their holdings. The Seventh Circuit held that:
The difference between the state's preferring state residents in
its own dealings and forcing local agencies to do so in theirs is
both analytical and quantitative. When the project on which the
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v.Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. deS. Ct. 2814 (1991).
Id.at 910.
Id.
730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 489 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 271 (1981)).
400. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 274).

395.
nied, III
396.
397.
398.
399.
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state impresses a home-state preference is undertaken by a unit
of local government without any state financial support or supervision, the state is not a participant in the project but a regulator. And since more public contracting in the states is done at
the local level, by cities, school districts, park districts, counties,
etc., than at the state level, extending Reeves and White to cases
where the state's relationship to its local agencies is purely regulatory could do great damage to the principles of free trade on
40 1
which the negative commerce clause is based.
The court in Trojan disagreed and could "find no compelling analytical difference between a local government unit and central state
4 2
agencies. Both exist only through affirmative acts of the state.
Building upon this "alter ego" theory, the court continued:
Under Pennsylvania law it is clear that the local bodies covered
by the statute exist only by grace of state authority and with
such powers as the state affirmatively provides, We see no reason why, attendant on making such affirmative grants of power,
the Commonwealth may not also restrict the contracting authority of such local bodies. Imposing such restrictions on central
state agencies certainly would be permitted and we do not be40 3
lieve restrictions on local bodies stand in any different light.
Moreover, the court felt that White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, Inc.404 supported the legislation:
If employees of a private contractor can be thought to be in relationship with the city [of Boston], we think it equally clear
that suppliers of a local public entity can be thought to be "sup405
plying for the state.
Thus, as a concomitant to Pennsylvania's regulatory control over local municipalities, the court in Trojan believed that Pennsylvania
could impose limits on municipal contracting authority under the
market participant doctrine.
The most recent case upholding discriminatory state buy-local
0 6 Big
legislation is Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Education.'
Country involved the constitutionality of an Alaskan preference statute that required schools which receive state funds to purchase lo401. Id. at 496.
402. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, I II S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
403. Id. (footnote omitted).
404. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
405. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911.
406. 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992).
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cally-harvested dairy products when the bid was no more than 7 %
higher than bids for dairy products harvested out-of-state. 0 7 The
funds at issue originated from the federal government and were
channeled by the State of Alaska to its school districts."°8
Appellant, Big Country Foods, Inc. ("Big Country"), a distributor of Washington-harvested milk, submitted the lowest milk bid to
Anchorage School District for the 1988-89 school year. 0 9 A higher

bid was submitted by an Alaskan-owned supplier of Alaska-harvested milk, but the bid was less than 7 % higher than Big Country's
bid and was accepted pursuant to the preference statute.""0 Big

Country proffered three arguments opposing application of the market participant rule: (1) the Alaska statute regulates the purchase of
milk by local school boards - entities distinct from the State; (2)
the milk purchases were made possible by federal funding; and (3)
Alaska, in directing preferential purchasing, was acting in a distinct
"governmental" or "regulatory" capacity." 1
The Ninth Circuit understood the first argument as the argument rejected in Trojan and adopted that court's. analysis. 1 2 On the
issue of federal funding, the court was unable to find congressional
approval for the preference similar to that found by the Supreme
Court in White."' Absent such approval, the court interpreted
White as commanding a single inquiry: whether the Alaskan pro-

gram constituted direct state participation in the market.' 1 ' The
court held that it did."1 5 Last, the court rejected Big Country's con-

tention that Alaska was acting in a distinct "governmental" or "regulatory" capacity since Alaska's influence wa:s confined to state
purchases.'
407. Id. at 1175 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 36.15.050 (1988)).
408. Federal funding was accomplished through the Federal School Breakfast Program,
42 U.S.C. § 1771 et seq. (1978), and the National School Lunch Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1751
et seq. (1978).
409. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1992).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1177-78.
412. Id. at 1178-79.
413. Id. at 1180; see also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for the Supreme
Court's analysis in White.
414. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 1992).
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1180-81. Big Country's third argument would seem to beg the question of
state market participation/regulation and will not be discussed at length. To the extent, however, that Big Country was arguing that Alaska was regulating simply because it accomplished
its preference through regulation, its argument must fail. After all, this is how states and their
political subdivisions operate irrespective of whether or not such operations are proprietary in
nature.
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1. Were Trojan and Big Country Decided Correctly?-The
Third Circuit in Trojan appreciated that Pennsylvania municipalities
and political subdivisions are subject to statutory limitations on their
authority. For the most part, this was the beginning and end of the
court's inquiry. Sub silentio the court conferred a form of derivative
market participant status on the Commonwealth bottomed on a theory that municipalities are creatures of the state and, if a municipality is a market participant, then the Commonwealth acting through
it, or on it, also is a market participant. This conceptual leap, however, gives inadequate weight to the nexus requirement which serves
to establish proprietary conduct - that the costs of a preference are
borne by those preferred. 17 Recall that it is the equitable redistribution of benefits back to those whose funding has made the benefits
possible that champions market participant immunity. 18 By overlooking the source of funding of the statutory preference, the court
in Trojan failed to recognize that local municipalities often fund
purchases through revenues collected exclusively from municipal taxpayers and, yet, under the Steel Act, Pennsylvania residents as a
whole are the beneficiaries of the mandated preferential disbursement of these revenues. In this respect, restrictions on local bodies do
indeed "stand in a different light" than restrictions on the activities
of central state agencies that receive their funding from state residents as a group. With this loose redistributional interest, the provisions of the Steel Act appear regulatory in operation, and Pennsylvania's sovereign claim to prefer its residents as a whole is reduced. 1 9
In addition, the expensiveness check42 0 is somewhat deflated because
of the relative efficiency by which Pennsylvania may legislate to provide for state-wide preferences in the absence of any direct responsibility for funding.
A second problem with the Steel Act is that it contains penalty
provisions enforceable only by the Commonwealth. The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania recently has reaffirmed that penalty clauses in
private contracting are unenforceable as against public policy.""
417. See generally supra Part IV.A.l. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802-03 (1992), holding that Oklahoma acts as a market
participant when directing the purchasing decisions of state agencies, offers no support for
Pennsylvania's position. The state agency in Wyoming was a public utility owned by the State
of Oklahoma.
418. See supra notes 60-61, 194-96, 200-01 and accompanying text.
419. See generally supra Parts 1V.A. and IV.A.I.
420. See generally supra Part IV.A.I.a.
421. See Holt's Cigar Co. v. 222 Liberty Assoc., 591 A.2d 743, 747- 49 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (articulating the public policy against the enforcement of penalty clauses in actions ex
contractu).
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Since the penalty provisions of the Steel Act govern all public contracting and are implied in every public contract, public agencies
have a means of assuring nonbreach beyond the means available to
private parties. As such, the concept of evenhandedness 4 22 counsels
against the extension of market participant immunity.
A third problem is with downstream restraints. First, based on
the characteristics of the public contractor's/supplier's steel purchasing decisions - per job or in bulk - the potential exists for a statutory preference for American-made steel to work its way into downstream private contracting when the latter method of purchasing
prevails. Second, the Steel Act applies to products containing steel
components.4 23 As a result, products containing American-made
steel are likely to be preferred with an unintended preference extending to non-steel components permanently affixed to these products. With such a wide net thrown by a state, the potential to restrain downstream transactions absent a supporting proprietary
interest increases. The degree of downstream regulation should have
factored into the court's market participant equation.
And last, the court's reliance on White emphasizes the importance of beginning the analysis of market participation with the
question of spending. The Third Circuit's statement that "suppliers
of a local public entity can be thought to be 'supplying for the
state'
may indeed serve to rebut a claim of downstream regulation. It serves little, however, to support the proprietary nature of the
activity from which a downstream restraint originates. After all, the
question of downstream regulation presupposes proprietary activity
coupled with a coercive downstream restraint. All things considered,
Trojan was not an easy case. The Seventh Circuit in W.C.M. Window chose to search for a nexus between state or local spending and
the entity claiming market participant status. Such an approach
comports nicely with market participant theory.
Nor was Big Country an easy case. Citing Trojan, the Ninth
Circuit began by dispensing with Big Country's contention that
Alaska was regulating entities (school boards) distinct from the
State. 25 As in Trojan, the court failed to focus on the source of
422. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; see alsc supra note 298 where the
Ninth Circuit was presented with analogous statutory provisions inWashington State Bldg. &
Constr. Traders Council v.Spellman.
423. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1886 (1971).
424. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
425. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir.
1992).
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funding used to sustain the statutory preference and thus failed to
identify a critical factual distinction between Trojan and Big Country. Pennsylvania could be seen as regulating in Trojan because a
statutory preference often may have been funded by local taxpayers
a source distinct from the Commonwealth at-large. Conversely,
the funding in Big Country was appropriated by Congress for the
states with final state distribution to their school districts."2" Theoretically, it makes sense for market participant immunity purposes to
distinguish between state mandated preferential distribution of municipal revenues and state mandated preferential distribution of federal revenues appropriated to the states. The concept of redistribution suggests as much. Thus viewed, it was unnecessary for the
Ninth Circuit to reject W.C.M. Window and follow the Third Circuit's reasoning in Trojan, for both cases were distinguishable. A
citation to White should have sufficed.
The court in Big Country saved its citation to White for a much
broader proposition in response to Big County's second contention
that Congress did not "affirmatively sanction" the preferential distribution of the federal funds to local milk suppliers: "In the absence of
such congressional approval, and there is none in this case, White
commands "a single inquiry: whether the challenged 'program constitute[s] direct state participation in the market.' "27 In further
support, the court cited Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County'2 8 as precedent, rejecting "that the presence of federal funding ma[kes] the market participant exception inapplicable." 29 As
suggested above,' 30 the analysis in Swin was superficial and unhelpful. The error is compounded in Big Country because there is no
indication from pertinent federal statutes suggesting an intention to
confer a preferential benefit on local milk suppliers.
The Ninth Circuit "recognize[d] that there are strong public
policy arguments to the contrary" and noted that "[i]t may be asserted with some logic that the use of federal as opposed to state or
local funding allows Alaska to reap where in has not sown.' 31 Professor Coenen's "sowing and reaping" rationale, 432 however, is more
426. Id. at 1173, 1175, 1179 n.5; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1753, 1773 (1978).
427. Id. at 1180.
428. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
429. Big Country, i52 F.2d at 1180 (citing Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County, 883 F.2d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990)).
430. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
431. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Coenen, supra note 112, at 441).
432. See Coenen, supra note 112, at 423 ("As a matter of both equity and accepted
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than simply a policy argument to be used when arguing for or
against application of the market participant exception. Metaphorically, it expresses a state's redistributional interest and, hence, is
central to the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings. When funding
derives from federal sources, a state's redistributional interest is limited not only by the Commerce Clause, but also by Congress' authority to condition distribution pursuant to its Spending Power. Absent
affirmative sanction, to add a preference to Congress' design after
funds are appropriated and distributed conflits with Congress'
Spending Power and runs the risk of thwarting congressional intent.4 33 Moreover, when federal monies fund state programs, each
national citizen can expect to retain a redistributional interest to the
full extent Congress has not conferred it elsewhere. State usurpation
of this interest implicates national unification goals.
Big Country presents another difficult issue of market participation. As a matter of market participant theory, when states spend
federal funds they should be allowed to discriminate in favor of local
residents absent dormant Commerce Clause constraints only when
acting pursuant to "affirmative sanction" by Congress. States already receive the benefits of federal subsidization; it is difficult to
understand why they should derive additional unintended benefits.
B.

Congressional Policy Implications

The national solid waste disposal situation has drawn attention
from Congress in the past.434 Recently, Congress has begun to address, with particularity, the problems associated with the interstate
transport of solid waste. Last Congress, Congressman Luken sponsored House Bill 3735435 which would reauthorize the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act43 6 (RCRA). The reauthorization plan would require the states to develop twenty-year "solid
waste management plans" for the recycling and disposal of solid
waste.43 7 Those states with approved plans which could certify that
notions of the nature of property, the citizens of a state may reap where they have sown.").
433. In Big Country, Congress can be seen as funding both Alaska's breakfast and lunch
programs and the relative inefficiency of the State's local milk suppliers. Funding of the latter,
of course, affects the efficacy of the former. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
434. See The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 690187 (1977); The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59 (1965). For a
description of the purposes of these Acts, see generally Keith E. Johnston, Comment, State
Embargo of Solid Waste: Impermissible Isolation or Rational 5olution to a Pressing Problem?, 82 DiCK. L. REv. 325, 328-32 (1978).
435. H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
436. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1977).
437. See H.R. 3735, at § 302; see also Geo. Note, supra note 63, at 581-90 (interpreting
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they had completed construction on faciliiies to provide at least 70%
of the capacity for recycling, incineration, and disposal of their
state's solid waste disposal needs and which could further certify
that they had completed siting approval on facilities to provide
100% of such needed capacity, could block the import of out-ofstate waste - the carrot. 4 8 Those states that failed to submit acceptable plans would be prohibited from exporting trash - the
stick.' 3 9 In the words of the sponsor of the Bill: "States who have not
taken responsibility of their garbage and think they can continue to
pass the buck on to other states will have a rude awakening when
they are unable to export their problem."" 0
Congressman Swift has introduced House Bill 3865441 in the
current Congress to continue the course of reauthorizing RCRA. Bill
3865 resembles Bill 3735, yet offers a more moderate and politically
saleable approach by providing tempered and eclectic incentives for
state compliance. Again, the states are directed to develop "solid
waste management plans" for- the recycling and disposal of solid
waste, but only for a ten-year period." 2 Interstate compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance for the management of solid
waste are permitted." 3 States with plans submitted within 30
months of enactment and approved within 12 months thereafter have
the option of either: (1) charging discriminatory fees for out-of-state
waste at rates no higher than specified capped limits and in amounts
based on the greater of the importing or exporting state's "waste
surcharge;' ' 444 or (2) imposing limitations (freezes) on the quantity
of imported solid waste which limits may not be less than the quantity being imported when the decision to limit imported waste is
made, 44 and with a provision whereby local municipalities or political subdivisions are granted authority to "opt out" of the state mandated limitation. 446 Bill 3865 also includes cumbersome permit, manifest, and inspection provisions for those states that export 30% or
the Luken Bill and offering several suggested improvements).
438. H.R. 3735, at § 303(e)(l)(A).
439. H.R. 3735, at § 303(f).
440. News Release from Congressman Tom Luken (Ohio - 1st District) (January 23,
1990).
441. H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
442. H.R. 3865, at § 102.
443. H.R. 3865, at § 4013(h).
444. Waste surcharge is defined as the "total of the highest fees, taxes, surcharges, and
other charges imposed by a State government on a ton of municipal solid waste generated and
disposed of in that State." H.R. 3865, at § 4013(b)(2).
445. H.R. 3865, at § 4013(k).
446. H.R. 3865, at § 4013(k)(5).
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more of the solid waste generated annually within the state. 4 7
This Congress also has seen the introduction of Congressman
Boucher's House Bill 3952 and its recent amendment by subcommittee into Bill 3865, replacing Bill 3865's provisions governing the interstate transportation of solid waste."4 8 The Boucher Bill offers an
alternate approach to interstate movement of solid waste by affording local municipalities and political subdivisions -- not states - the
authority to decide whether out-of-state waste will be accepted at a
new local facility.4 49 Only those facilities operating in compliance
with newly-promulgated Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
minimum standards for all municipal solid waste landfills 45 0 can ac451
cept interstate waste.
By sanctioning discriminatory waste surcharges, the Swift Bill
(pre-Amendment) creates an profound incentive toward state selfsufficiency analogous to, but less harsh than, the earlier Luken proposal. Supporters of the Swift proposal thus believe that each state
presently has the means to provide for its own solid waste disposal
needs, for it would be inequitable to penalize states that must export
(with discriminatory fees). Absent an interstate compact, discriminatory surcharges for the interstate disposal of waste, even that within
traditional or otherwise rational wasteshed areas, would receive congressional imprimatur irrespective of whether interstate transport
would provide for environmentally superior or environmentally comparable disposal. States without surcharges would need to adopt such
charges and could leverage their discrimination by adopting relatively high charges. The Boucher Bill, however, concentrates on the
environmentally safe disposal of waste and reduces the incentive toward state self-sufficiency by leaving to individual local state municipalities and political subdivisions the authority to limit importation.
The Boucher Bill also contemplates the potential economic incentives
toward larger, regional landfills created by new EPA regulations.
In the end, the environmental and economic costs and benefits
of preserving the interstate market must be weighed against the environmental and economic costs and benefits of eliminating interstate
transport and the extent to which the costs under this latter approach may be ameliorated through interstate compacts. But more
447. H.R.
448. H.R.
full vote by the
449. H.R.
450. EPA
451. H.R.

3865, at § 40136).
3952, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). At the time this Article was sent to print,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce was pending.
3865, at § 4013(a) (Boucher amendment).
Criteria for Municipal Waste Landfills, 40 C.F.R. § 258 (1991).
2865, at § 4013(b) (Boucher amendment).
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significant for market participant doctrine analysis, what these
House Bills represent is not only the political responsiveness of the
Legislative Branch of federal government, but what always looms
ultimate as the final constraint on state market participant activity
- the Commerce Power.

